Alexis Garapin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexis Garapin has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Olivier Bonroy
Université Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, UMR GAEL, Grenoble, France
2 shared publications Daniel Llerena
Grenoble Alpes University, INRA GAEL, Grenoble France
1 shared publication- Nicolas Pasquier
Bordeaux School of Economics, University of Bordeaux, Pessac, France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 93 (4) , 585-614
Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
- 9 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 93 (4) , 585-614
Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment
- 2 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 13 (2) , 197-216
Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence
This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information.
- 2 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 13 (2) , 197-216
Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence
This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information.