Burak Öz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Burak Öz has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Florian Matthes
Technical University of Munich
6 shared publications - Jonas Gebele
Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany
5 shared publications - Filip Rezabek
Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany
4 shared publications - Bruno Mazorra
Flashbots, Barcelona, Spain
3 shared publications - Christof Ferreira Torres
Instituto Superior Técnico & University of Lisbon & INESC-ID, Lisbon, Portugal
3 shared publications - Christoph Schlegel
Flashbots, Zurich, Switzerland
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 54 (1) , 13-15
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Validator location affects resilience to regional shocks and fairness in reward access, yet in major blockchains, geographical locations are not encoded in the rules but arise from economic incentives. When some regions offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate, as seen in Ethereum. In this paper, we study validators' geographic positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design by modeling how its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, interact with the geographic distribution of validators and information sources. We analyze the model under a mean-field approximation and complement it with agent-based simulations calibrated using real-world latency data. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral: both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 54 (1) , 13-15
Open AccessGeographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Validator location affects resilience to regional shocks and fairness in reward access, yet in major blockchains, geographical locations are not encoded in the rules but arise from economic incentives. When some regions offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate, as seen in Ethereum. In this paper, we study validators' geographic positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design by modeling how its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, interact with the geographic distribution of validators and information sources. We analyze the model under a mean-field approximation and complement it with agent-based simulations calibrated using real-world latency data. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral: both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- Open Access
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 54 (1) , 19-21
Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets are fragmented across block-chains, creating price differences that arbitrage helps eliminate. Today, much of this price alignment occurs against centralized exchanges, whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them dominant venues for price discovery. As trading activity moves on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges is becoming increasingly important. Yet despite its relevance to DeFi, prior work has largely been limited to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. We conduct a year-long empirical study of cross-chain arbitrage from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling USD 868.64 million in volume. Activity grows by 5.5x over the study period and surges after the Dencun upgrade on March 13, 2024. Most trades rely on pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in a median of 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, highlighting the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is substantial: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one address alone captures nearly 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. Taken together, these patterns suggest that cross-chain arbitrage can encourage vertical integration, concentrating sequencing infrastructure and economic power, thereby increasing censorship and consensus security risks. Decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are therefore important mitigation directions.
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
- Vol. 54 (1) , 19-21
Open AccessCross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets are fragmented across block-chains, creating price differences that arbitrage helps eliminate. Today, much of this price alignment occurs against centralized exchanges, whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them dominant venues for price discovery. As trading activity moves on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges is becoming increasingly important. Yet despite its relevance to DeFi, prior work has largely been limited to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. We conduct a year-long empirical study of cross-chain arbitrage from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling USD 868.64 million in volume. Activity grows by 5.5x over the study period and surges after the Dencun upgrade on March 13, 2024. Most trades rely on pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in a median of 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, highlighting the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is substantial: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one address alone captures nearly 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. Taken together, these patterns suggest that cross-chain arbitrage can encourage vertical integration, concentrating sequencing infrastructure and economic power, thereby increasing censorship and consensus security risks. Decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are therefore important mitigation directions.
- Open Access
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 19-21
Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 19-21
Open AccessCross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
- Open Access
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 13-15
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 13-15
Open AccessGeographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
- Open Access
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-42
Geographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Where validators operate affects resilience to regional shocks (e.g., outages, natural disasters, or government intervention) as well as fairness in reward access. Yet major blockchain protocols do not encode geographical location in their rules; instead, validator locations emerge from a combination of economic incentives, regulatory constraints, infrastructure availability, and validator deployment choices. When certain locations offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate to maximize expected rewards, as observed in Ethereum, where validators cluster along the Atlantic corridor, which exhibits favorable latency. In this paper, we propose a formal model of validators' geographical positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design, capturing the interaction between its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, and the geographical distribution of validators and information sources. We analytically characterize the model under a mean-field approximation and complement this analysis with an agent-based simulation calibrated with real-world latency data to quantify how these incentives translate into geographical concentration under heterogeneous geographic and infrastructural conditions. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral. Both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- 29 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 10 (2) , 1-42
Open AccessGeographical Centralization Resilience in Ethereum's Block-Building Paradigms
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Where validators operate affects resilience to regional shocks (e.g., outages, natural disasters, or government intervention) as well as fairness in reward access. Yet major blockchain protocols do not encode geographical location in their rules; instead, validator locations emerge from a combination of economic incentives, regulatory constraints, infrastructure availability, and validator deployment choices. When certain locations offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate to maximize expected rewards, as observed in Ethereum, where validators cluster along the Atlantic corridor, which exhibits favorable latency. In this paper, we propose a formal model of validators' geographical positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design, capturing the interaction between its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, and the geographical distribution of validators and information sources. We analytically characterize the model under a mean-field approximation and complement this analysis with an agent-based simulation calibrated with real-world latency data to quantify how these incentives translate into geographical concentration under heterogeneous geographic and infrastructural conditions. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral. Both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 9 (3) , 1-33
Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against centralized exchanges (CEXes), whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them the primary venue for price discovery. As trading volume migrates on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges (DEXes) will become the canonical mechanism for price alignment. Yet, despite its importance to DeFi-and the on-chain transparency making real activity tractable in a way CEX-to-DEX arbitrage is not-existing research remains confined to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. In this paper, we study cross-chain arbitrage with a year-long measurement. We analyze transactions from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling 868.64 million USD volume. Activity clusters on Ethereum-centric L1-L2 pairs, grows 5.5x over the study period, and surges-higher volume, more trades, lower fees-after the Dencun upgrade (March 13, 2024) which cut costs for rollups. High-volume activity typically involves long-tail assets and moderately correlate with major asset prices. Most trades use pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, underscoring the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is high: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one alone captures almost 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. We conclude that cross-chain arbitrage fosters vertical integration, centralizing sequencing infrastructure and economic power and thereby exacerbating censorship, liveness, and finality risks; decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are critical to countering these threats.
- 2 December 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
- Vol. 9 (3) , 1-33
Open AccessCross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against centralized exchanges (CEXes), whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them the primary venue for price discovery. As trading volume migrates on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges (DEXes) will become the canonical mechanism for price alignment. Yet, despite its importance to DeFi-and the on-chain transparency making real activity tractable in a way CEX-to-DEX arbitrage is not-existing research remains confined to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. In this paper, we study cross-chain arbitrage with a year-long measurement. We analyze transactions from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling 868.64 million USD volume. Activity clusters on Ethereum-centric L1-L2 pairs, grows 5.5x over the study period, and surges-higher volume, more trades, lower fees-after the Dencun upgrade (March 13, 2024) which cut costs for rollups. High-volume activity typically involves long-tail assets and moderately correlate with major asset prices. Most trades use pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, underscoring the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is high: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one alone captures almost 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. We conclude that cross-chain arbitrage fosters vertical integration, centralizing sequencing infrastructure and economic power and thereby exacerbating censorship, liveness, and finality risks; decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are critical to countering these threats.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 16-26
Sealed-Bid Auctions via TEE-Backed Confidential Compute Blockchains
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 16-26
Open AccessSealed-Bid Auctions via TEE-Backed Confidential Compute Blockchains
- Open Access
- 8 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 288-297
A Study of MEV Extraction Techniques on a First-Come-First-Served Blockchain
- 8 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 288-297
Open AccessA Study of MEV Extraction Techniques on a First-Come-First-Served Blockchain
- Open Access
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-8
Time Moves Faster When There is Nothing You Anticipate: The Role of Time in MEV Rewards
We present a novel analysis of a competitive dynamic present on Ethereum known as "waiting games", where validators can use their distinct monopoly position in their assigned slots to delay block proposals in order to optimize returns through Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) payments, a type of incentive outside the Proof-of-Stake incentive scheme. However, this strategy risks block exclusion due to missed slots or potential orphaning. Our analysis reveals evidence that, although there are substantial incentives to undertaking the risks, validators are not capitalizing on waiting games, leaving potential profits unrealized. Moreover, we present an agent-based model to test the eventual consensus disruption caused by waiting games under different settings, arguing that such disruption only occurs with significant delay strategies. Ultimately, this research provides in-depth insights into Ethereum's waiting games, illuminating the trade-offs and potential profit opportunities for validators in this evolving blockchain landscape.
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-8
Open AccessTime Moves Faster When There is Nothing You Anticipate: The Role of Time in MEV Rewards
We present a novel analysis of a competitive dynamic present on Ethereum known as "waiting games", where validators can use their distinct monopoly position in their assigned slots to delay block proposals in order to optimize returns through Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) payments, a type of incentive outside the Proof-of-Stake incentive scheme. However, this strategy risks block exclusion due to missed slots or potential orphaning. Our analysis reveals evidence that, although there are substantial incentives to undertaking the risks, validators are not capitalizing on waiting games, leaving potential profits unrealized. Moreover, we present an agent-based model to test the eventual consensus disruption caused by waiting games under different settings, arguing that such disruption only occurs with significant delay strategies. Ultimately, this research provides in-depth insights into Ethereum's waiting games, illuminating the trade-offs and potential profit opportunities for validators in this evolving blockchain landscape.