Kris Goffin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kris Goffin has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Stacie Friend
University of Edinburgh
2 shared publications - Aaron Meskin
University of Leeds
1 shared publication - Alfred Archer
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
1 shared publication Anna Ichino
Department of Philosophy, Universiteit Antwerpen, Antwerp, Belgium
1 shared publicationAnnelies Monseré
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Universiteit Gent, Ghent, Belgium
1 shared publicationFlorian Cova
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-19
Autistic injustice as affective injustice: the double empathy problem is not about empathy
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-19
Open AccessAutistic injustice as affective injustice: the double empathy problem is not about empathy
- Open Access
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-24
Don’t go reading my emotions: affective harm, affective injustice and affective artificial intelligence
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-24
Open AccessDon’t go reading my emotions: affective harm, affective injustice and affective artificial intelligence
- Open Access
- 28 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1-24
Chatbot-fictionalism and empathetic AI: Should we worry about AI when AI worries about us?
- 28 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1-24
Open AccessChatbot-fictionalism and empathetic AI: Should we worry about AI when AI worries about us?
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 64 (4) , 700-702
Belgian Solutions
Belgian Solutions is a photography project by Brussels-based German artist David Helbich. His works include sound art, performances, and conceptual works. Belgian Solutions belongs to this latter category. ‘Conceptual art’ might be an unexpected categorization as the output of the Belgian Solutions project entirely consists of photographs of actual Belgian solutions. However, Helbich’s project is not about the aesthetics of the pictures. Rather, the focus of the project is the creation of a new concept: ‘Belgian solution’. The photographs are not artificial creations, but they document actual instances of Belgian solutions found in Belgium. It is hard to describe in words what a Belgian solution exactly entails. It is not impossible, of course, but a quicker route to understanding it is by just looking at a few Belgian solution pictures, especially if you are familiar with Belgium and how people solve things there. Many examples of Belgian solutions involve traffic signs. For instance, one Belgian solution is a sign for a road diversion. The sign contains an arrow directed towards the right: ‘→’. However, the sign is supposed to point to the left. The solution created here is achieved by the use of two differently coloured tapes. The background colour of the sign is orange and the arrow is black. The arrow pointing to the right is therefore taped over by orange tape, while a new arrow, pointing to the left, is created by two pieces of black tape. The result is both laughably very clever and—more importantly—kind of absurd.
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in British Journal of Aesthetics
- Vol. 64 (4) , 700-702
Belgian Solutions
Belgian Solutions is a photography project by Brussels-based German artist David Helbich. His works include sound art, performances, and conceptual works. Belgian Solutions belongs to this latter category. ‘Conceptual art’ might be an unexpected categorization as the output of the Belgian Solutions project entirely consists of photographs of actual Belgian solutions. However, Helbich’s project is not about the aesthetics of the pictures. Rather, the focus of the project is the creation of a new concept: ‘Belgian solution’. The photographs are not artificial creations, but they document actual instances of Belgian solutions found in Belgium. It is hard to describe in words what a Belgian solution exactly entails. It is not impossible, of course, but a quicker route to understanding it is by just looking at a few Belgian solution pictures, especially if you are familiar with Belgium and how people solve things there. Many examples of Belgian solutions involve traffic signs. For instance, one Belgian solution is a sign for a road diversion. The sign contains an arrow directed towards the right: ‘→’. However, the sign is supposed to point to the left. The solution created here is achieved by the use of two differently coloured tapes. The background colour of the sign is orange and the arrow is black. The arrow pointing to the right is therefore taped over by orange tape, while a new arrow, pointing to the left, is created by two pieces of black tape. The result is both laughably very clever and—more importantly—kind of absurd.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 39 (3) , 348-363
Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology
According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal‐temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal‐causal order of the world.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 39 (3) , 348-363
Emotions in time: The temporal unity of emotion phenomenology
According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal‐temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal‐causal order of the world.
- 14 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (6) , 1-14
Feeling is believing: recalcitrant emotion & Spinozan belief formation
- 14 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 200 (6) , 1-14
Feeling is believing: recalcitrant emotion & Spinozan belief formation
- 29 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (8) , 2200-2219
The linguistic fallacy & the complex content of emotion
Some argue that emotions represent so-called core relational themes. A core relational theme describes a relation between a particular event and an organism’s well-being. For instance, the core relational theme of anger is ‘a demeaning offense against me and mine’. I argue that a core relational theme is a summary or generalization of a more complex mental content. Defenders of the Simple Core Relational Theme View reject the idea that emotional content is complex. Instead, they argue that the content of emotion simply consists of a core relational theme. I argue that this view commits the linguistic fallacy: it confuses a theory of emotion categorization with a theory of emotional content.
- 29 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (8) , 2200-2219
The linguistic fallacy & the complex content of emotion
Some argue that emotions represent so-called core relational themes. A core relational theme describes a relation between a particular event and an organism’s well-being. For instance, the core relational theme of anger is ‘a demeaning offense against me and mine’. I argue that a core relational theme is a summary or generalization of a more complex mental content. Defenders of the Simple Core Relational Theme View reject the idea that emotional content is complex. Instead, they argue that the content of emotion simply consists of a core relational theme. I argue that this view commits the linguistic fallacy: it confuses a theory of emotion categorization with a theory of emotional content.
- 21 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1237-1255
Biased Emotions: Implicit Bias, emotion & attributability
- 21 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1237-1255
Biased Emotions: Implicit Bias, emotion & attributability
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Vol. 80 (2) , 129-139
Learning Implicit Biases from Fiction
Philosophers and psychologists have argued that fiction can ethically educate us: fiction supposedly can make us better people. This view has been contested. It is, however, rarely argued that fiction can morally “corrupt” us. In this article, we focus on the alleged power of fiction to decrease one's prejudices and biases. We argue that if fiction has the power to change prejudices and biases for the better, then it can also have the opposite effect. We further argue that fictions are more likely to be a bad influence than a good one.
- 31 January 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Vol. 80 (2) , 129-139
Learning Implicit Biases from Fiction
Philosophers and psychologists have argued that fiction can ethically educate us: fiction supposedly can make us better people. This view has been contested. It is, however, rarely argued that fiction can morally “corrupt” us. In this article, we focus on the alleged power of fiction to decrease one's prejudices and biases. We argue that if fiction has the power to change prejudices and biases for the better, then it can also have the opposite effect. We further argue that fictions are more likely to be a bad influence than a good one.
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 88 (8) , 3651
Correction to: Better Scared than Sorry: The Pragmatic Account of Emotional Representation
- 11 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 88 (8) , 3651
Correction to: Better Scared than Sorry: The Pragmatic Account of Emotional Representation