Arzé Karam
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Arzé Karam has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Caleb A. Cox
Department of Economics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
1 shared publication Dimitar Bogoev
1 shared publication- Matthias Pelster
Mercator School of Management, University of Duisburg-Essen & European Center for Financial Services (ECFS), 47057 Duisburg, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Can Policy Credibility Precede Formal Institutional Integration?Evidence from the Proposed UK--EU Emissions Trading System Linkage
This paper examines whether expectations of future emissions-market linkageaffect carbon-market integration before formal regulatory linkage occurs. Westudy the proposed linkage between the United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme(UK ETS) and the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) using dailyUK Allowance (UKA) and EU Allowance (EUA) futures prices from 2024 to 2026.We combine interaction regressions, rolling dependence measures, cointegrationand vector error-correction models, price-discovery analysis, and event-studytests. UKA sensitivity to EUA returns increases substantially during theperiod in which UK--EU linkage commitments become more credible, while rollingcorrelations and betas remain persistently higher. EUA and UKA futures alsoshare a statistically significant long-run equilibrium despite the continuedlegal separation of the two systems. By contrast, major geopolitical eventsproduce comparatively temporary relative-price effects. The findings areconsistent with anticipatory market integration: expectations of futureregulatory coordination become incorporated into current carbon prices beforeformal allowance fungibility is established. This implies that part of theeconomic adjustment associated with emissions-market linkage may occur duringthe negotiation and policy-communication phase.
- 8 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCan Policy Credibility Precede Formal Institutional Integration?Evidence from the Proposed UK--EU Emissions Trading System Linkage
This paper examines whether expectations of future emissions-market linkageaffect carbon-market integration before formal regulatory linkage occurs. Westudy the proposed linkage between the United Kingdom Emissions Trading Scheme(UK ETS) and the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) using dailyUK Allowance (UKA) and EU Allowance (EUA) futures prices from 2024 to 2026.We combine interaction regressions, rolling dependence measures, cointegrationand vector error-correction models, price-discovery analysis, and event-studytests. UKA sensitivity to EUA returns increases substantially during theperiod in which UK--EU linkage commitments become more credible, while rollingcorrelations and betas remain persistently higher. EUA and UKA futures alsoshare a statistically significant long-run equilibrium despite the continuedlegal separation of the two systems. By contrast, major geopolitical eventsproduce comparatively temporary relative-price effects. The findings areconsistent with anticipatory market integration: expectations of futureregulatory coordination become incorporated into current carbon prices beforeformal allowance fungibility is established. This implies that part of theeconomic adjustment associated with emissions-market linkage may occur duringthe negotiation and policy-communication phase.
- Open Access
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Quote Fragility, Intermediary Constraints, and Tail Risk
We construct a high-frequency measure of intermediary liquidity conditions from quotepath instability and transient price displacement in four futures markets. The measure contains information beyond volatility, spreads, depth, price impact, order-flow toxicity, and cross-market stress, and covaries with independent funding and dealer-positioning measures. Its predictive contribution persists across chronological expanding-and rolling-window tests. The relation is nonlinear: predicted tail-event probabilities change materially as markets enter the joint fragile state but flatten at extreme levels. The results identify an intraday market-based signal associated with intermediary risk-bearing conditions and the conditional distribution of future returns.
- 25 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessQuote Fragility, Intermediary Constraints, and Tail Risk
We construct a high-frequency measure of intermediary liquidity conditions from quotepath instability and transient price displacement in four futures markets. The measure contains information beyond volatility, spreads, depth, price impact, order-flow toxicity, and cross-market stress, and covaries with independent funding and dealer-positioning measures. Its predictive contribution persists across chronological expanding-and rolling-window tests. The relation is nonlinear: predicted tail-event probabilities change materially as markets enter the joint fragile state but flatten at extreme levels. The results identify an intraday market-based signal associated with intermediary risk-bearing conditions and the conditional distribution of future returns.
- Open Access
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Modern Financial Markets and Regulatory Innovation: Liquidity, Volatility, and Financial Stability
Financial markets have undergone a profound technological transformation over the past two decades. Advances in algorithmic trading, high-frequency data processing, electronic trading platforms, and quantitative investment strategies have converted trading venues into complex digital infrastructures where automated agents interact at millisecond speeds. Rather than treating financial markets solely as a setting for efficiency-enhancing technolo- gical change, this paper frames algorithmic markets as a leading case of a broader governance challenge: how public institutions adapt regulatory frameworks to oversee highly automated digital infrastructures operating in real time. The paper synthesizes research on liquidity, volatility, algorithmic and high-frequency trading, passive investing, retail participation, non-bank financial intermediation, market fragmentation, dark pools, and systematic intern- alisers, with particular attention to European and UK markets. Building on this literature, it develops a conceptual framework linking market infrastructure innovation, institutional lag, and regulatory innovation. We argue that the increasing speed, automation, and fragment- ation of financial markets require a shift from ex-post volatility-based interventions toward liquidity-aware and data-intensive supervision centered on market reliability. Finally, the paper examines how decentralized finance (DeFi), private markets, and AI-enabled regulat- ory technology (RegTech) are reshaping liquidity provision, market oversight, and financial stability, while identifying broader challenges for governance under rapidly evolving digital market infrastructures.
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessModern Financial Markets and Regulatory Innovation: Liquidity, Volatility, and Financial Stability
Financial markets have undergone a profound technological transformation over the past two decades. Advances in algorithmic trading, high-frequency data processing, electronic trading platforms, and quantitative investment strategies have converted trading venues into complex digital infrastructures where automated agents interact at millisecond speeds. Rather than treating financial markets solely as a setting for efficiency-enhancing technolo- gical change, this paper frames algorithmic markets as a leading case of a broader governance challenge: how public institutions adapt regulatory frameworks to oversee highly automated digital infrastructures operating in real time. The paper synthesizes research on liquidity, volatility, algorithmic and high-frequency trading, passive investing, retail participation, non-bank financial intermediation, market fragmentation, dark pools, and systematic intern- alisers, with particular attention to European and UK markets. Building on this literature, it develops a conceptual framework linking market infrastructure innovation, institutional lag, and regulatory innovation. We argue that the increasing speed, automation, and fragment- ation of financial markets require a shift from ex-post volatility-based interventions toward liquidity-aware and data-intensive supervision centered on market reliability. Finally, the paper examines how decentralized finance (DeFi), private markets, and AI-enabled regulat- ory technology (RegTech) are reshaping liquidity provision, market oversight, and financial stability, while identifying broader challenges for governance under rapidly evolving digital market infrastructures.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Can Policy Credibility Substitute for Formal Institutional Integration?Evidence from the Proposed UK--EU Emissions Trading System Linkage
Major institutional reforms rarely influence economic behaviour only when legislation enters into force. Instead, they evolve through prolonged periods of political negotiation, regulatory coordination, and expectation formation during which governments progressively establish the credibility of future institutional arrangements. Existing research on institutional innovation and policy implementation has largely focused on the legal and administrative dimensions of implementation, paying comparatively little attention to whether institutions may begin influencing economic behaviour before they become legally operational. This paper argues that policy implementation also has an economic dimension, whereby credible policy commitments reshape market expectations and behaviour prior to formal implementation. We define this process as anticipatory economic implementation: the stage in which credible institutional commitments reshape expectations and behaviour before formal legal implementation is complete. We examine this proposition using the proposed linkage between the United Kingdom and European Union Emissions Trading Systems (UK ETS and EU ETS), which provides a natural experiment separating changing institutional expectations from unchanged legal institutions. Following Brexit, successive political negotiations and joint policy announcements increased expectations of future market linkage while the two emissions trading systems remained legally independent. Using daily carbon futures prices from 2024 to 2026, we evaluate the evolution of market behaviour through structural-break analysis, rolling dependence measures, cointegration, vector error-correction models, price-discovery decomposition, and event-study analysis. We show that credible policy commitments reshape market behaviour before formal institutional implementation. Markets therefore provide observable evidence that implementation begins during the expectation-formation stage rather than only when legislation becomes legally effective. In contrast, geopolitical shocks produced comparatively temporary pricing effects with little evidence of persistent changes in market integration. The paper contributes by showing that institutions can begin shaping economic behaviour through regulatory credibility before formal implementation occurs, suggesting that policy implementation should be understood as both a legal process and an anticipatory economic process driven by expectations.
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCan Policy Credibility Substitute for Formal Institutional Integration?Evidence from the Proposed UK--EU Emissions Trading System Linkage
Major institutional reforms rarely influence economic behaviour only when legislation enters into force. Instead, they evolve through prolonged periods of political negotiation, regulatory coordination, and expectation formation during which governments progressively establish the credibility of future institutional arrangements. Existing research on institutional innovation and policy implementation has largely focused on the legal and administrative dimensions of implementation, paying comparatively little attention to whether institutions may begin influencing economic behaviour before they become legally operational. This paper argues that policy implementation also has an economic dimension, whereby credible policy commitments reshape market expectations and behaviour prior to formal implementation. We define this process as anticipatory economic implementation: the stage in which credible institutional commitments reshape expectations and behaviour before formal legal implementation is complete. We examine this proposition using the proposed linkage between the United Kingdom and European Union Emissions Trading Systems (UK ETS and EU ETS), which provides a natural experiment separating changing institutional expectations from unchanged legal institutions. Following Brexit, successive political negotiations and joint policy announcements increased expectations of future market linkage while the two emissions trading systems remained legally independent. Using daily carbon futures prices from 2024 to 2026, we evaluate the evolution of market behaviour through structural-break analysis, rolling dependence measures, cointegration, vector error-correction models, price-discovery decomposition, and event-study analysis. We show that credible policy commitments reshape market behaviour before formal institutional implementation. Markets therefore provide observable evidence that implementation begins during the expectation-formation stage rather than only when legislation becomes legally effective. In contrast, geopolitical shocks produced comparatively temporary pricing effects with little evidence of persistent changes in market integration. The paper contributes by showing that institutions can begin shaping economic behaviour through regulatory credibility before formal implementation occurs, suggesting that policy implementation should be understood as both a legal process and an anticipatory economic process driven by expectations.
- 4 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 29-62
Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets
- 4 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 29-62
Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets
- 13 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 57 (1) , 27-44
Dealers' incentives to reveal their names
This research investigates dealers' motivation to disclose their names when quoting on the NASDAQ over the years. NASDAQ enables dealers to quote limit orders either anonymously or with a feature that reveals their names. Results are consistent with dealers advertising by revealing their identities so as to develop and maintain their reputation for reliable pricing. Dealers strategically choose to reveal their identities when order flow is profitable. Post‐name disclosure analysis further suggests that named quotations are likely to be driven by informational considerations. This research contributes to our understanding of the use of non‐anonymity in electronic trading.
- 13 April 2020
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 57 (1) , 27-44
Dealers' incentives to reveal their names
This research investigates dealers' motivation to disclose their names when quoting on the NASDAQ over the years. NASDAQ enables dealers to quote limit orders either anonymously or with a feature that reveals their names. Results are consistent with dealers advertising by revealing their identities so as to develop and maintain their reputation for reliable pricing. Dealers strategically choose to reveal their identities when order flow is profitable. Post‐name disclosure analysis further suggests that named quotations are likely to be driven by informational considerations. This research contributes to our understanding of the use of non‐anonymity in electronic trading.
- 25 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Finance & Economics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 492-503
The effects of intraday news flow on dealers' quotations, market liquidity, and volatility
Market regulators emphasize that the reduction in dealers' liquidity to today's markets is one of the drivers of extreme behaviour such as flash crash. Yet the challenge is to understand the effects of intraday news flow on dealers' quoting behaviour, high‐frequency returns, price volatility, liquidity, and trading activity. This paper addresses these issues shortly before the analyst recommendation changes on the Nasdaq. The sample period is 2004 at times where dealers were frequently displaying their quotations on the system. Results show that dealers remain active in quoting, in particular, in the events when the report is issued by their affiliated analysts. Their activity is associated with lower inside spreads, more trading, a more two‐sided market, and lower order imbalance.
- 25 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Finance & Economics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 492-503
The effects of intraday news flow on dealers' quotations, market liquidity, and volatility
Market regulators emphasize that the reduction in dealers' liquidity to today's markets is one of the drivers of extreme behaviour such as flash crash. Yet the challenge is to understand the effects of intraday news flow on dealers' quoting behaviour, high‐frequency returns, price volatility, liquidity, and trading activity. This paper addresses these issues shortly before the analyst recommendation changes on the Nasdaq. The sample period is 2004 at times where dealers were frequently displaying their quotations on the system. Results show that dealers remain active in quoting, in particular, in the events when the report is issued by their affiliated analysts. Their activity is associated with lower inside spreads, more trading, a more two‐sided market, and lower order imbalance.