Leslie Berger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Leslie Berger has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
D. B. Faulkner
Department of Animal Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana 61801
4 shared publicationsN.A. Pyatt
Department of Animal Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana 61801
4 shared publicationsJ.W. Homm
Department of Animal Sciences
3 shared publications- Lan Guo
Wilfrid Laurier University
3 shared publications N. A. Pyatt
Department of Animal Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana 61801
3 shared publicationsT.G. Nash
Department of Animal Sciences, University of Illinois, Urbana 61801
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-22
The Effect of Relative Performance Information on Creative Problem-Solving Performance
Despite the frequent use of relative performance information (RPI) feedback in practice, there is a paucity of research on the extent to which discretionary use of RPI can influence employees’ creative problem-solving performance. Using the experimental method, we study how variations in the completeness of public RPI affect individual performance on an insight task. We consider three levels of RPI completeness: complete, partial, and none. In complete RPI, all employees’ performance is ranked and publicly disclosed; in partial RPI, only top-ranking employees are publicly announced; and in no RPI, no ranking feedback is provided. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we expect and find that partial RPI leads to higher creative problem-solving performance than complete RPI or no RPI at all. Implications for creative problem-solving and the RPI literature are discussed. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-22
The Effect of Relative Performance Information on Creative Problem-Solving Performance
Despite the frequent use of relative performance information (RPI) feedback in practice, there is a paucity of research on the extent to which discretionary use of RPI can influence employees’ creative problem-solving performance. Using the experimental method, we study how variations in the completeness of public RPI affect individual performance on an insight task. We consider three levels of RPI completeness: complete, partial, and none. In complete RPI, all employees’ performance is ranked and publicly disclosed; in partial RPI, only top-ranking employees are publicly announced; and in no RPI, no ranking feedback is provided. Drawing on regulatory focus theory, we expect and find that partial RPI leads to higher creative problem-solving performance than complete RPI or no RPI at all. Implications for creative problem-solving and the RPI literature are discussed. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-23
Paying Employees to Quit: An Experimental Study of Sorting and Motivational Effects
We study whether pay-to-quit incentives (i.e., payments offered to employees who resign) can help organizations maintain a workforce of employees who highly identify with the organization. Across a laboratory experiment and an online vignette experiment, we find that pay-to-quit incentives induce employees with lower levels of organizational identification (OI) to leave their organization. Employees with low (high) OI are generally likely (unlikely) to leave the organization regardless of whether a pay-to-quit incentive is offered. As a result, relative to no incentive, the effect of a pay-to-quit incentive on employees’ likelihood of leaving is strongest among employees with moderate OI. We also find that employees who forgo the pay-to-quit incentive subsequently exert higher work effort than before. This research contributes to the rising accounting literature on the sorting effects of incentives by showing that pay-to-quit incentives both help retain highly identified employees and motivate those who remain. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-23
Open AccessPaying Employees to Quit: An Experimental Study of Sorting and Motivational Effects
We study whether pay-to-quit incentives (i.e., payments offered to employees who resign) can help organizations maintain a workforce of employees who highly identify with the organization. Across a laboratory experiment and an online vignette experiment, we find that pay-to-quit incentives induce employees with lower levels of organizational identification (OI) to leave their organization. Employees with low (high) OI are generally likely (unlikely) to leave the organization regardless of whether a pay-to-quit incentive is offered. As a result, relative to no incentive, the effect of a pay-to-quit incentive on employees’ likelihood of leaving is strongest among employees with moderate OI. We also find that employees who forgo the pay-to-quit incentive subsequently exert higher work effort than before. This research contributes to the rising accounting literature on the sorting effects of incentives by showing that pay-to-quit incentives both help retain highly identified employees and motivate those who remain. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-20
Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation
One significant challenge of motivating team performance is that the contribution of individual team members is difficult to observe. In this setting, managers often seek private information about team members’ relative contributions to help allocate team bonuses. However, the presence of self-interested biases in such communication, especially strategic bias, could reduce its informational value. We study the effects of two features of team members’ communication about their relative contributions—whether it is mandatory or voluntary and whether an explanation is required—on the severity of employees’ self-interested biases in their communication. As predicted, experimental results show that when explanations are not required, low-ability team members incorporate more strategic bias into their relative contribution communication when it is voluntary, compared to mandatory. We also observe that among low-ability team members, the greater strategic bias observed when the relative contribution communication is voluntary, compared to mandatory, diminishes when an explanation is required. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-20
Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation
One significant challenge of motivating team performance is that the contribution of individual team members is difficult to observe. In this setting, managers often seek private information about team members’ relative contributions to help allocate team bonuses. However, the presence of self-interested biases in such communication, especially strategic bias, could reduce its informational value. We study the effects of two features of team members’ communication about their relative contributions—whether it is mandatory or voluntary and whether an explanation is required—on the severity of employees’ self-interested biases in their communication. As predicted, experimental results show that when explanations are not required, low-ability team members incorporate more strategic bias into their relative contribution communication when it is voluntary, compared to mandatory. We also observe that among low-ability team members, the greater strategic bias observed when the relative contribution communication is voluntary, compared to mandatory, diminishes when an explanation is required. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 635-648
Navigating the Journal Review Process
The purpose of this chapter is to provide scholars, particularly emerging scholars working on behavioural accounting research, with information and advice about the journal review process. We present an overview of the current publishing landscape for behavioural accounting researchers, summarize the journal review process, and discuss the roles of the senior editor, editor, and reviewers at a journal. In addition, we collect and analyse survey responses from established, behavioural accounting researchers to provide a collection of advice and best practices for emerging scholars to consider when navigating the journal review process. Finally, we identify additional resources for readers to access when navigating the review process.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 635-648
Navigating the Journal Review Process
The purpose of this chapter is to provide scholars, particularly emerging scholars working on behavioural accounting research, with information and advice about the journal review process. We present an overview of the current publishing landscape for behavioural accounting researchers, summarize the journal review process, and discuss the roles of the senior editor, editor, and reviewers at a journal. In addition, we collect and analyse survey responses from established, behavioural accounting researchers to provide a collection of advice and best practices for emerging scholars to consider when navigating the journal review process. Finally, we identify additional resources for readers to access when navigating the review process.
- Open Access
- 4 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 73-94
Navigating Unprecedented Times: How Managers’ Empathetic Adjustments in a Crisis Influence Employee Effort in a Competitive Environment
When organizational crises arise, one way that managers can help employees cope is to provide empathetic adjustments, where managers adjust downward performance expectations for all employees while communicating the adjustment with empathy. In a competitive environment, we explore whether providing an empathetic adjustment to employees during a crisis affects their postcrisis effort. We conduct an experiment and observe that an empathetic adjustment significantly improves the postcrisis effort of top and bottom performers. The increase in postcrisis effort of top performers can be attributed to the effect of the adjustment, whereas the increase in postcrisis effort of bottom performers can be attributed to the effect of empathy. In a supplemental survey, we find a range of positive effects of empathetic adjustment, including increased engagement, reduced burnout, and lower turnover intentions. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: G31; G32; G33; M21.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 73-94
Open AccessNavigating Unprecedented Times: How Managers’ Empathetic Adjustments in a Crisis Influence Employee Effort in a Competitive Environment
When organizational crises arise, one way that managers can help employees cope is to provide empathetic adjustments, where managers adjust downward performance expectations for all employees while communicating the adjustment with empathy. In a competitive environment, we explore whether providing an empathetic adjustment to employees during a crisis affects their postcrisis effort. We conduct an experiment and observe that an empathetic adjustment significantly improves the postcrisis effort of top and bottom performers. The increase in postcrisis effort of top performers can be attributed to the effect of the adjustment, whereas the increase in postcrisis effort of bottom performers can be attributed to the effect of empathy. In a supplemental survey, we find a range of positive effects of empathetic adjustment, including increased engagement, reduced burnout, and lower turnover intentions. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: G31; G32; G33; M21.
- 24 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 199 (1) , 19-35
Navigating Between Control and Trust: The Whistleblowing Mindset
- 24 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 199 (1) , 19-35
Navigating Between Control and Trust: The Whistleblowing Mindset
- Open Access
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Canadian Tax Foundation in Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne
- Vol. 71 (1) , 1-32
"Tax-Free": The Effect of a Heuristic Cue on the Choice Between a TFSA and an RRSP
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Canadian Tax Foundation in Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne
- Vol. 71 (1) , 1-32
Open Access"Tax-Free": The Effect of a Heuristic Cue on the Choice Between a TFSA and an RRSP
- Open Access
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 167 (2) , 207
Correction to: Selfish Sharing? The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Tax Reporting Honesty
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 167 (2) , 207
Open AccessCorrection to: Selfish Sharing? The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Tax Reporting Honesty
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 167 (2) , 181-205
Selfish Sharing? The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Tax Reporting Honesty
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 167 (2) , 181-205
Selfish Sharing? The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Tax Reporting Honesty
- 1 August 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 31 (2) , 1-17
The Importance of Task Complexity When Rewarding Nonfinancial Performance
In this study, I investigate whether the effectiveness of rewarding performance of nonfinancial measures varies across levels of task complexity. I use a multi-period experiment where participants are assigned a highly or moderately complex task and an incentive contract where only financial measures or both financial and nonfinancial measures are rewarded. I find that in a moderately complex task, individuals perform better when only the financial measures are rewarded in the incentive contract. However, in a highly complex task, individuals perform better when both financial and nonfinancial measures are rewarded. Collectively, the results identify task complexity as an important task characteristic that impacts the effectiveness of incentives on nonfinancial measures of performance.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 31 (2) , 1-17
The Importance of Task Complexity When Rewarding Nonfinancial Performance
In this study, I investigate whether the effectiveness of rewarding performance of nonfinancial measures varies across levels of task complexity. I use a multi-period experiment where participants are assigned a highly or moderately complex task and an incentive contract where only financial measures or both financial and nonfinancial measures are rewarded. I find that in a moderately complex task, individuals perform better when only the financial measures are rewarded in the incentive contract. However, in a highly complex task, individuals perform better when both financial and nonfinancial measures are rewarded. Collectively, the results identify task complexity as an important task characteristic that impacts the effectiveness of incentives on nonfinancial measures of performance.