Stacie Friend
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Stacie Friend has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Heather J. Ferguson
University of Kent
4 shared publications Angela Nyhout
School of Psychology, University of Kent Canterbury, Canterbury, UK
2 shared publications- Gregory Currie
University of York
2 shared publications - Kris Goffin
Maastricht University
2 shared publications Abigail Pitt
School of Psychology, University of Kent Canterbury, Canterbury, UK
1 shared publication- Aino Petterson
Swedish Defense University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1-24
Chatbot-fictionalism and empathetic AI: Should we worry about AI when AI worries about us?
- 28 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1-24
Open AccessChatbot-fictionalism and empathetic AI: Should we worry about AI when AI worries about us?
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 27 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 79 (1) , 102-123
Art opening minds: An experimental study on the effects of temporal and perspectival complexity in film on open-mindedness
Aesthetic Cognitivism posits that artworks have the potential to enhance open-mindedness. However, this claim has not yet been explored empirically. Here, we present two experiments that investigate the extent to which two formal features of the film – temporal and perspectival complexity – can ‘open our minds’. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the temporal complexity of the film. Participants ( N total = 100) watched a film ( Memento ) either in its original non-chronological order or the same film in chronological order. In Experiment 2, we manipulated perspectival complexity in film. Participants ( N total = 100) watched an excerpt from a film ( Jackie Brown ) that either included the perspectives of multiple characters on an event or a single character’s perspective on the same event. Film conditions in both experiments were further compared with a control condition in which participants did not watch a film ( N = 50). Participants’ open-mindedness was assessed in both experiments through four empirical indicators (creativity, imaginability, cognitive flexibility, openness to new evidence) and in Experiment 2, participants’ eye movements, heart rate and electrodermal activity were measured while watching the film. Results showed that watching films, regardless of their temporal or perspectival complexity, modulated only one facet of open-mindedness – cognitive flexibility – when compared to the no-film control condition, providing only limited support for the aesthetic cognitivist claim that artistic films can ‘open our minds’. Real-time measures in Experiment 2 revealed that pupil size and number of fixations were modulated by perspectival complexity: both were smaller when watching a film from multiple perspectives compared to a single perspective. Possible explanations for this difference are examined in relation to the viewers’ cognitive processes involved in understanding and interpreting film content.
- 27 April 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 79 (1) , 102-123
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessArt opening minds: An experimental study on the effects of temporal and perspectival complexity in film on open-mindedness
Aesthetic Cognitivism posits that artworks have the potential to enhance open-mindedness. However, this claim has not yet been explored empirically. Here, we present two experiments that investigate the extent to which two formal features of the film – temporal and perspectival complexity – can ‘open our minds’. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the temporal complexity of the film. Participants ( N total = 100) watched a film ( Memento ) either in its original non-chronological order or the same film in chronological order. In Experiment 2, we manipulated perspectival complexity in film. Participants ( N total = 100) watched an excerpt from a film ( Jackie Brown ) that either included the perspectives of multiple characters on an event or a single character’s perspective on the same event. Film conditions in both experiments were further compared with a control condition in which participants did not watch a film ( N = 50). Participants’ open-mindedness was assessed in both experiments through four empirical indicators (creativity, imaginability, cognitive flexibility, openness to new evidence) and in Experiment 2, participants’ eye movements, heart rate and electrodermal activity were measured while watching the film. Results showed that watching films, regardless of their temporal or perspectival complexity, modulated only one facet of open-mindedness – cognitive flexibility – when compared to the no-film control condition, providing only limited support for the aesthetic cognitivist claim that artistic films can ‘open our minds’. Real-time measures in Experiment 2 revealed that pupil size and number of fixations were modulated by perspectival complexity: both were smaller when watching a film from multiple perspectives compared to a single perspective. Possible explanations for this difference are examined in relation to the viewers’ cognitive processes involved in understanding and interpreting film content.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Journal of Media Psychology
- Vol. 36 (4) , 220-230
Moral Understanding and Media
According to a widespread view in the arts and humanities, artworks are not only cognitively but also morally valuable. However, arguments for this claim often proceed with little attention to empirical evidence. At the same time, artists, filmmakers, and media creators deliberately deploy various devices to effect cognitive change; but whether these devices have the desired effects, and on whom, also remains largely untested. If we want to understand the ways that film and media can have moral impacts, we must step out of our disciplinary siloes. It is not enough for film experts, philosophers, and experimentalists to merely take note of each other’s work; collaborative interdisciplinary research is required, both to improve methods and to examine questions that have not yet been empirically explored. In this article we propose a framework for this kind of research, focusing on how media can influence moral understanding. We first outline the challenges that must be met for such research to be successful, including clarifying and operationalizing concepts, measuring moral understanding, and applying empirical methods to media and the arts. We then describe the advantages of interdisciplinary collaboration for meeting these challenges, in the context of some recent examples of interdisciplinary projects on related themes.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Journal of Media Psychology
- Vol. 36 (4) , 220-230
Moral Understanding and Media
According to a widespread view in the arts and humanities, artworks are not only cognitively but also morally valuable. However, arguments for this claim often proceed with little attention to empirical evidence. At the same time, artists, filmmakers, and media creators deliberately deploy various devices to effect cognitive change; but whether these devices have the desired effects, and on whom, also remains largely untested. If we want to understand the ways that film and media can have moral impacts, we must step out of our disciplinary siloes. It is not enough for film experts, philosophers, and experimentalists to merely take note of each other’s work; collaborative interdisciplinary research is required, both to improve methods and to examine questions that have not yet been empirically explored. In this article we propose a framework for this kind of research, focusing on how media can influence moral understanding. We first outline the challenges that must be met for such research to be successful, including clarifying and operationalizing concepts, measuring moral understanding, and applying empirical methods to media and the arts. We then describe the advantages of interdisciplinary collaboration for meeting these challenges, in the context of some recent examples of interdisciplinary projects on related themes.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
- Vol. 97 (1) , 202-220
Aesthetic Appreciation without Inversion
C. Thi Nguyen claims that although we can make aesthetic judgements based on testimony or inference, we resist doing so owing to a contingent norm of our social practice. For Nguyen, aesthetic engagement involves a ‘motivational inversion’ similar to games in which we adopt inefficient means of winning so that we can enjoy the process of playing. Similarly, he says, adopting the norm enables us to engage in the autonomous activity of appreciation. I argue that Nguyen is right that the purpose of our practice is appreciation, but wrong to think any motivational inversion is required in pursuing it.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
- Vol. 97 (1) , 202-220
Aesthetic Appreciation without Inversion
C. Thi Nguyen claims that although we can make aesthetic judgements based on testimony or inference, we resist doing so owing to a contingent norm of our social practice. For Nguyen, aesthetic engagement involves a ‘motivational inversion’ similar to games in which we adopt inefficient means of winning so that we can enjoy the process of playing. Similarly, he says, adopting the norm enables us to engage in the autonomous activity of appreciation. I argue that Nguyen is right that the purpose of our practice is appreciation, but wrong to think any motivational inversion is required in pursuing it.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 62 (2) , 257-271
Emotion in Fiction: State of the Art
In this paper, I review developments in discussions of fiction and emotion over the last decade concerning both the descriptive question of how to classify fiction-directed emotions and the normative question of how to evaluate those emotions. Although many advances have been made on these topics, a mistaken assumption is still common: that we must hold either that fiction-directed emotions are (empirically or normatively) the same as other emotions, or that they are different. I argue that we should reject this dichotomy.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 62 (2) , 257-271
Top Cited PapersEmotion in Fiction: State of the Art
In this paper, I review developments in discussions of fiction and emotion over the last decade concerning both the descriptive question of how to classify fiction-directed emotions and the normative question of how to evaluate those emotions. Although many advances have been made on these topics, a mistaken assumption is still common: that we must hold either that fiction-directed emotions are (empirically or normatively) the same as other emotions, or that they are different. I argue that we should reject this dichotomy.
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Vol. 80 (2) , 129-139
Learning Implicit Biases from Fiction
Philosophers and psychologists have argued that fiction can ethically educate us: fiction supposedly can make us better people. This view has been contested. It is, however, rarely argued that fiction can morally “corrupt” us. In this article, we focus on the alleged power of fiction to decrease one's prejudices and biases. We argue that if fiction has the power to change prejudices and biases for the better, then it can also have the opposite effect. We further argue that fictions are more likely to be a bad influence than a good one.
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Vol. 80 (2) , 129-139
Learning Implicit Biases from Fiction
Philosophers and psychologists have argued that fiction can ethically educate us: fiction supposedly can make us better people. This view has been contested. It is, however, rarely argued that fiction can morally “corrupt” us. In this article, we focus on the alleged power of fiction to decrease one's prejudices and biases. We argue that if fiction has the power to change prejudices and biases for the better, then it can also have the opposite effect. We further argue that fictions are more likely to be a bad influence than a good one.
- 31 December 2021
- Published by International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature in Scientific Study of Literature
- Vol. 11 (2) , 223-265
The effects of reading narrative fiction on social and moral cognition
We present two experiments examining the effects of reading narrative fiction (vs.narrative non-fictionvs.expository non-fiction) on social and moral cognition, using a battery of self-report, explicit and implicit indicators. Experiment 1 (N = 340) implemented a pre-registered, randomized between-groups design, and assessed multiple outcomes after a short reading assignment. Results failed to reveal any differences between the three reading conditions on either social or moral cognition. Experiment 2 employed a longitudinal design.N = 104 participants were randomly assigned to read an entire book over seven days. Outcome variables were assessed before and after the reading assignment as well as at a one-week follow-up. Results did not show any differential development between the three reading conditions over time. The present results do not support the claim that reading narrative fiction is apt to improve our general social and moral cognition.
- 31 December 2021
- Published by International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature in Scientific Study of Literature
- Vol. 11 (2) , 223-265
The effects of reading narrative fiction on social and moral cognition
We present two experiments examining the effects of reading narrative fiction (vs.narrative non-fictionvs.expository non-fiction) on social and moral cognition, using a battery of self-report, explicit and implicit indicators. Experiment 1 (N = 340) implemented a pre-registered, randomized between-groups design, and assessed multiple outcomes after a short reading assignment. Results failed to reveal any differences between the three reading conditions on either social or moral cognition. Experiment 2 employed a longitudinal design.N = 104 participants were randomly assigned to read an entire book over seven days. Outcome variables were assessed before and after the reading assignment as well as at a one-week follow-up. Results did not show any differential development between the three reading conditions over time. The present results do not support the claim that reading narrative fiction is apt to improve our general social and moral cognition.
- Top Cited Papers
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Documentary Film
- Vol. 15 (2) , 151-162
Falsehoods in film: documentary vs fiction
I claim that we should reject a sharp distinction between fiction and non-fiction according to which documentary is a faithful representation of the facts, whilst fiction films merely invite us to imagine what is made up. Instead, we should think of fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a combination of non-essential features and which influence appreciation in a variety of ways. An objection to this approach is that it renders the distinction too conventional and fragile, undermining our justification for criticising documentaries like Bowling for Columbine or The Hunting Ground for playing fast and loose with the facts. I argue that this objection is misguided, misidentifying the justification for criticising non-fiction films that mislead or deceive. I develop an alternative account that explains why we also criticise many fictions for inaccuracy.
- 4 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Documentary Film
- Vol. 15 (2) , 151-162
Top Cited PapersFalsehoods in film: documentary vs fiction
I claim that we should reject a sharp distinction between fiction and non-fiction according to which documentary is a faithful representation of the facts, whilst fiction films merely invite us to imagine what is made up. Instead, we should think of fiction and non-fiction as genres: categories whose membership is determined by a combination of non-essential features and which influence appreciation in a variety of ways. An objection to this approach is that it renders the distinction too conventional and fragile, undermining our justification for criticising documentaries like Bowling for Columbine or The Hunting Ground for playing fast and loose with the facts. I argue that this objection is misguided, misidentifying the justification for criticising non-fiction films that mislead or deceive. I develop an alternative account that explains why we also criticise many fictions for inaccuracy.
- 9 April 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 60 (4) , 403-418
Fiction and Emotion: The Puzzle of Divergent Norms
A familiar question in the literature on emotional responses to fiction, originally put forward by Colin Radford, is how such responses can be rational. How can we make sense of pitying Anna Karenina when we know there is no such person? In this paper I argue that contrary to the usual interpretation, the question of rationality has nothing to do with the Paradox of Fiction. Instead, the real problem is why there is a divergence in our normative assessments of emotions in different contexts. I argue that explaining this divergence requires a more nuanced account of the rationality of emotion than has previously been proposed. One advantage of my proposal over alternatives is that it helps to explain one way we can learn emotionally from fiction and imagination.
- 9 April 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 60 (4) , 403-418
Fiction and Emotion: The Puzzle of Divergent Norms
A familiar question in the literature on emotional responses to fiction, originally put forward by Colin Radford, is how such responses can be rational. How can we make sense of pitying Anna Karenina when we know there is no such person? In this paper I argue that contrary to the usual interpretation, the question of rationality has nothing to do with the Paradox of Fiction. Instead, the real problem is why there is a divergence in our normative assessments of emotions in different contexts. I argue that explaining this divergence requires a more nuanced account of the rationality of emotion than has previously been proposed. One advantage of my proposal over alternatives is that it helps to explain one way we can learn emotionally from fiction and imagination.