Hannes Lang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Hannes Lang has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gregory DeAngelo
Department of Economics, 1601 University Avenue, Morgantown, WV 26506, USA
2 shared publications - Michelle Bongard
RAND Corporation, 4570 Fifth Ave #600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
2 shared publications - Beth Freeborn
Economist, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington DC 20580
1 shared publication - David Wuepper
Land Economics Group, Institute for Food and Resource Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
1 shared publication Emmanuel Benjamin
1 shared publication- Emmanuel Olatunbosun Benjamin
Aglobe Development Center (ADC) and Universität der Bundeswehr München (UniBw M) , Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Economic Inequality
- Vol. 18 (4) , 571-584
Ancestral Ways of Life and Human Capital Formation in Kenya
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Economic Inequality
- Vol. 18 (4) , 571-584
Ancestral Ways of Life and Human Capital Formation in Kenya
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Ecosystem Services
- Vol. 35, 52-66
Determinants of the environmental conservation and poverty alleviation objectives of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Ecosystem Services
- Vol. 35, 52-66
Determinants of the environmental conservation and poverty alleviation objectives of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs
- Open Access
Explaining Public Goods Game Contributions with Rational Ability
As the link between psychology and economics has grown, so too has research on the link between personality traits and economic behavior. We build on this previous work, bringing to light the relationship between personality traits and contributions in a one-shot public goods game. We find that contributions to the public good are smaller for rational participants as measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory—revised 40 (REI-40) item scale. We find no effect on contributions for the measures of the Big Five personality traits or the remaining measures from the REI-40.
Open AccessExplaining Public Goods Game Contributions with Rational Ability
As the link between psychology and economics has grown, so too has research on the link between personality traits and economic behavior. We build on this previous work, bringing to light the relationship between personality traits and contributions in a one-shot public goods game. We find that contributions to the public good are smaller for rational participants as measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory—revised 40 (REI-40) item scale. We find no effect on contributions for the measures of the Big Five personality traits or the remaining measures from the REI-40.
- Open Access
Theory of Mind and General Intelligence in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
Decreasing social sensitivity (i.e., the ability of a person to perceive, understand, and respect the feelings and viewpoints of others), has been shown to facilitate selfish behavior. This is not only true for exogenous changes in social sensitivity, but also for social sensitivity influenced by someone’s social cognition. In this analysis, we examined one measure of social cognition, namely a person’s Theory of Mind (ToM), to examine differences in decision-making in standard non-strategic and strategic environments (dictator and ultimatum games). We found that participants with higher ToM gave a greater share in the non-strategic environment. In the ultimatum game, however, ToM showed no correlation with the offers of the ultimators. Instead, we found that general intelligence scores—measured by the Wonderlic test—shared a negative, albeit weak, correlation with the amount offered in the ultimatum game. Thus, we find that lower social cognition is an important explanatory variable for selfish behavior in a non-strategic environment, while general intelligence shares some correlation in a strategic environment. Similar to the change in social sensitivity created by a specific game design, social sensitivity influenced by individual personality traits can influence behavior in non-strategic environments.
Open AccessTheory of Mind and General Intelligence in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
Decreasing social sensitivity (i.e., the ability of a person to perceive, understand, and respect the feelings and viewpoints of others), has been shown to facilitate selfish behavior. This is not only true for exogenous changes in social sensitivity, but also for social sensitivity influenced by someone’s social cognition. In this analysis, we examined one measure of social cognition, namely a person’s Theory of Mind (ToM), to examine differences in decision-making in standard non-strategic and strategic environments (dictator and ultimatum games). We found that participants with higher ToM gave a greater share in the non-strategic environment. In the ultimatum game, however, ToM showed no correlation with the offers of the ultimators. Instead, we found that general intelligence scores—measured by the Wonderlic test—shared a negative, albeit weak, correlation with the amount offered in the ultimatum game. Thus, we find that lower social cognition is an important explanatory variable for selfish behavior in a non-strategic environment, while general intelligence shares some correlation in a strategic environment. Similar to the change in social sensitivity created by a specific game design, social sensitivity influenced by individual personality traits can influence behavior in non-strategic environments.
- 7 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (4) , 1833-1867
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO‐STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Multiperiod models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We present the first experimental test of a two‐stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. This prediction is based on the belief that if the penalty for the first offenses is sufficiently low, the agent should commit the offense and continue to offend if undetected. Our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. (JEL C91, K42, K10)
- 7 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (4) , 1833-1867
PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO‐STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
Multiperiod models of criminal enforcement based on the standard economic approach of Becker (1968) generally find that the optimal penalty structure is either flat or declining. We present the first experimental test of a two‐stage theoretical model that predicts decreasing penalty structures will yield greater deterrence than increasing penalty structures. This prediction is based on the belief that if the penalty for the first offenses is sufficiently low, the agent should commit the offense and continue to offend if undetected. Our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that decreasing fine structures are more effective at reducing risky behavior. (JEL C91, K42, K10)