Hongsong Liu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Hongsong Liu has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yue Xu
University of Shanghai for Science and Technology
4 shared publications - Ahmed Bux Jamali
Postdoctoral researcher, Institute of International and Regional Studies, Sun Yat‐sen University, Zhuhai campus, China
2 shared publications Tong Wu
School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University , Shanghai , China
2 shared publicationsAhmed Bux Jamali
Shanghai International Studies University
1 shared publicationAleksandr Zarnadze
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication- Christian Kaunert
Dublin City University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Policy Sciences
- p. 1-23
From policy experimentation to policy absorption: how regulatory sandbox outputs enter standing policy decisions
- 27 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Policy Sciences
- p. 1-23
From policy experimentation to policy absorption: how regulatory sandbox outputs enter standing policy decisions
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review
- p. 1-33
Industrial irreplaceability and China’s refining node power in critical mineral networks
Decarbonization has shifted geopolitical competition into the material infrastructures that underpin electrification, renewable power, storage, and advanced manufacturing. Across the Asia-Pacific, ...
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review
- p. 1-33
Industrial irreplaceability and China’s refining node power in critical mineral networks
Decarbonization has shifted geopolitical competition into the material infrastructures that underpin electrification, renewable power, storage, and advanced manufacturing. Across the Asia-Pacific, ...
- 18 May 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Relations
Institutional hedging in contested global governance: Explaining Italy’s entry and exit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Italy became the only G7 member to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019. Yet, 5 years later, Rome announced its withdrawal, a rare reversal among BRI participants. This article examines Italy’s abrupt policy shift. We argue that Italy’s decision to join and subsequently exit the BRI reflects a strategy of institutional hedging, in which states calibrate their institutional engagements based on evolving assessments of institutions’ relative capacities, relevance and risks. Initially, Italy perceived the BRI as an unparalleled opportunity in the absence of viable Western alternatives, with anticipated risks deemed limited. As rival institutions emerged, Italy’s relevance in them increased, and the risks of participation in the BRI grew, Rome recalibrated its stance at different stages from institutional hedging to balancing. By examining this case, we demonstrate how small and middle powers navigate institutional rivalry between great powers. Theoretically, this article contributes to the literature by developing an analytical framework of institutional hedging, an existing yet insufficiently elaborated concept, to account for small and middle powers’ behavior regarding international institutions.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Relations
Institutional hedging in contested global governance: Explaining Italy’s entry and exit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Italy became the only G7 member to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019. Yet, 5 years later, Rome announced its withdrawal, a rare reversal among BRI participants. This article examines Italy’s abrupt policy shift. We argue that Italy’s decision to join and subsequently exit the BRI reflects a strategy of institutional hedging, in which states calibrate their institutional engagements based on evolving assessments of institutions’ relative capacities, relevance and risks. Initially, Italy perceived the BRI as an unparalleled opportunity in the absence of viable Western alternatives, with anticipated risks deemed limited. As rival institutions emerged, Italy’s relevance in them increased, and the risks of participation in the BRI grew, Rome recalibrated its stance at different stages from institutional hedging to balancing. By examining this case, we demonstrate how small and middle powers navigate institutional rivalry between great powers. Theoretically, this article contributes to the literature by developing an analytical framework of institutional hedging, an existing yet insufficiently elaborated concept, to account for small and middle powers’ behavior regarding international institutions.
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Maritime Economics & Logistics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 1-32
Maritime ringside: Trump’s overseas port policies amid US–China rivalry
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Maritime Economics & Logistics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 1-32
Maritime ringside: Trump’s overseas port policies amid US–China rivalry
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Focus
- Vol. 41 (1) , 116-127
The Taliban's Regime Security and the Strategic Calculus of China and Pakistan
This article contributes to the understanding of China and Pakistan's relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It examines why do the Taliban prioritize regime security in relations with China and Pakistan. The analysis argues that while China and Pakistan approach Afghanistan based on strategic, security, and economic interests, the Taliban remain primarily focused on regime survival and internal stability. Despite historical tensions, the Taliban sustain unofficial relations with both states to secure political legitimacy and security guarantees. China's non‐interference policy enables the Taliban to consolidate power without external governance pressure, while Beijing seeks stable conditions to access Afghanistan's resources and expand regional connectivity. Pakistan aims to prevent Tehreek‐e‐Taliban militancy while maintaining leverage in Kabul. Using a regime security framework and qualitative analysis, the article finds that the Taliban's internal priorities often diverge from the expectations of China and Pakistan, limiting the depth of trilateral cooperation in security and regional integration.
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Focus
- Vol. 41 (1) , 116-127
The Taliban's Regime Security and the Strategic Calculus of China and Pakistan
This article contributes to the understanding of China and Pakistan's relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It examines why do the Taliban prioritize regime security in relations with China and Pakistan. The analysis argues that while China and Pakistan approach Afghanistan based on strategic, security, and economic interests, the Taliban remain primarily focused on regime survival and internal stability. Despite historical tensions, the Taliban sustain unofficial relations with both states to secure political legitimacy and security guarantees. China's non‐interference policy enables the Taliban to consolidate power without external governance pressure, while Beijing seeks stable conditions to access Afghanistan's resources and expand regional connectivity. Pakistan aims to prevent Tehreek‐e‐Taliban militancy while maintaining leverage in Kabul. Using a regime security framework and qualitative analysis, the article finds that the Taliban's internal priorities often diverge from the expectations of China and Pakistan, limiting the depth of trilateral cooperation in security and regional integration.
- Open Access
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Japanese Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 26 (4) , 229-246
Institutional isomorphism in Chinese development finance regimes: a comparative study of the AIIB, the NDB, and the two policy banks
China’s growing development finance gives rise to the speculation that Beijing is creating a new model of foreign aid. There are also efforts to socialise China and change Chinese-led development finance institutions (DFIs) from within. Are Chinese DFIs convergent with/divergent from traditional DFIs? What are the mechanisms that drive their convergence/divergence? This article answers the questions with the three mechanisms of isomorphism, namely the coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. We focus on the prominent Chinese DFIs of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the two policy banks (the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), examine their isomorphic pressures, and compare their resemblance to the traditional donors. We find that the AIIB, subject to high pressures from all of the three mechanisms, displays a strong resemblance to its Western counterparts; the NDB, subject to medium pressures, shows a less significant resemblance; the two Chinese policy banks, not subject to significant pressures, demonstrates a faint resemblance.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Japanese Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 26 (4) , 229-246
Open AccessInstitutional isomorphism in Chinese development finance regimes: a comparative study of the AIIB, the NDB, and the two policy banks
China’s growing development finance gives rise to the speculation that Beijing is creating a new model of foreign aid. There are also efforts to socialise China and change Chinese-led development finance institutions (DFIs) from within. Are Chinese DFIs convergent with/divergent from traditional DFIs? What are the mechanisms that drive their convergence/divergence? This article answers the questions with the three mechanisms of isomorphism, namely the coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. We focus on the prominent Chinese DFIs of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the two policy banks (the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), examine their isomorphic pressures, and compare their resemblance to the traditional donors. We find that the AIIB, subject to high pressures from all of the three mechanisms, displays a strong resemblance to its Western counterparts; the NDB, subject to medium pressures, shows a less significant resemblance; the two Chinese policy banks, not subject to significant pressures, demonstrates a faint resemblance.
- 9 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Structural Change and Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 75, 638-653
Is productive service intermediate input a good instrument for enhancing the Global Value Chain participation?
- 9 October 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Structural Change and Economic Dynamics
- Vol. 75, 638-653
Is productive service intermediate input a good instrument for enhancing the Global Value Chain participation?
- Open Access
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Review of Political Economy
- Vol. 4 (1) , 1-21
India’s gulf policy in the context of China-U.S. strategic competition
India's engagement with the Gulf region has a long-standing history, spanning cultural, economic, and diasporic dimensions. Since Prime Minister Modi's tenure, India's Gulf policy has undergone significant adjustments, aiming to enhance its geopolitical influence, ensure energy security, and advance economic and security cooperation by strengthening ties with Gulf nations. Despite achieving some successes, India continues to confront challenges such as U.S. sanctions on Iran and China's competitive presence in West Asia, particularly in the context of intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition. The impact of China-U.S. strategic rivalry on India's Gulf policy is multifaceted. Firstly, the pressure to maintain a dynamic balance in geopolitical maneuvering has increased, necessitating India to remain adaptable in a complex international environment. Secondly, the intensifying China-U.S. competition has prompted India to reassess and adjust its Gulf policy to better safeguard its interests and adapt to the evolving international landscape. Thirdly, the urgency to formulate policies that preserve India's traditional interests has escalated. In response to these challenges, the Modi administration has recalibrated India's Gulf policy, which exhibits three key shifts. Firstly, the Gulf region has gained greater prominence in India's overall diplomatic strategy. Secondly, India has deepened its economic ties with Gulf nations through enhanced trade and investment cooperation. Thirdly, India has selectively coordinated policies with the U.S. to ensure the protection of its interests in the security domain. Looking ahead, India's Gulf policy can be further refined by deepening cooperation in the region and leveraging China's development momentum to share the economic benefits in the Gulf. Additionally, it is imperative for India to formulate a pragmatic and cautious policy towards Iran, characterized by risk aversion and limited proactive engagement.
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Review of Political Economy
- Vol. 4 (1) , 1-21
Open AccessIndia’s gulf policy in the context of China-U.S. strategic competition
India's engagement with the Gulf region has a long-standing history, spanning cultural, economic, and diasporic dimensions. Since Prime Minister Modi's tenure, India's Gulf policy has undergone significant adjustments, aiming to enhance its geopolitical influence, ensure energy security, and advance economic and security cooperation by strengthening ties with Gulf nations. Despite achieving some successes, India continues to confront challenges such as U.S. sanctions on Iran and China's competitive presence in West Asia, particularly in the context of intensifying China-U.S. strategic competition. The impact of China-U.S. strategic rivalry on India's Gulf policy is multifaceted. Firstly, the pressure to maintain a dynamic balance in geopolitical maneuvering has increased, necessitating India to remain adaptable in a complex international environment. Secondly, the intensifying China-U.S. competition has prompted India to reassess and adjust its Gulf policy to better safeguard its interests and adapt to the evolving international landscape. Thirdly, the urgency to formulate policies that preserve India's traditional interests has escalated. In response to these challenges, the Modi administration has recalibrated India's Gulf policy, which exhibits three key shifts. Firstly, the Gulf region has gained greater prominence in India's overall diplomatic strategy. Secondly, India has deepened its economic ties with Gulf nations through enhanced trade and investment cooperation. Thirdly, India has selectively coordinated policies with the U.S. to ensure the protection of its interests in the security domain. Looking ahead, India's Gulf policy can be further refined by deepening cooperation in the region and leveraging China's development momentum to share the economic benefits in the Gulf. Additionally, it is imperative for India to formulate a pragmatic and cautious policy towards Iran, characterized by risk aversion and limited proactive engagement.
- 19 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-164
Chinese Academic Representations of the Rise of Populism in Europe
- 19 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-164
Chinese Academic Representations of the Rise of Populism in Europe