GDGregory DeAngelo

Gregory DeAngelo

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Gregory DeAngelo has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • URBAN TRANSPORT AND CRIME: EVIDENCE FROM UNANTICIPATED MASS TRANSIT STRIKES

    by Gregory DeAngelo, Kaj Gittings, Daniel S. Grossman, Umair Khalil

    We examine the effects of mass transit strikes on criminal behavior in Los Angeles County utilizing a unique dataset of reported crimes between 2000 and 2007. Geocoded location and time information pertaining to each offense accommodates a fine grained difference‐in‐differences panel data analysis. We find that in locations affected by the strike, aggravated assaults rose by 18.7% while aggregate property crimes increased by 5.7%, relative to their mean. This increase in crime was disproportionately larger in lower income neighborhoods, which report higher usage of mass transit, suggesting local isolation of both criminals and victims as a mechanism. (JEL J52, K42, K31)


  • Open Access

    Explaining Public Goods Game Contributions with Rational Ability

    by Hannes Lang, Gregory DeAngelo, Michelle Bongard

    As the link between psychology and economics has grown, so too has research on the link between personality traits and economic behavior. We build on this previous work, bringing to light the relationship between personality traits and contributions in a one-shot public goods game. We find that contributions to the public good are smaller for rational participants as measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory—revised 40 (REI-40) item scale. We find no effect on contributions for the measures of the Big Five personality traits or the remaining measures from the REI-40.


  • Open Access

    Theory of Mind and General Intelligence in Dictator and Ultimatum Games

    by Hannes Lang, Gregory DeAngelo, Michelle Bongard

    Decreasing social sensitivity (i.e., the ability of a person to perceive, understand, and respect the feelings and viewpoints of others), has been shown to facilitate selfish behavior. This is not only true for exogenous changes in social sensitivity, but also for social sensitivity influenced by someone’s social cognition. In this analysis, we examined one measure of social cognition, namely a person’s Theory of Mind (ToM), to examine differences in decision-making in standard non-strategic and strategic environments (dictator and ultimatum games). We found that participants with higher ToM gave a greater share in the non-strategic environment. In the ultimatum game, however, ToM showed no correlation with the offers of the ultimators. Instead, we found that general intelligence scores—measured by the Wonderlic test—shared a negative, albeit weak, correlation with the amount offered in the ultimatum game. Thus, we find that lower social cognition is an important explanatory variable for selfish behavior in a non-strategic environment, while general intelligence shares some correlation in a strategic environment. Similar to the change in social sensitivity created by a specific game design, social sensitivity influenced by individual personality traits can influence behavior in non-strategic environments.


  • EXAMINING REGULATORY CAPTURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE NHL

    by Gregory DeAngelo, Adam Nowak, Imke Reimers

    Regulatory capture has garnered significant attention, but poses a difficult empirical exercise since most relationships between regulators and regulated parties occur behind closed doors. In this research, we overcome this problem by analyzing an environment where the behavior of both the regulator and regulated parties are publicly available. Specifically, we utilize data from the National Hockey League (NHL) to examine the impact of general experience as a referee as well as experience refereeing a particular team on the assignation of penalties. We find that gaining general experience as a referee significantly reduces the number of penalties that a referee assigns. However, as a referee gains experience refereeing a specific team, they significantly reduce the number of penalties assessed to this team relative to teams that they have less experience refereeing, confirming that regulatory capture is observed among referees and teams in the NHL. (JEL G18, L51, K42)