Lan Guo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Lan Guo has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Elliot Bendoly
The Ohio State University Columbus Ohio USA
3 shared publications - Leslie Berger
Wilfrid Laurier University
3 shared publications Yuming Hu
3 shared publicationsJutta Tobias
Cranfield University - School of Management
2 shared publications- Kelsey Matthews
University of Waterloo
2 shared publications Leslie Berger
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-23
Paying Employees to Quit: An Experimental Study of Sorting and Motivational Effects
We study whether pay-to-quit incentives (i.e., payments offered to employees who resign) can help organizations maintain a workforce of employees who highly identify with the organization. Across a laboratory experiment and an online vignette experiment, we find that pay-to-quit incentives induce employees with lower levels of organizational identification (OI) to leave their organization. Employees with low (high) OI are generally likely (unlikely) to leave the organization regardless of whether a pay-to-quit incentive is offered. As a result, relative to no incentive, the effect of a pay-to-quit incentive on employees’ likelihood of leaving is strongest among employees with moderate OI. We also find that employees who forgo the pay-to-quit incentive subsequently exert higher work effort than before. This research contributes to the rising accounting literature on the sorting effects of incentives by showing that pay-to-quit incentives both help retain highly identified employees and motivate those who remain. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- p. 1-23
Open AccessPaying Employees to Quit: An Experimental Study of Sorting and Motivational Effects
We study whether pay-to-quit incentives (i.e., payments offered to employees who resign) can help organizations maintain a workforce of employees who highly identify with the organization. Across a laboratory experiment and an online vignette experiment, we find that pay-to-quit incentives induce employees with lower levels of organizational identification (OI) to leave their organization. Employees with low (high) OI are generally likely (unlikely) to leave the organization regardless of whether a pay-to-quit incentive is offered. As a result, relative to no incentive, the effect of a pay-to-quit incentive on employees’ likelihood of leaving is strongest among employees with moderate OI. We also find that employees who forgo the pay-to-quit incentive subsequently exert higher work effort than before. This research contributes to the rising accounting literature on the sorting effects of incentives by showing that pay-to-quit incentives both help retain highly identified employees and motivate those who remain. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Coordination Incentive Design and Cross-Functional Information Exchange: Evidence from the Field
Cross-functional information exchange is critical for organizational coordination. However, seeking and sharing decision-relevant information requires time and cognitive investment, and managers may lack the motivation to incur these costs. We examine how coordination incentive design facilitates cross-functional information exchange within firms. Using 27 interviews and survey data from 543 managers and executives in 181 electronics manufacturing firms, we distinguish between coordination incentive intensity and alignment and between information volume and usefulness. We find that coordination incentive intensity is positively associated with information volume but not usefulness, whereas coordination incentive alignment is positively associated with information usefulness but not volume. Both information volume and usefulness are positively associated with operational performance. Overall, our study suggests that coordination incentive design is associated not only with whether managers exchange information across functions but also with whether that information is useful for decision making.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCoordination Incentive Design and Cross-Functional Information Exchange: Evidence from the Field
Cross-functional information exchange is critical for organizational coordination. However, seeking and sharing decision-relevant information requires time and cognitive investment, and managers may lack the motivation to incur these costs. We examine how coordination incentive design facilitates cross-functional information exchange within firms. Using 27 interviews and survey data from 543 managers and executives in 181 electronics manufacturing firms, we distinguish between coordination incentive intensity and alignment and between information volume and usefulness. We find that coordination incentive intensity is positively associated with information volume but not usefulness, whereas coordination incentive alignment is positively associated with information usefulness but not volume. Both information volume and usefulness are positively associated with operational performance. Overall, our study suggests that coordination incentive design is associated not only with whether managers exchange information across functions but also with whether that information is useful for decision making.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-20
Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation
One significant challenge of motivating team performance is that the contribution of individual team members is difficult to observe. In this setting, managers often seek private information about team members’ relative contributions to help allocate team bonuses. However, the presence of self-interested biases in such communication, especially strategic bias, could reduce its informational value. We study the effects of two features of team members’ communication about their relative contributions—whether it is mandatory or voluntary and whether an explanation is required—on the severity of employees’ self-interested biases in their communication. As predicted, experimental results show that when explanations are not required, low-ability team members incorporate more strategic bias into their relative contribution communication when it is voluntary, compared to mandatory. We also observe that among low-ability team members, the greater strategic bias observed when the relative contribution communication is voluntary, compared to mandatory, diminishes when an explanation is required. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 17 March 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 37 (1) , 1-20
Strategic Bias in Team Members’ Communication about Relative Contributions: The Effects of Voluntary Communication and Explanation
One significant challenge of motivating team performance is that the contribution of individual team members is difficult to observe. In this setting, managers often seek private information about team members’ relative contributions to help allocate team bonuses. However, the presence of self-interested biases in such communication, especially strategic bias, could reduce its informational value. We study the effects of two features of team members’ communication about their relative contributions—whether it is mandatory or voluntary and whether an explanation is required—on the severity of employees’ self-interested biases in their communication. As predicted, experimental results show that when explanations are not required, low-ability team members incorporate more strategic bias into their relative contribution communication when it is voluntary, compared to mandatory. We also observe that among low-ability team members, the greater strategic bias observed when the relative contribution communication is voluntary, compared to mandatory, diminishes when an explanation is required. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 519-529
Structural Equation Modelling in Behavioural Accounting Research
Structural equations modelling (SEM) is a family of powerful yet relatively underutilized statistical techniques in the accounting literature. SEM allows a set of relations between one or more independent variables and one or more dependent variables to be examined simultaneously. In this chapter, different SEM techniques are discussed, and when each should be used is explained, with examples from accounting research. Next, the way SEM can be used for analysing survey data, experimental data, and archival data is discussed, and again, examples from accounting research are provided. Finally, “best practice” reporting guidelines are developed for use by accounting researchers.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 519-529
Structural Equation Modelling in Behavioural Accounting Research
Structural equations modelling (SEM) is a family of powerful yet relatively underutilized statistical techniques in the accounting literature. SEM allows a set of relations between one or more independent variables and one or more dependent variables to be examined simultaneously. In this chapter, different SEM techniques are discussed, and when each should be used is explained, with examples from accounting research. Next, the way SEM can be used for analysing survey data, experimental data, and archival data is discussed, and again, examples from accounting research are provided. Finally, “best practice” reporting guidelines are developed for use by accounting researchers.
- 18 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 58
Cooperate or compete? The impact of vertical wage dispersion on employees’ behavior in tournaments
- 18 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 58
Cooperate or compete? The impact of vertical wage dispersion on employees’ behavior in tournaments
- 21 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 103
Conscious and nonconscious goal pursuit in multidimensional tasks
- 21 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 103
Conscious and nonconscious goal pursuit in multidimensional tasks
- Open Access
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 167 (2) , 207
Correction to: Selfish Sharing? The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Tax Reporting Honesty
- 7 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 167 (2) , 207
Open AccessCorrection to: Selfish Sharing? The Impact of the Sharing Economy on Tax Reporting Honesty
- Open Access
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Performance Effect of Goal-Based Prosocial Rewards: Does Reward Size Matter?
In recent years the use of performance-contingent prosocial rewards, where employees must give their reward to a charity or a coworker, has become more common. Using a piece-rate incentive structure, prior research shows small dollar prosocial rewards lead to greater performance than small dollar cash rewards, but this effect diminishes when the reward size increases. We extend this research by conducting an improvisational replication under a more common goal-based incentive structure. Our experiment uses an effort-sensitive task and participants are rewarded for the attainment of a challenging performance goal. We use a 2 by 2 between-subjects design where we manipulate the type of reward for goal attainment (cash vs. prosocial) and the size of the reward (small vs. large). We find that goal-based prosocial rewards result in higher performance than goal-based cash rewards when the reward size is small, but this performance advantage is not observed when the reward size is large. We also find that the affective value individuals attach to goal attainment mediates our results. Contrary to evidence from a piece-rate setting we observe in supplemental analysis that an increase in prosocial rewards for goal attainment negatively affects performance. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Performance Effect of Goal-Based Prosocial Rewards: Does Reward Size Matter?
In recent years the use of performance-contingent prosocial rewards, where employees must give their reward to a charity or a coworker, has become more common. Using a piece-rate incentive structure, prior research shows small dollar prosocial rewards lead to greater performance than small dollar cash rewards, but this effect diminishes when the reward size increases. We extend this research by conducting an improvisational replication under a more common goal-based incentive structure. Our experiment uses an effort-sensitive task and participants are rewarded for the attainment of a challenging performance goal. We use a 2 by 2 between-subjects design where we manipulate the type of reward for goal attainment (cash vs. prosocial) and the size of the reward (small vs. large). We find that goal-based prosocial rewards result in higher performance than goal-based cash rewards when the reward size is small, but this performance advantage is not observed when the reward size is large. We also find that the affective value individuals attach to goal attainment mediates our results. Contrary to evidence from a piece-rate setting we observe in supplemental analysis that an increase in prosocial rewards for goal attainment negatively affects performance. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Operations & Production Management
- Vol. 37 (8) , 1031-1053
Different departments, different drivers
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the antecedents and performance consequences of voluntary information exchange between the production and sales functions.Design/methodology/approach: Building on the motivation-opportunity-ability framework, the authors first posit a general model for bilateral information exchange across functional levels. The innovation presented in this model consists in allowing both sides of such an exchange (e.g. production-to-sales and sales-to-production) to differ in the perceived adequacy of information they receive. The two sides can also differ in terms of how their motivation and ability impact that adequacy. To test the model, the authors make use of survey responses and objective data from sales, production and executive managers of 182 Chinese manufacturers.Findings: Analysis of the sample shows that the sales-to-production exchange has a smaller estimated performance effect than the production-to-sales exchange. Although shared opportunity is important in predicting both sides of the exchange, the measure of motivation appears to only significantly impact the sales-to-production exchange. In contrast, the measure of ability only appears to significantly affect the production-to-sales exchange.Research limitations/implications: Although limited to a regional context, differences in information-sharing drivers on the two sides of production-sales dyads pose strong implications that may be generalizable.Practical implications: Specifically, these findings suggest alternative approaches and foci for resource investment that higher level managers can leverage in developing more effective cross-functional work settings.Originality/value: This study differentiates itself from extant literature on information sharing by focusing on cross-functional (vs intra-functional) and voluntary (vs routine) information exchange.
- 7 August 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Operations & Production Management
- Vol. 37 (8) , 1031-1053
Open AccessDifferent departments, different drivers
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the antecedents and performance consequences of voluntary information exchange between the production and sales functions.Design/methodology/approach: Building on the motivation-opportunity-ability framework, the authors first posit a general model for bilateral information exchange across functional levels. The innovation presented in this model consists in allowing both sides of such an exchange (e.g. production-to-sales and sales-to-production) to differ in the perceived adequacy of information they receive. The two sides can also differ in terms of how their motivation and ability impact that adequacy. To test the model, the authors make use of survey responses and objective data from sales, production and executive managers of 182 Chinese manufacturers.Findings: Analysis of the sample shows that the sales-to-production exchange has a smaller estimated performance effect than the production-to-sales exchange. Although shared opportunity is important in predicting both sides of the exchange, the measure of motivation appears to only significantly impact the sales-to-production exchange. In contrast, the measure of ability only appears to significantly affect the production-to-sales exchange.Research limitations/implications: Although limited to a regional context, differences in information-sharing drivers on the two sides of production-sales dyads pose strong implications that may be generalizable.Practical implications: Specifically, these findings suggest alternative approaches and foci for resource investment that higher level managers can leverage in developing more effective cross-functional work settings.Originality/value: This study differentiates itself from extant literature on information sharing by focusing on cross-functional (vs intra-functional) and voluntary (vs routine) information exchange.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting
Prior research has shown that vertical pay dispersion can adversely affect employee relations and morale mainly due to perceived unfairness (Ackerlof and Yellen
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting
Prior research has shown that vertical pay dispersion can adversely affect employee relations and morale mainly due to perceived unfairness (Ackerlof and Yellen