Ahmed Bux Jamali
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ahmed Bux Jamali has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mehmood Hussain
Department of Politics & International Relations Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad Pakistan
4 shared publications - Hongsong Liu
School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
2 shared publications Abdulfattah Omar
Department of English, College of Science & Humanities Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University Alkharj Saudi Arabia
1 shared publicationAbhishek Verma
Diplomacy and Disarmament (DAD) Division, Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
1 shared publication- Dechun Zhang
University of Copenhagen
1 shared publication - Maria Papageorgiou
Newcastle University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Europe-Asia Studies
- Vol. 78 (7) , 1220-1222
Ukraine’s Thorny Path to the EU: From ‘Integration Without Membership’ to ‘Integration Through War’
This edited volume examines Ukraine’s long and contested path towards EU membership, tracing its trajectory from the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 to the transformative ...
- 9 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Europe-Asia Studies
- Vol. 78 (7) , 1220-1222
Ukraine’s Thorny Path to the EU: From ‘Integration Without Membership’ to ‘Integration Through War’
This edited volume examines Ukraine’s long and contested path towards EU membership, tracing its trajectory from the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 to the transformative ...
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Focus
- Vol. 41 (2) , 189-202
Examining Pakistan's Strategic Hedging Between the United States and China
The intensifying competition between the United States and China has been significantly reshaping the global order, presenting considerable challenges for states in the Asia‐Pacific region. As an emerging geopolitical construct, the region has posed formidable challenges and strategic constraints for Pakistan, compelling it to manage its historical alliances, redefine priorities, and formulate viable policy responses in the evolving global landscape. To unfold Pakistan's positioning, this paper asks how Pakistan navigates its foreign policy priorities and strategic calculations while dealing with the US–China competition? Based on the hedging framework, the paper argues that Pakistan's foreign policy positioning revolves around pragmatic hedging with either power in the US–China rivalry. Pakistan's geostrategic engagement with the United States and its geo‐economic and geo‐security partnership with China aim to cultivate a zero‐enemy stance/narrative, balancing competitive coexistence and maximizing returns from both powers. The evaluation demonstrates that Pakistan's national security strategic doctrine/policy prioritizes geo‐economics considerations over geopolitics to navigate its economic challenges, address its status dilemma in South Asian geopolitics, and manage complex geo‐security issues.
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Focus
- Vol. 41 (2) , 189-202
Examining Pakistan's Strategic Hedging Between the United States and China
The intensifying competition between the United States and China has been significantly reshaping the global order, presenting considerable challenges for states in the Asia‐Pacific region. As an emerging geopolitical construct, the region has posed formidable challenges and strategic constraints for Pakistan, compelling it to manage its historical alliances, redefine priorities, and formulate viable policy responses in the evolving global landscape. To unfold Pakistan's positioning, this paper asks how Pakistan navigates its foreign policy priorities and strategic calculations while dealing with the US–China competition? Based on the hedging framework, the paper argues that Pakistan's foreign policy positioning revolves around pragmatic hedging with either power in the US–China rivalry. Pakistan's geostrategic engagement with the United States and its geo‐economic and geo‐security partnership with China aim to cultivate a zero‐enemy stance/narrative, balancing competitive coexistence and maximizing returns from both powers. The evaluation demonstrates that Pakistan's national security strategic doctrine/policy prioritizes geo‐economics considerations over geopolitics to navigate its economic challenges, address its status dilemma in South Asian geopolitics, and manage complex geo‐security issues.
- 16 December 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Vol. 53 (2) , 534-536
Narratives of the Sino-Middle Eastern futures: in the eye of the beholder
- 16 December 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Vol. 53 (2) , 534-536
Narratives of the Sino-Middle Eastern futures: in the eye of the beholder
- 16 December 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
- Vol. 12 (1) , 109-133
Standing in-between— Gulf States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Under New Security Dynamics: The GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
The addition of Gulf states to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has significantly altered regional dynamics. By examining two Gulf states’ foreign policy motivations for joining the SCO, through the lens of institutional balancing and hedging concepts, we argue that they engage in both hedging through multi-alignment to achieve national objectives and mitigate risks and institutional balancing in order to constrain China’s and Russia’s geopolitical ambitions within the organisation, check their regional rivals and at the same time exclude the United States from an emerging security architecture. Moreover, Gulf states’ priorities focus on strategic autonomy and have avoided taking clear-cut sides in the US–China competition, while not isolating Russia despite capitalising on its deteriorating position in the Middle East since the Ukraine war. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s reluctant position as a unitary actor in establishing relations with the SCO indicates its strategic neutrality and a cautious stance towards the United States as its security guarantor.
- 16 December 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
- Vol. 12 (1) , 109-133
Standing in-between— Gulf States in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Under New Security Dynamics: The GCC, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
The addition of Gulf states to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has significantly altered regional dynamics. By examining two Gulf states’ foreign policy motivations for joining the SCO, through the lens of institutional balancing and hedging concepts, we argue that they engage in both hedging through multi-alignment to achieve national objectives and mitigate risks and institutional balancing in order to constrain China’s and Russia’s geopolitical ambitions within the organisation, check their regional rivals and at the same time exclude the United States from an emerging security architecture. Moreover, Gulf states’ priorities focus on strategic autonomy and have avoided taking clear-cut sides in the US–China competition, while not isolating Russia despite capitalising on its deteriorating position in the Middle East since the Ukraine war. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s reluctant position as a unitary actor in establishing relations with the SCO indicates its strategic neutrality and a cautious stance towards the United States as its security guarantor.
- 8 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in Politics & Policy
- Vol. 52 (1) , 227-244
The China–Iran strategic deal and CPEC: Navigating the influence of pragmatic balancing in China's relations with Iran and Pakistan
This article argues that China is advancing its relations with Iran and Pakistan based on pragmatic balancing, a key component of soft balancing, to safeguard and advance national self‐interest. China's relationship with Pakistan is based on shared interests to counter the Indian hegemony in South Asia and end the Chinese energy security dilemma through an overland route of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The bilateral relationship has enhanced and expanded over the years, despite steep transformations in regional geopolitics. Meanwhile, abundant Iranian energy reserves and Tehran's willingness to support China against the United States in the Middle East encouraged the Chinese leadership to sign a strategic deal with no significant ramifications for Pakistan and CPEC. The fair‐weather friendship between China and Iran remains limited in scope, often suspending cooperation in various domains, including energy and defense. Nonetheless, an all‐weather friendship between China and Pakistan sustained the collaboration of security, economy, and diplomacy, meticulously representing sincerity and cordiality.Related Articles: Bishwakarma, Jham Kumar, and Zongshan Hu. 2021. “Problems and Prospects for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).” Politics & Policy 50(1): 154–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12443.Singh, Amit, and Amit Sarwal. 2017. “Paraspara, Encounters, and Confluences: India's Soft Power Objective in the Indo‐Pacific Region.” Politics & Policy 45(5): 733–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12222.Zaidi, Syed Muhammad Saad. 2020. “American Global Supremacy under Threat? The Chinese Factor.” Politics & Policy 49(2): 502–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12402.
- 8 February 2024
- Published by Wiley in Politics & Policy
- Vol. 52 (1) , 227-244
The China–Iran strategic deal and CPEC: Navigating the influence of pragmatic balancing in China's relations with Iran and Pakistan
This article argues that China is advancing its relations with Iran and Pakistan based on pragmatic balancing, a key component of soft balancing, to safeguard and advance national self‐interest. China's relationship with Pakistan is based on shared interests to counter the Indian hegemony in South Asia and end the Chinese energy security dilemma through an overland route of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The bilateral relationship has enhanced and expanded over the years, despite steep transformations in regional geopolitics. Meanwhile, abundant Iranian energy reserves and Tehran's willingness to support China against the United States in the Middle East encouraged the Chinese leadership to sign a strategic deal with no significant ramifications for Pakistan and CPEC. The fair‐weather friendship between China and Iran remains limited in scope, often suspending cooperation in various domains, including energy and defense. Nonetheless, an all‐weather friendship between China and Pakistan sustained the collaboration of security, economy, and diplomacy, meticulously representing sincerity and cordiality.Related Articles: Bishwakarma, Jham Kumar, and Zongshan Hu. 2021. “Problems and Prospects for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).” Politics & Policy 50(1): 154–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12443.Singh, Amit, and Amit Sarwal. 2017. “Paraspara, Encounters, and Confluences: India's Soft Power Objective in the Indo‐Pacific Region.” Politics & Policy 45(5): 733–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12222.Zaidi, Syed Muhammad Saad. 2020. “American Global Supremacy under Threat? The Chinese Factor.” Politics & Policy 49(2): 502–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12402.
- 27 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in East Asia
- Vol. 41 (1) , 25-40
Belt and Road Initiative: the Intertwining of China’s Foreign Policy and Economic Nationalism
- 27 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in East Asia
- Vol. 41 (1) , 25-40
Belt and Road Initiative: the Intertwining of China’s Foreign Policy and Economic Nationalism
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
- Vol. 17 (1) , 31-48
Regional Connectivity and Inclusion of New Partners in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges
This paper examines the potential of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for shared prosperity and economic development through enhanced regional connectivity. It argues that CPEC can act as a regional connector for South Asian and Middle Eastern states by bringing enormous economic and trade opportunities. Having examined the potential utilisation of CPEC as a regional connector in contextualising the Pakistan-China shared consensus for the inclusion of new partners, this paper investigates the areas of regional connectivity cooperation and cross-border linkages with India, Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and highlights the prospects and challenges to CPEC for mutual collaboration and expanded regionalisation.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
- Vol. 17 (1) , 31-48
Regional Connectivity and Inclusion of New Partners in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges
This paper examines the potential of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for shared prosperity and economic development through enhanced regional connectivity. It argues that CPEC can act as a regional connector for South Asian and Middle Eastern states by bringing enormous economic and trade opportunities. Having examined the potential utilisation of CPEC as a regional connector in contextualising the Pakistan-China shared consensus for the inclusion of new partners, this paper investigates the areas of regional connectivity cooperation and cross-border linkages with India, Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and highlights the prospects and challenges to CPEC for mutual collaboration and expanded regionalisation.
- Open Access
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in East Asia
- Vol. 39 (3) , 279-296
China’s “Weaponized” Vaccine: Intertwining Between International and Domestic Politics
Ever since China has formally joined the WHO-backed global COVID-19 vaccine initiative known as COVAX, there is a presumed notion that China’s vaccine diplomacy will make a significant contribution to the international public good and thus uplift Beijing’s role as the rule-maker of international order. To scrutinize this, the paper asks if China succeeded in proliferating its weaponized vaccine policy to obtain maximum diplomatic gains and soft power projection to intensify its international image, geopolitical power, and domestic politico legitimacy. The authors argue that despite its vaccine diplomacy demonstrated the robust governance capacity and responsibility to be a great power. Yet, Beijing’s geopolitical influence and international image are significantly overrated and not enough to play a more prominent role in the global power fulcrum/equilibrium. On the contrary, China enjoys a leading position on the domestic political front. Its successful portrayal of China’s vaccine provision in the global market and remarkable configuration to leverage a deep-rooted nationalism has fundamentally provided China with a powerful rationale to divert its public’s attention from Beijing’s earlier inadequate handling of the outbreak. The evaluation of the paper reveals that China’s vaccine diplomacy’s influence in promoting international image and geopolitics is limited but has successfully stabilized its domestic political environment and enhanced its domestic legitimacy.
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in East Asia
- Vol. 39 (3) , 279-296
Open AccessChina’s “Weaponized” Vaccine: Intertwining Between International and Domestic Politics
Ever since China has formally joined the WHO-backed global COVID-19 vaccine initiative known as COVAX, there is a presumed notion that China’s vaccine diplomacy will make a significant contribution to the international public good and thus uplift Beijing’s role as the rule-maker of international order. To scrutinize this, the paper asks if China succeeded in proliferating its weaponized vaccine policy to obtain maximum diplomatic gains and soft power projection to intensify its international image, geopolitical power, and domestic politico legitimacy. The authors argue that despite its vaccine diplomacy demonstrated the robust governance capacity and responsibility to be a great power. Yet, Beijing’s geopolitical influence and international image are significantly overrated and not enough to play a more prominent role in the global power fulcrum/equilibrium. On the contrary, China enjoys a leading position on the domestic political front. Its successful portrayal of China’s vaccine provision in the global market and remarkable configuration to leverage a deep-rooted nationalism has fundamentally provided China with a powerful rationale to divert its public’s attention from Beijing’s earlier inadequate handling of the outbreak. The evaluation of the paper reveals that China’s vaccine diplomacy’s influence in promoting international image and geopolitics is limited but has successfully stabilized its domestic political environment and enhanced its domestic legitimacy.
- 15 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Focus
- Vol. 36 (1) , 5-39
India's Indo‐Pacific Strategy: A Pragmatic Balancing between the United States and China
Despite having differing foreign policy objectives against the core Indo‐Pacific fundamentals, Prime Minister Modi is constructing a robust, proactive, and influential role of India in the Indo‐Pacific region without formally aligning with the United States or gesturing for any confrontational behavior against China. To unfold India's Indo‐Pacific positioning, this paper asks how India behaves between the United States and China in the Indo‐Pacific. The authors argue that to address this, Modi's Indo‐Pacific strategy revolves around Pragmatic Balancing between the United States and China in the Indo‐Pacific. The paper highlights Modi's Indo‐Pacific ambitions to explore this pragmatic balancing, keeping in view the US Indo‐Pacific strategy. To deal with the United States on the geostrategic front, ensuring maximum strategic autonomy and building India's maritime security order in the Indian Ocean region are Modi's crucial policy outlooks. On the other hand, to deal with China on the geo‐economics front, maintaining the maritime economy's flow, thereby preventing any confrontational behavior with China on multilateralism, is the critical component of Modi's Indo‐Pacific strategy. The evaluation demonstrates Modi's pragmatism by redefining India's balancing behavior with the United States and China to achieve the desired foreign policy outcomes, before presenting the article's final conclusion.
- 15 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Pacific Focus
- Vol. 36 (1) , 5-39
India's Indo‐Pacific Strategy: A Pragmatic Balancing between the United States and China
Despite having differing foreign policy objectives against the core Indo‐Pacific fundamentals, Prime Minister Modi is constructing a robust, proactive, and influential role of India in the Indo‐Pacific region without formally aligning with the United States or gesturing for any confrontational behavior against China. To unfold India's Indo‐Pacific positioning, this paper asks how India behaves between the United States and China in the Indo‐Pacific. The authors argue that to address this, Modi's Indo‐Pacific strategy revolves around Pragmatic Balancing between the United States and China in the Indo‐Pacific. The paper highlights Modi's Indo‐Pacific ambitions to explore this pragmatic balancing, keeping in view the US Indo‐Pacific strategy. To deal with the United States on the geostrategic front, ensuring maximum strategic autonomy and building India's maritime security order in the Indian Ocean region are Modi's crucial policy outlooks. On the other hand, to deal with China on the geo‐economics front, maintaining the maritime economy's flow, thereby preventing any confrontational behavior with China on multilateralism, is the critical component of Modi's Indo‐Pacific strategy. The evaluation demonstrates Modi's pragmatism by redefining India's balancing behavior with the United States and China to achieve the desired foreign policy outcomes, before presenting the article's final conclusion.