Akihiro Mizutani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Akihiro Mizutani has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kiyoshi Tamaki
University of Toyama
3 shared publications - Marcos Curty
University of Vigo
3 shared publications - Yuki Takeuchi
NTT Communication Science Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 3-1 Morinosato Wakamiya, Atsugi, Kanagawa 243-0198, Japan
3 shared publications - Go Kato
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
2 shared publications Kiyoshi Tamaki
Univ Toyama, Fac Engn, Gofuku 3190, Toyama 9308555, Japan
2 shared publications- Ryo Hiromasa
Mitsubishi Electric
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 7 (4)
Security loophole in error verification in quantum key distribution
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is evaluated based on the secrecy of Alice's key and the correctness of the keys held by Alice and Bob. A practical method for ensuring correctness is known as error verification, in which Alice and Bob reveal a portion of their reconciled keys and check whether the revealed information matches. In this paper, we point out that when error verification is performed in a QKD protocol, the definition of secrecy must be revised accordingly. We illustrate the necessity of this revision with a counterexample, showing that neglecting it can lead to an incorrect security claim. In particular, we observe that in the case of the security proof method based on phase error correction, which is one of the mainstream approaches and also known as Koashi's approach, no explicit method has been established to properly incorporate the revised secrecy definition. To resolve this issue, we present a way to translate the phase error correction-based approach into another mainstream approach, called the leftover hash lemma-based approach, also known as Renner's approach, where a solution has already been formulated. As a consequence, security proofs under the phase error correction-based approach automatically remain valid without any change in the secret key length, even if they implicitly consider error verification without revising the secrecy definition.
- 2 December 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 7 (4)
Open AccessSecurity loophole in error verification in quantum key distribution
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is evaluated based on the secrecy of Alice's key and the correctness of the keys held by Alice and Bob. A practical method for ensuring correctness is known as error verification, in which Alice and Bob reveal a portion of their reconciled keys and check whether the revealed information matches. In this paper, we point out that when error verification is performed in a QKD protocol, the definition of secrecy must be revised accordingly. We illustrate the necessity of this revision with a counterexample, showing that neglecting it can lead to an incorrect security claim. In particular, we observe that in the case of the security proof method based on phase error correction, which is one of the mainstream approaches and also known as Koashi's approach, no explicit method has been established to properly incorporate the revised secrecy definition. To resolve this issue, we present a way to translate the phase error correction-based approach into another mainstream approach, called the leftover hash lemma-based approach, also known as Renner's approach, where a solution has already been formulated. As a consequence, security proofs under the phase error correction-based approach automatically remain valid without any change in the secret key length, even if they implicitly consider error verification without revising the secrecy definition.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 11 (1) , 015010
Finite-key security analysis of the decoy-state BB84 QKD with passive measurement
The decoy-state Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is widely regarded as the de facto standard for practical implementations. On the receiver side, passive basis choice is attractive because it significantly reduces the need for random number generators and eliminates the need for optical modulators. Despite these advantages, a finite-key analytical security proof for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, where the basis is chosen passively with a biased probability, has been lacking. In this work, we present a simple analytical finite-key security proof for this setting, yielding a closed-form secret-key rate formula that can be directly evaluated using experimentally accessible parameters. Numerical simulations show that the key rates of passive- and active-measurement implementations are nearly identical, indicating that passive measurement does not compromise key-generation efficiency in practical QKD systems.
- 26 November 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 11 (1) , 015010
Open AccessFinite-key security analysis of the decoy-state BB84 QKD with passive measurement
The decoy-state Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is widely regarded as the de facto standard for practical implementations. On the receiver side, passive basis choice is attractive because it significantly reduces the need for random number generators and eliminates the need for optical modulators. Despite these advantages, a finite-key analytical security proof for the decoy-state BB84 protocol, where the basis is chosen passively with a biased probability, has been lacking. In this work, we present a simple analytical finite-key security proof for this setting, yielding a closed-form secret-key rate formula that can be directly evaluated using experimentally accessible parameters. Numerical simulations show that the key rates of passive- and active-measurement implementations are nearly identical, indicating that passive measurement does not compromise key-generation efficiency in practical QKD systems.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (3) , 035002
Loss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Current implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically rely on prepare-and-measure (P&M) schemes. Unfortunately, these implementations are not completely secure, unless security proofs fully incorporate all imperfections of real devices. So far, existing proofs have primarily focused on imperfections of either the light source or the measurement device. In this paper, we establish a security proof for the loss-tolerant P&M QKD protocol that incorporates imperfections in both the source and the detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate the security of this scheme when the emitted states deviate from the ideal ones and Bob’s measurement device does not meet the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment to characterise the detection efficiency mismatch of commercial single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation state of the input light, and determine the expected secret key rate in the presence of state preparation flaws when using such detectors. Our work provides a way towards guaranteeing the security of actual implementations of widely deployed P&M QKD.
- 22 April 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (3) , 035002
Open AccessLoss-tolerant quantum key distribution with detection efficiency mismatch
Current implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically rely on prepare-and-measure (P&M) schemes. Unfortunately, these implementations are not completely secure, unless security proofs fully incorporate all imperfections of real devices. So far, existing proofs have primarily focused on imperfections of either the light source or the measurement device. In this paper, we establish a security proof for the loss-tolerant P&M QKD protocol that incorporates imperfections in both the source and the detectors. Specifically, we demonstrate the security of this scheme when the emitted states deviate from the ideal ones and Bob’s measurement device does not meet the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Furthermore, we conduct an experiment to characterise the detection efficiency mismatch of commercial single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation state of the input light, and determine the expected secret key rate in the presence of state preparation flaws when using such detectors. Our work provides a way towards guaranteeing the security of actual implementations of widely deployed P&M QKD.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 69 (1) , 1-37
Rewindable Quantum Computation and Its Equivalence to Cloning and Adaptive Postselection
We define rewinding operators that invert quantum measurements. Then, we define complexity classes $$\textsf{RwBQP}$$ , $$\textsf{CBQP}$$ , and $$\textsf{AdPostBQP}$$ as sets of decision problems solvable by polynomial-size quantum circuits with a polynomial number of rewinding operators, cloning operators, and adaptive postselections, respectively. Our main result is that $$\textsf{BPP}^\textsf{PP}\subseteq \textsf{RwBQP}=\textsf{CBQP}=\textsf{AdPostBQP}\subseteq \textsf{PSPACE}$$ . As a byproduct of this result, we show that any problem in $$\textsf{PostBQP}$$ can be solved with only postselections of events that occur with probabilities polynomially close to one. Under the strongly believed assumption that $$\textsf{BQP}\nsupseteq \textsf{SZK}$$ , or the shortest independent vectors problem cannot be efficiently solved with quantum computers, we also show that a single rewinding operator is sufficient to achieve tasks that are intractable for quantum computation. Finally, we show that rewindable Clifford circuits remain classically simulatable, but rewindable instantaneous quantum polynomial time circuits can solve any problem in $$\textsf{PP}$$ .- 17 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 69 (1) , 1-37
Open AccessRewindable Quantum Computation and Its Equivalence to Cloning and Adaptive Postselection
We define rewinding operators that invert quantum measurements. Then, we define complexity classes $$\textsf{RwBQP}$$ , $$\textsf{CBQP}$$ , and $$\textsf{AdPostBQP}$$ as sets of decision problems solvable by polynomial-size quantum circuits with a polynomial number of rewinding operators, cloning operators, and adaptive postselections, respectively. Our main result is that $$\textsf{BPP}^\textsf{PP}\subseteq \textsf{RwBQP}=\textsf{CBQP}=\textsf{AdPostBQP}\subseteq \textsf{PSPACE}$$ . As a byproduct of this result, we show that any problem in $$\textsf{PostBQP}$$ can be solved with only postselections of events that occur with probabilities polynomially close to one. Under the strongly believed assumption that $$\textsf{BQP}\nsupseteq \textsf{SZK}$$ , or the shortest independent vectors problem cannot be efficiently solved with quantum computers, we also show that a single rewinding operator is sufficient to achieve tasks that are intractable for quantum computation. Finally, we show that rewindable Clifford circuits remain classically simulatable, but rewindable instantaneous quantum polynomial time circuits can solve any problem in $$\textsf{PP}$$ . - Open Access
- 20 December 2024
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 6 (4)
Tight scaling of key rate for differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution
The performance of quantum key distribution protocols is evaluated based on the ease of implementation and key generation rate. Among major protocols, the differential-phase-shift (DPS) protocol has the advantage of simple implementation using a train of coherent pulses and a passive detection unit. Unfortunately, however, its key rate is known to be at least proportional to η 2 with respect to channel transmission η → 0 . If one can only prove the rate proportional to η 2 and cannot improve the analysis beyond that, then the DPS protocol will be deemed inferior to other major protocols, such as the decoy BB84 protocol. In this paper, we consider a type of DPS protocol in which the phase of each emitted block comprising n pulses is randomized and significantly improves the analysis of its key rate. Specifically, we reveal that the key rate is proportional to η 1 + 1 n − 2 and this scaling is tight. This implies that the DPS protocol can achieve a key rate proportional to η for a large number of n , which is the same scaling as the decoy BB84 protocol. Our result suggests that the DPS protocol can achieve a combination of both advantages of ease of implementation and a high key generation rate. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
- 20 December 2024
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review Research
- Vol. 6 (4)
Open AccessTight scaling of key rate for differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution
The performance of quantum key distribution protocols is evaluated based on the ease of implementation and key generation rate. Among major protocols, the differential-phase-shift (DPS) protocol has the advantage of simple implementation using a train of coherent pulses and a passive detection unit. Unfortunately, however, its key rate is known to be at least proportional to η 2 with respect to channel transmission η → 0 . If one can only prove the rate proportional to η 2 and cannot improve the analysis beyond that, then the DPS protocol will be deemed inferior to other major protocols, such as the decoy BB84 protocol. In this paper, we consider a type of DPS protocol in which the phase of each emitted block comprising n pulses is randomized and significantly improves the analysis of its key rate. Specifically, we reveal that the key rate is proportional to η 1 + 1 n − 2 and this scaling is tight. This implies that the DPS protocol can achieve a key rate proportional to η for a large number of n , which is the same scaling as the decoy BB84 protocol. Our result suggests that the DPS protocol can achieve a combination of both advantages of ease of implementation and a high key generation rate. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
- Open Access
- 14 October 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (1) , 015001
Quantum key distribution with unbounded pulse correlations
Typical security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the emitted signals are independent and identically distributed. In practice, however, this assumption is not met because intrinsic device flaws inevitably introduce correlations between the emitted signals. Although analyses addressing this issue have been recently proposed, they only consider a restrictive scenario in which the correlations have a finite and known maximum length that is much smaller than the total number of emitted signals. While it is expected that the magnitude of the correlations decreases as the pulse separation increases, the assumption that this magnitude is exactly zero after a certain point does not seem to have any physical justification. Concerningly, this means that the available analyses cannot guarantee the security of current QKD implementations. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a rigorous framework that, when combined with existing results, can guarantee security against pulse correlations of unbounded length. Our framework is rather general and could be applied to other situations for which the existing analyses consider a scenario that differs slightly from the actual one.
- 14 October 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 10 (1) , 015001
Open AccessQuantum key distribution with unbounded pulse correlations
Typical security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the emitted signals are independent and identically distributed. In practice, however, this assumption is not met because intrinsic device flaws inevitably introduce correlations between the emitted signals. Although analyses addressing this issue have been recently proposed, they only consider a restrictive scenario in which the correlations have a finite and known maximum length that is much smaller than the total number of emitted signals. While it is expected that the magnitude of the correlations decreases as the pulse separation increases, the assumption that this magnitude is exactly zero after a certain point does not seem to have any physical justification. Concerningly, this means that the available analyses cannot guarantee the security of current QKD implementations. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a rigorous framework that, when combined with existing results, can guarantee security against pulse correlations of unbounded length. Our framework is rather general and could be applied to other situations for which the existing analyses consider a scenario that differs slightly from the actual one.
- Open Access
- 10 September 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 9 (4) , 045042
Differential-phase-shift QKD with practical Mach–Zehnder interferometer
Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution stands as a promising protocol due to its simple implementation, which can be realized with a train of coherent pulses and a passive measurement unit. To implement the DPS protocol, it is crucial to establish security proofs incorporating practical imperfections in users’ devices, however, existing security proofs make unrealistic assumptions on the measurement unit using a Mach–Zehnder interferometer. In this paper, we enhance the implementation security of the DPS protocol by incorporating a major imperfection in the measurement unit. Specifically, our proof enables us to use practical beam splitters with a known range of the transmittance rather than the one with exactly 50%, as was assumed in the existing security proofs. Our numerical simulations demonstrate that even with fluctuations of ± 0.5 % in the transmittance from the ideal value, the key rate degrades only by a factor of 0.57. This result highlights the feasibility of the DPS protocol with practical measurement setups.
- 10 September 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Quantum Science and Technology
- Vol. 9 (4) , 045042
Open AccessDifferential-phase-shift QKD with practical Mach–Zehnder interferometer
Differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution stands as a promising protocol due to its simple implementation, which can be realized with a train of coherent pulses and a passive measurement unit. To implement the DPS protocol, it is crucial to establish security proofs incorporating practical imperfections in users’ devices, however, existing security proofs make unrealistic assumptions on the measurement unit using a Mach–Zehnder interferometer. In this paper, we enhance the implementation security of the DPS protocol by incorporating a major imperfection in the measurement unit. Specifically, our proof enables us to use practical beam splitters with a known range of the transmittance rather than the one with exactly 50%, as was assumed in the existing security proofs. Our numerical simulations demonstrate that even with fluctuations of ± 0.5 % in the transmittance from the ideal value, the key rate degrades only by a factor of 0.57. This result highlights the feasibility of the DPS protocol with practical measurement setups.
- Open Access
Unconditional verification of quantum computation with classical light
Verification of quantum computation is a task to efficiently check whether an output given from a quantum computer is correct. Existing verification protocols conducted between a quantum computer to be verified and a verifier necessitate quantum communication to unconditionally detect any malicious behavior of the quantum computer solving any promise problem in ${\sf BQP}$. In this paper, we remove the necessity of the communication of qubits by proposing a "physically classical" verification protocol in which the verifier just sends coherent light to the quantum computer.Open AccessUnconditional verification of quantum computation with classical light
Verification of quantum computation is a task to efficiently check whether an output given from a quantum computer is correct. Existing verification protocols conducted between a quantum computer to be verified and a verifier necessitate quantum communication to unconditionally detect any malicious behavior of the quantum computer solving any promise problem in ${\sf BQP}$. In this paper, we remove the necessity of the communication of qubits by proposing a "physically classical" verification protocol in which the verifier just sends coherent light to the quantum computer. - Open Access
Rewindable Quantum Computation and Its Equivalence to Cloning and Adaptive Postselection
We define rewinding operators that invert quantum measurements. Then, we define complexity classes ${\sf RwBQP}$, ${\sf CBQP}$, and ${\sf AdPostBQP}$ as sets of decision problems solvable by polynomial-size quantum circuits with a polynomial number of rewinding operators, cloning operators, and adaptive postselections, respectively. Our main result is that ${\sf BPP}^{\sf PP}\subseteq{\sf RwBQP}={\sf CBQP}={\sf AdPostBQP}\subseteq{\sf PSPACE}$. As a byproduct of this result, we show that any problem in ${\sf PostBQP}$ can be solved with only postselections of outputs whose probabilities are polynomially close to one. Under the strongly believed assumption that ${\sf BQP}\nsupseteq{\sf SZK}$, or the shortest independent vectors problem cannot be efficiently solved with quantum computers, we also show that a single rewinding operator is sufficient to achieve tasks that are intractable for quantum computation. In addition, we consider rewindable Clifford and instantaneous quantum polynomial time circuits.Open AccessRewindable Quantum Computation and Its Equivalence to Cloning and Adaptive Postselection
We define rewinding operators that invert quantum measurements. Then, we define complexity classes ${\sf RwBQP}$, ${\sf CBQP}$, and ${\sf AdPostBQP}$ as sets of decision problems solvable by polynomial-size quantum circuits with a polynomial number of rewinding operators, cloning operators, and adaptive postselections, respectively. Our main result is that ${\sf BPP}^{\sf PP}\subseteq{\sf RwBQP}={\sf CBQP}={\sf AdPostBQP}\subseteq{\sf PSPACE}$. As a byproduct of this result, we show that any problem in ${\sf PostBQP}$ can be solved with only postselections of outputs whose probabilities are polynomially close to one. Under the strongly believed assumption that ${\sf BQP}\nsupseteq{\sf SZK}$, or the shortest independent vectors problem cannot be efficiently solved with quantum computers, we also show that a single rewinding operator is sufficient to achieve tasks that are intractable for quantum computation. In addition, we consider rewindable Clifford and instantaneous quantum polynomial time circuits. - Open Access
Quantum key distribution with simply characterized light sources
To guarantee the security of quantum key distribution (QKD), several assumptions on light sources must be satisfied. For example, each random bit information is precisely encoded on an optical pulse and the photon-number probability distribution of the pulse is exactly known. Unfortunately, however, it is hard to check if all the assumptions are really met in practice, and it is preferable that we have minimal number of device assumptions. In this paper, we adopt the differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD protocol and drastically mitigate the requirements on light sources. Specifically, we only assume the independence among emitted pulses, the independence of the vacuum emission probability from a chosen bit, and upper bounds on the tail distribution function of the total photon number in a single block of pulses for single, two and three photons. Remarkably, no other detailed characterizations, such as the amount of phase modulation, are required. Our security proof significantly relaxes demands for light sources, which paves a route to guarantee implementation security with simple verification of the devices.
Open AccessQuantum key distribution with simply characterized light sources
To guarantee the security of quantum key distribution (QKD), several assumptions on light sources must be satisfied. For example, each random bit information is precisely encoded on an optical pulse and the photon-number probability distribution of the pulse is exactly known. Unfortunately, however, it is hard to check if all the assumptions are really met in practice, and it is preferable that we have minimal number of device assumptions. In this paper, we adopt the differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD protocol and drastically mitigate the requirements on light sources. Specifically, we only assume the independence among emitted pulses, the independence of the vacuum emission probability from a chosen bit, and upper bounds on the tail distribution function of the total photon number in a single block of pulses for single, two and three photons. Remarkably, no other detailed characterizations, such as the amount of phase modulation, are required. Our security proof significantly relaxes demands for light sources, which paves a route to guarantee implementation security with simple verification of the devices.