Kiyoshi Tamaki
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kiyoshi Tamaki has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marcos Curty
University of Vigo
10 shared publications - Margarida Pereira
University of Vigo
8 shared publications - Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo
University of Vigo
7 shared publications Akihiro Mizutani
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Information Technology R&D Center, 5-1-1 Ofuna, Kamakura-shi, Kanagawa 247-8501, Japan
5 shared publications- Go Kato
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
4 shared publications - Akihiro Mizutani
University of Toyama
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 8 (3) , L032045
Phase-error-estimation security framework for quantum key distribution with correlated sources
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) modulators introduce correlations between consecutively emitted pulses due to bandwidth limitations, violating key assumptions underlying many security proof techniques. Here, we address this problem by introducing a simple yet powerful mathematical framework to directly extend phase-error-estimation-based security proofs for imperfect but uncorrelated sources to also incorporate encoding correlations. Our framework overcomes important limitations of previous approaches in terms of generality and rigor, significantly narrowing the gap between theoretical security guarantees and real-world QKD implementations.
- 15 September 2026
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 8 (3) , L032045
Open AccessPhase-error-estimation security framework for quantum key distribution with correlated sources
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) modulators introduce correlations between consecutively emitted pulses due to bandwidth limitations, violating key assumptions underlying many security proof techniques. Here, we address this problem by introducing a simple yet powerful mathematical framework to directly extend phase-error-estimation-based security proofs for imperfect but uncorrelated sources to also incorporate encoding correlations. Our framework overcomes important limitations of previous approaches in terms of generality and rigor, significantly narrowing the gap between theoretical security guarantees and real-world QKD implementations.
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Optica Publishing Group in Optica Quantum
- Vol. 3 (6) , 525
Security framework for quantum key distribution with imperfect sources
Imperfect bit-and-basis encoders compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems via modulation flaws, side channels, and inter-pulse correlations, which invalidate standard security proofs. Existing results addressing such imperfections suffer from critical limitations: they either consider only specific flaws, offer an unreasonably poor performance, or require the protocol to be run very slowly. Here, we present a finite-key security proof approach against coherent attacks that incorporates general bit-and-basis encoding imperfections (including modulation flaws, side channels, and inter-pulse correlations) while achieving significantly better performances than previous approaches and requiring only partial characterization.
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Optica Publishing Group in Optica Quantum
- Vol. 3 (6) , 525
Security framework for quantum key distribution with imperfect sources
Imperfect bit-and-basis encoders compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems via modulation flaws, side channels, and inter-pulse correlations, which invalidate standard security proofs. Existing results addressing such imperfections suffer from critical limitations: they either consider only specific flaws, offer an unreasonably poor performance, or require the protocol to be run very slowly. Here, we present a finite-key security proof approach against coherent attacks that incorporates general bit-and-basis encoding imperfections (including modulation flaws, side channels, and inter-pulse correlations) while achieving significantly better performances than previous approaches and requiring only partial characterization.
- Open Access
- 2 June 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (3) , 035034
Quantum key distribution with imperfectly isolated devices
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak information to the channel due to device imperfections or the active action of an eavesdropper. Here, we solve this pressing issue by introducing a security proof in the presence of information leakage from all state preparation settings for arguably the most popular QKD scheme, namely the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The proof requires minimal experimental characterization, as only a single parameter related to the isolation of the source needs to be determined, thus providing a clear path for bridging the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, if information about the state of the side channels is available, this can be readily incorporated into the analysis to further improve the resulting performance.
- 2 June 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (3) , 035034
Open AccessQuantum key distribution with imperfectly isolated devices
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak information to the channel due to device imperfections or the active action of an eavesdropper. Here, we solve this pressing issue by introducing a security proof in the presence of information leakage from all state preparation settings for arguably the most popular QKD scheme, namely the decoy-state BB84 protocol. The proof requires minimal experimental characterization, as only a single parameter related to the isolation of the source needs to be determined, thus providing a clear path for bridging the gap between theory and practice. Moreover, if information about the state of the side channels is available, this can be readily incorporated into the analysis to further improve the resulting performance.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (3) , 035002
Loss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Current implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically rely on prepare-and-measure (P&M) schemes. Unfortunately, these implementations are not completely secure, unless security proofs fully incorporate all imperfections of real devices. So far, existing proofs have primarily focused on imperfections of either the light source or the measurement device. In this paper, we establish a security proof for the loss-tolerant P&M QKD protocol that incorporates imperfections in both the source and the detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate the security of this scheme when the emitted states deviate from the ideal ones and Bob’s measurement device does not meet the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment to characterise the detection efficiency mismatch of commercial single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation state of the input light, and determine the expected secret key rate in the presence of state preparation flaws when using such detectors. Our work provides a way towards guaranteeing the security of actual implementations of widely deployed P&M QKD.
- 22 April 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (3) , 035002
Open AccessLoss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Current implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically rely on prepare-and-measure (P&M) schemes. Unfortunately, these implementations are not completely secure, unless security proofs fully incorporate all imperfections of real devices. So far, existing proofs have primarily focused on imperfections of either the light source or the measurement device. In this paper, we establish a security proof for the loss-tolerant P&M QKD protocol that incorporates imperfections in both the source and the detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate the security of this scheme when the emitted states deviate from the ideal ones and Bob’s measurement device does not meet the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment to characterise the detection efficiency mismatch of commercial single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation state of the input light, and determine the expected secret key rate in the presence of state preparation flaws when using such detectors. Our work provides a way towards guaranteeing the security of actual implementations of widely deployed P&M QKD.
- Open Access
- 14 October 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (1) , 015001
Quantum key distribution with unbounded pulse correlations
Typical security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the emitted signals are independent and identically distributed. In practice, however, this assumption is not met because intrinsic device flaws inevitably introduce correlations between the emitted signals. Although analyses addressing this issue have been recently proposed, they only consider a restrictive scenario in which the correlations have a finite and known maximum length that is much smaller than the total number of emitted signals. While it is expected that the magnitude of the correlations decreases as the pulse separation increases, the assumption that this magnitude is exactly zero after a certain point does not seem to have any physical justification. Concerningly, this means that the available analyses cannot guarantee the security of current QKD implementations. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a rigorous framework that, when combined with existing results, can guarantee security against pulse correlations of unbounded length. Our framework is rather general and could be applied to other situations for which the existing analyses consider a scenario that differs slightly from the actual one.
- 14 October 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (1) , 015001
Open AccessQuantum key distribution with unbounded pulse correlations
Typical security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the emitted signals are independent and identically distributed. In practice, however, this assumption is not met because intrinsic device flaws inevitably introduce correlations between the emitted signals. Although analyses addressing this issue have been recently proposed, they only consider a restrictive scenario in which the correlations have a finite and known maximum length that is much smaller than the total number of emitted signals. While it is expected that the magnitude of the correlations decreases as the pulse separation increases, the assumption that this magnitude is exactly zero after a certain point does not seem to have any physical justification. Concerningly, this means that the available analyses cannot guarantee the security of current QKD implementations. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a rigorous framework that, when combined with existing results, can guarantee security against pulse correlations of unbounded length. Our framework is rather general and could be applied to other situations for which the existing analyses consider a scenario that differs slightly from the actual one.
- Open Access
- 22 December 2023
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 9 (1) , 015025
Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect phase randomisation
The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multiphoton emissions, due to the photon-number-splitting attack. The most efficient solution, the decoy-state method, requires that the phases of all transmitted pulses are independent and uniformly random. In practice, however, these phases are often correlated, especially in high-speed systems, which opens a security loophole. Here, we address this pressing problem by providing a security proof for decoy-state QKD with correlated phases that offers key rates close to the ideal scenario. Our work paves the way towards high-performance secure QKD with practical laser sources, and may have applications beyond QKD.
- 22 December 2023
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 9 (1) , 015025
Open AccessSecurity of quantum key distribution with imperfect phase randomisation
The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multiphoton emissions, due to the photon-number-splitting attack. The most efficient solution, the decoy-state method, requires that the phases of all transmitted pulses are independent and uniformly random. In practice, however, these phases are often correlated, especially in high-speed systems, which opens a security loophole. Here, we address this pressing problem by providing a security proof for decoy-state QKD with correlated phases that offers key rates close to the ideal scenario. Our work paves the way towards high-performance secure QKD with practical laser sources, and may have applications beyond QKD.
- Open Access
- 27 April 2023
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 5 (2) , 023065
Modified BB84 quantum key distribution protocol robust to source imperfections
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. However, despite enormous theoretical and experimental efforts in the past decades, the security of this protocol with imperfect sources has not yet been rigorously established. In this paper, we address this shortcoming and prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of multiple source imperfections, including state preparation flaws and side channels, such as Trojan-horse attacks, mode dependencies and classical correlations between the emitted pulses. To do so, we consider a modified BB84 protocol that exploits the basis mismatched events, which are often discarded in standard security analyses of this scheme; and employ the reference technique, a powerful mathematical tool to accommodate source imperfections in the security analysis of QKD. Moreover, we compare the achievable secret-key rate of the modified BB84 protocol with that of the three-state loss-tolerant protocol, and show that the addition of a fourth state, while redundant in ideal conditions, significantly improves the estimation of the leaked information in the presence of source imperfections, resulting in a better performance. This paper demonstrates the relevance of the BB84 protocol in guaranteeing implementation security, taking us a step further towards closing the existing gap between theory and practice of QKD.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 5 (2) , 023065
Open AccessModified BB84 quantum key distribution protocol robust to source imperfections
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is the most widely implemented quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme. However, despite enormous theoretical and experimental efforts in the past decades, the security of this protocol with imperfect sources has not yet been rigorously established. In this paper, we address this shortcoming and prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of multiple source imperfections, including state preparation flaws and side channels, such as Trojan-horse attacks, mode dependencies and classical correlations between the emitted pulses. To do so, we consider a modified BB84 protocol that exploits the basis mismatched events, which are often discarded in standard security analyses of this scheme; and employ the reference technique, a powerful mathematical tool to accommodate source imperfections in the security analysis of QKD. Moreover, we compare the achievable secret-key rate of the modified BB84 protocol with that of the three-state loss-tolerant protocol, and show that the addition of a fourth state, while redundant in ideal conditions, significantly improves the estimation of the leaked information in the presence of source imperfections, resulting in a better performance. This paper demonstrates the relevance of the BB84 protocol in guaranteeing implementation security, taking us a step further towards closing the existing gap between theory and practice of QKD.
- Open Access
Quantum key distribution with correlated sources
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security. In practice, however, it does not due to the discrepancies between the assumptions used in the security proofs and the behaviour of the real apparatuses. Recent years have witnessed a tremendous effort to fill the gap, but the treatment of correlations among pulses has remained a major elusive problem. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrarily long-range pulse correlations. Our method is compatible with those security proofs that accommodate all the other typical device imperfections, thus paving the way towards achieving implementation security in QKD with arbitrary flawed devices. Moreover, we introduce a new framework for security proofs, which we call the reference technique. This framework includes existing security proofs as special cases and it can be widely applied to a number of QKD protocols.
Open AccessQuantum key distribution with correlated sources
In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security. In practice, however, it does not due to the discrepancies between the assumptions used in the security proofs and the behaviour of the real apparatuses. Recent years have witnessed a tremendous effort to fill the gap, but the treatment of correlations among pulses has remained a major elusive problem. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrarily long-range pulse correlations. Our method is compatible with those security proofs that accommodate all the other typical device imperfections, thus paving the way towards achieving implementation security in QKD with arbitrary flawed devices. Moreover, we introduce a new framework for security proofs, which we call the reference technique. This framework includes existing security proofs as special cases and it can be widely applied to a number of QKD protocols.
- Open Access
- 7 December 2021
- Published by Verein zur Forderung des Open Access Publizierens in den Quantenwissenschaften in Quantum
- Vol. 5, 602-27
Security of quantum key distribution with intensity correlations
The decoy-state method in quantum key distribution (QKD) is a popular technique to approximately achieve the performance of ideal single-photon sources by means of simpler and practical laser sources. In high-speed decoy-state QKD systems, however, intensity correlations between succeeding pulses leak information about the users' intensity settings, thus invalidating a key assumption of this approach. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a general technique to incorporate arbitrary intensity correlations to the security analysis of decoy-state QKD. This technique only requires to experimentally quantify two main parameters: the correlation range and the maximum relative deviation between the selected and the actually emitted intensities. As a side contribution, we provide a non-standard derivation of the asymptotic secret key rate formula from the non-asymptotic one, in so revealing a necessary condition for the significance of the former.
- 7 December 2021
- Published by Verein zur Forderung des Open Access Publizierens in den Quantenwissenschaften in Quantum
- Vol. 5, 602-27
Open AccessSecurity of quantum key distribution with intensity correlations
The decoy-state method in quantum key distribution (QKD) is a popular technique to approximately achieve the performance of ideal single-photon sources by means of simpler and practical laser sources. In high-speed decoy-state QKD systems, however, intensity correlations between succeeding pulses leak information about the users' intensity settings, thus invalidating a key assumption of this approach. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a general technique to incorporate arbitrary intensity correlations to the security analysis of decoy-state QKD. This technique only requires to experimentally quantify two main parameters: the correlation range and the maximum relative deviation between the selected and the actually emitted intensities. As a side contribution, we provide a non-standard derivation of the asymptotic secret key rate formula from the non-asymptotic one, in so revealing a necessary condition for the significance of the former.
- 6 July 2021
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 104 (1) , 012406
Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory
The core of security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the estimation of a parameter that determines the amount of privacy amplification that the users need to apply in order to distill a secret key. To estimate this parameter using the observed data, one needs to apply concentration inequalities such as random sampling theory or Azuma's inequality. The latter can be straightforwardly employed in a wider class of QKD protocols, including those that do not rely on basis-independent sources such as the loss-tolerant (LT) protocol. However, when applied to real-life finite-length QKD experiments, Azuma's inequality typically results in substantially lower secret-key rates. Here we propose an alternative security analysis of the LT protocol against general attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent versions, that is based on random sampling theory. Consequently, our security proof provides considerably higher secret-key rates than the previous finite-key analysis based on Azuma's inequality. This work opens up the possibility of using random sampling theory to provide alternative security proofs for other QKD protocols.
- 6 July 2021
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 104 (1) , 012406
Finite-key analysis of loss-tolerant quantum key distribution based on random sampling theory
The core of security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the estimation of a parameter that determines the amount of privacy amplification that the users need to apply in order to distill a secret key. To estimate this parameter using the observed data, one needs to apply concentration inequalities such as random sampling theory or Azuma's inequality. The latter can be straightforwardly employed in a wider class of QKD protocols, including those that do not rely on basis-independent sources such as the loss-tolerant (LT) protocol. However, when applied to real-life finite-length QKD experiments, Azuma's inequality typically results in substantially lower secret-key rates. Here we propose an alternative security analysis of the LT protocol against general attacks, for both its prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent versions, that is based on random sampling theory. Consequently, our security proof provides considerably higher secret-key rates than the previous finite-key analysis based on Azuma's inequality. This work opens up the possibility of using random sampling theory to provide alternative security proofs for other QKD protocols.