CTChristof Ferreira Torres

Christof Ferreira Torres

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Christof Ferreira Torres has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance

    by Burak Öz, Christof Ferreira Torres, Christoph Schlegel, Bruno Mazorra, Jonas Gebele, Filip Rezabek, Florian Matthes

    Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets are fragmented across block-chains, creating price differences that arbitrage helps eliminate. Today, much of this price alignment occurs against centralized exchanges, whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them dominant venues for price discovery. As trading activity moves on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges is becoming increasingly important. Yet despite its relevance to DeFi, prior work has largely been limited to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. We conduct a year-long empirical study of cross-chain arbitrage from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling USD 868.64 million in volume. Activity grows by 5.5x over the study period and surges after the Dencun upgrade on March 13, 2024. Most trades rely on pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in a median of 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, highlighting the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is substantial: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one address alone captures nearly 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. Taken together, these patterns suggest that cross-chain arbitrage can encourage vertical integration, concentrating sequencing infrastructure and economic power, thereby increasing censorship and consensus security risks. Decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are therefore important mitigation directions.

  • Open Access

    Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance

    by Burak Öz, Christof Ferreira Torres, Christoph Schlegel, Bruno Mazorra, Jonas Gebele, Filip Rezabek, Florian Matthes

  • Open Access

    Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance

    by Burak Öz, Christof Ferreira Torres, Christoph Schlegel, Bruno Mazorra, Jonas Gebele, Filip Rezabek, Florian Matthes

    Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against centralized exchanges (CEXes), whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them the primary venue for price discovery. As trading volume migrates on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges (DEXes) will become the canonical mechanism for price alignment. Yet, despite its importance to DeFi-and the on-chain transparency making real activity tractable in a way CEX-to-DEX arbitrage is not-existing research remains confined to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. In this paper, we study cross-chain arbitrage with a year-long measurement. We analyze transactions from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling 868.64 million USD volume. Activity clusters on Ethereum-centric L1-L2 pairs, grows 5.5x over the study period, and surges-higher volume, more trades, lower fees-after the Dencun upgrade (March 13, 2024) which cut costs for rollups. High-volume activity typically involves long-tail assets and moderately correlate with major asset prices. Most trades use pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, underscoring the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is high: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one alone captures almost 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. We conclude that cross-chain arbitrage fosters vertical integration, centralizing sequencing infrastructure and economic power and thereby exacerbating censorship, liveness, and finality risks; decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are critical to countering these threats.


  • Beyond the Public Mempool: Catching DeFi Attacks Before They Happen with Real-Time Smart Contract Analysis

    by Bahareh Parhizkari, Antonio Ken Iannillo, Christof Ferreira Torres, Sebastian Banescu, Joseph Xu, Radu State


  • Open Access

    Rolling in the Shadows: Analyzing the Extraction of MEV Across Layer-2 Rollups

    by Christof Ferreira Torres, Albin Mamuti, Ben Weintraub, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Shweta Shinde

    The emergence of decentralized finance has transformed asset trading on the blockchain, making traditional financial instruments more accessible while also introducing a series of exploitative economic practices known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Concurrently, decentralized finance has embraced rollup-based Layer-2 solutions to facilitate asset trading at reduced transaction costs compared to Layer-1 solutions such as Ethereum. However, rollups lack a public mempool like Ethereum, making the extraction of MEV more challenging. In this paper, we investigate the prevalence and impact of MEV on Ethereum and prominent rollups such as Arbitrum, Optimism, and zkSync over a nearly three-year period. Our analysis encompasses various metrics including volume, profits, costs, competition, and response time to MEV opportunities. We discover that MEV is widespread on rollups, with trading volume comparable to Ethereum. We also find that, although MEV costs are lower on rollups, profits are also significantly lower compared to Ethereum. Additionally, we examine the prevalence of sandwich attacks on rollups. While our findings did not detect any sandwiching activity on popular rollups, we did identify the potential for cross-layer sandwich attacks facilitated by transactions that are sent across rollups and Ethereum. Consequently, we propose and evaluate the feasibility of three novel attacks that exploit cross-layer transactions, revealing that attackers could have already earned approximately 2 million USD through cross-layer sandwich attacks.


  • Open Access

    Analyzing the Impact of Copying-and-Pasting Vulnerable Solidity Code Snippets from Question-and-Answer Websites

    by Konrad Weiss, Christof Ferreira Torres, Florian Wendland

    Ethereum smart contracts are executable programs deployed on a blockchain. Once deployed, they cannot be updated due to their inherent immutability. Moreover, they often manage valuable assets that are worth millions of dollars, making them attractive targets for attackers. The introduction of vulnerabilities in programs due to the reuse of vulnerable code posted on Q&A websites such as Stack Overflow is not a new issue. However, little effort has been made to analyze the extent of this issue on deployed smart contracts. In this paper, we conduct a study on the impact of vulnerable code reuse from Q&A websites during the development of smart contracts and provide tools uniquely fit to detect vulnerable code patterns in complete and incomplete Smart Contract code. This paper proposes a pattern-based vulnerability detection tool that is able to analyze code snippets (i.e., incomplete code) as well as full smart contracts based on the concept of code property graphs. We also propose a methodology that leverages fuzzy hashing to quickly detect code clones of vulnerable snippets among deployed smart contracts. Our results show that our vulnerability search, as well as our code clone detection, are comparable to state-of-the-art while being applicable to code snippets. Our large-scale study on 18,660 code snippets reveals that 4,596 of them are vulnerable, out of which 616 can be found in 17,852 deployed smart contracts. These results highlight that the reuse of vulnerable code snippets is indeed an issue in currently deployed smart contracts.


  • Timely Identification of Victim Addresses in DeFi Attacks

    by Bahareh Parhizkari, Antonio Ken Iannillo, Christof Ferreira Torres, Sebastian Banescu, Joseph Xu, Radu State


  • Open Access

    Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities

    by Lioba Heimbach, Lucianna Kiffer, Christof Ferreira Torres, Roger Wattenhofer

    With Ethereum's transition from Proof-of-Work to Proof-of-Stake in September 2022 came another paradigm shift, the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) scheme. PBS was introduced to decouple the roles of selecting and ordering transactions in a block (i.e., the builder), from those validating its contents and proposing the block to the network as the new head of the blockchain (i.e., the proposer). In this landscape, proposers are the validators in the Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol, while now relying on specialized block builders for creating blocks with the highest value for the proposer. Additionally, relays act as mediators between builders and proposers. We study PBS adoption and show that the current landscape exhibits significant centralization amongst the builders and relays. Further, we explore whether PBS effectively achieves its intended objectives of enabling hobbyist validators to maximize block profitability and preventing censorship. Our findings reveal that although PBS grants validators the opportunity to access optimized and competitive blocks, it tends to stimulate censorship rather than reduce it. Additionally, we demonstrate that relays do not consistently uphold their commitments and may prove unreliable. Specifically, proposers do not always receive the complete promised value, and the censorship or filtering capabilities pledged by relays exhibit significant gaps.


  • Open Access

    Elysium: Context-Aware Bytecode-Level Patching to Automatically Heal Vulnerable Smart Contracts

    by Christof Ferreira Torres, Hugo Jonker, Radu State

    Fixing bugs is easiest by patching source code. However, source code is not always available: only 0.3% of the ~49M smart contracts that are currently deployed on Ethereum have their source code publicly available. Moreover, since contracts may call functions from other contracts, security flaws in closed-source contracts may affect open-source contracts as well. However, current state-of-the-art approaches that operate on closed-source contracts (i.e., EVM bytecode), such as EVMPatch and SmartShield, make use of purely hard-coded templates that leverage fix patching patterns. As a result, they cannot dynamically adapt to the bytecode that is being patched, which severely limits their flexibility and scalability. For instance, when patching integer overflows using hard-coded templates, a particular patch template needs to be employed as the bounds to be checked are different for each integer size. In this paper, we propose Elysium, a scalable approach towards automatic smart contract repair at the bytecode level. Elysium combines template-based and semantic-based patching by inferring context information from bytecode. Elysium is currently able to patch 7 different types of vulnerabilities in smart contracts automatically and can easily be extended with new templates and new bug-finding tools. We evaluate its effectiveness and correctness using 3 different datasets by replaying more than 500K transactions on patched contracts. We find that Elysium outperforms existing tools by patching at least 30% more contracts correctly. Finally, we also compare the overhead of Elysium in terms of deployment and transaction cost. In comparison to other tools, we find that generally Elysium minimizes the runtime cost (i.e., transaction cost) up to a factor of 1.7, for only a marginally higher deployment cost, where deployment cost is a one-time cost as compared to the runtime cost.


  • The Eye of Horus: Spotting and Analyzing Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts

    by Christof Ferreira Torres, Antonio Ken Iannillo, Arthur Gervais, Radu State