Caleb A. Cox
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Caleb A. Cox has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brock V. Stoddard
Department of Economics, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University, Peacock Hall, Boone, USA
2 shared publications - Andrzej Baranski
Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
1 shared publication Angela de Oliveira
1 shared publication- Arzé Karam
Durham University, Durham, UK
1 shared publication Brock Stoddard
1 shared publication- Brock Stoddard
Department of Economics, University of South Dakota, Beacom Hall, 414 E Clark St., Vermillion,SD 57069, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1
Public information and coordination with a divided majority – ERRATUM
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- p. 1
Open AccessPublic information and coordination with a divided majority – ERRATUM
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 55-77
Communication in multilateral bargaining with joint production
We experimentally investigate the effect of pre-bargaining communication on productive incentives in a multilateral bargaining game with joint production under two conditions: observable and unobservable investments. In both conditions, communication fosters fair sharing and is rarely used to pit individuals against each other. Proportional sharing arises with observable investments with or without communication, leading to high efficiency gains. Without investment observability, communication is widely used to truthfully report investments and call for equitable sharing, allowing substantial efficiency gains. Since communication occurs after production, our results highlight a novel indirect channel through which communication can enhance efficiency in social dilemmas. Our results contrast with previous findings on bargaining over an exogenous fund, where communication leads to highly unequal outcomes, competitive messages, and virtually no appeals to fairness.
- 14 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 26 (1) , 55-77
Communication in multilateral bargaining with joint production
We experimentally investigate the effect of pre-bargaining communication on productive incentives in a multilateral bargaining game with joint production under two conditions: observable and unobservable investments. In both conditions, communication fosters fair sharing and is rarely used to pit individuals against each other. Proportional sharing arises with observable investments with or without communication, leading to high efficiency gains. Without investment observability, communication is widely used to truthfully report investments and call for equitable sharing, allowing substantial efficiency gains. Since communication occurs after production, our results highlight a novel indirect channel through which communication can enhance efficiency in social dilemmas. Our results contrast with previous findings on bargaining over an exogenous fund, where communication leads to highly unequal outcomes, competitive messages, and virtually no appeals to fairness.
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (3) , 942-973
Strategic thinking in contests
We examine motives for ‘overbidding’ in contests between individuals using a “two-headed” approach to decision-making. In “two-headed” contests, subject pairs send suggested bids and messages to a partner. Content analysis of the messages provides insight into an individual’s bidding motives. In addition, we elicit measures of preferences, beliefs, and impulsiveness. We find that beliefs about others’ bids and messages that emphasize winning (i.e., utility of winning) are the most robust predictors of ‘overbidding’. Our results suggest that analyzing communication provides a rich window into an individual’s thought process when making decisions, and can complement insights from elicited values from common decision tasks (Replication materials, including data, do files, and software, are available at https://sites.google.com/view/david-bruner/research).
- 1 June 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 25 (3) , 942-973
Strategic thinking in contests
We examine motives for ‘overbidding’ in contests between individuals using a “two-headed” approach to decision-making. In “two-headed” contests, subject pairs send suggested bids and messages to a partner. Content analysis of the messages provides insight into an individual’s bidding motives. In addition, we elicit measures of preferences, beliefs, and impulsiveness. We find that beliefs about others’ bids and messages that emphasize winning (i.e., utility of winning) are the most robust predictors of ‘overbidding’. Our results suggest that analyzing communication provides a rich window into an individual’s thought process when making decisions, and can complement insights from elicited values from common decision tasks (Replication materials, including data, do files, and software, are available at https://sites.google.com/view/david-bruner/research).
- 4 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 29-62
Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets
- 4 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (1) , 29-62
Two-Period Duopolies with Forward Markets
- Open Access
Experiments on Communication in Games: Introduction to the Special Issue
Communication is an important topic in the experimental study of strategic behavior, both because of the vital role of communication in variety of strategic games, and because of the insights that can be gained through analyzing communication contents in experiments
Open AccessExperiments on Communication in Games: Introduction to the Special Issue
Communication is an important topic in the experimental study of strategic behavior, both because of the vital role of communication in variety of strategic games, and because of the insights that can be gained through analyzing communication contents in experiments
- 7 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 171, 211-213
Giving, taking, earned money, and cooperation in public good games
- 7 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 171, 211-213
Giving, taking, earned money, and cooperation in public good games
- 18 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 161, 31-43
Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams
- 18 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 161, 31-43
Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams
- Open Access
Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.
Open AccessFraming and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.