Marcel van Ackeren
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Marcel van Ackeren has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Martin Sticker
University of Bristol
2 shared publications - Alfred Archer
Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Matthieu Queloz
Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Simon Derpmann
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (2) , 413-424
Virtue Ethics and the Morality System
Virtue ethics is frequently billed as a remedy to the problems of deontological and consequentialist ethics that Bernard Williams identified in his critique of “the morality system.” But how far can virtue ethics be relied upon to avoid these problems? What does Williams’s critique of the morality system mean for virtue ethics? To answer this question, we offer a more principled characterisation of the defining features of the morality system in terms of its organising ambition—to shelter life against luck. This reveals the system to be multiply realisable: the same function can be served by substantively different but functionally equivalent ideas. After identifying four requirements that ethical thought must meet to function as a morality system, we show that they can also be met by certain constellations of virtue-ethical ideas, including notably Stoicism. We thereby demonstrate the possibility of virtue-ethical morality systems raising problems analogous to those besetting their deontological and consequentialist counterparts. This not only widens the scope of Williams’s critique and brings out the cautionary aspect of his legacy for virtue ethics; it also offers contemporary virtue ethicists a more principled understanding of the functional features that mark out morality systems and lie at the root of their problems, thereby helping them avoid or overcome these problems.
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 43 (2) , 413-424
Open AccessVirtue Ethics and the Morality System
Virtue ethics is frequently billed as a remedy to the problems of deontological and consequentialist ethics that Bernard Williams identified in his critique of “the morality system.” But how far can virtue ethics be relied upon to avoid these problems? What does Williams’s critique of the morality system mean for virtue ethics? To answer this question, we offer a more principled characterisation of the defining features of the morality system in terms of its organising ambition—to shelter life against luck. This reveals the system to be multiply realisable: the same function can be served by substantively different but functionally equivalent ideas. After identifying four requirements that ethical thought must meet to function as a morality system, we show that they can also be met by certain constellations of virtue-ethical ideas, including notably Stoicism. We thereby demonstrate the possibility of virtue-ethical morality systems raising problems analogous to those besetting their deontological and consequentialist counterparts. This not only widens the scope of Williams’s critique and brings out the cautionary aspect of his legacy for virtue ethics; it also offers contemporary virtue ethicists a more principled understanding of the functional features that mark out morality systems and lie at the root of their problems, thereby helping them avoid or overcome these problems.
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Moral Philosophy and Politics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 1-8
Introduction to the Special Issue on Demandingness in Practice
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Moral Philosophy and Politics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 1-8
Introduction to the Special Issue on Demandingness in Practice
- 21 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 407-428
Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant
We discuss Kant’s conception of moral rationalism from the viewpoint of recent debates, which have distinguished different forms of moral rationalism. We argue that Kant’s version, ‘silencing’, is different and stronger than currently held versions of moral rationalism and that it also differs from versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. We then discuss Kant’s version of silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and argue that silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding. However, it is important that whilst in cases of conflict between duty and personal happiness the normative standing of the latter is silenced, silencing does not require that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect duties. We finally indicate the kind of latitude imperfect duties allow for, according to Kant’s strong form of moral rationalism.
- 21 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 407-428
Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant
We discuss Kant’s conception of moral rationalism from the viewpoint of recent debates, which have distinguished different forms of moral rationalism. We argue that Kant’s version, ‘silencing’, is different and stronger than currently held versions of moral rationalism and that it also differs from versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. We then discuss Kant’s version of silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and argue that silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding. However, it is important that whilst in cases of conflict between duty and personal happiness the normative standing of the latter is silenced, silencing does not require that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect duties. We finally indicate the kind of latitude imperfect duties allow for, according to Kant’s strong form of moral rationalism.
- 21 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 373-378
Kant and the Problem of Demandingness: Introduction
- 21 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 373-378
Kant and the Problem of Demandingness: Introduction
- 27 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 315-334
How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost vs. Difficulty and Restriction
The standard view of demandingness understands demandingness exclusively as a matter of costs to the agent. The paper discusses whether the standard view must be given up because we should think of demandingness as a matter of difficulty or restriction of options. I will argue that difficulty can indeed increase demandingness, but only insofar as it leads to further costs. As to restrictions of options, I will show that confinement can become costly and thus increase demandingness in three ways, by prohibiting actions that the agent wants to perform in order to promote his well-being, by limiting the development of future preferences and projects and also by making the society less open. The paper thus defends a new variant of the standard view by arguing that difficulty and restrictions of options can increase the demandingness of morality on grounds of being costly.
- 27 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 315-334
How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost vs. Difficulty and Restriction
The standard view of demandingness understands demandingness exclusively as a matter of costs to the agent. The paper discusses whether the standard view must be given up because we should think of demandingness as a matter of difficulty or restriction of options. I will argue that difficulty can indeed increase demandingness, but only insofar as it leads to further costs. As to restrictions of options, I will show that confinement can become costly and thus increase demandingness in three ways, by prohibiting actions that the agent wants to perform in order to promote his well-being, by limiting the development of future preferences and projects and also by making the society less open. The paper thus defends a new variant of the standard view by arguing that difficulty and restrictions of options can increase the demandingness of morality on grounds of being costly.
- 27 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 301-307
Self-Sacrifice and Moral Philosophy
On 14 February 2018, Nikolaz Cruz carried out a gun attack in a Florida High School, killing 17 people. Among the victims was the 15-year-old school student and junior cadet Peter Wang, who died wh...
- 27 May 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 26 (3) , 301-307
Self-Sacrifice and Moral Philosophy
On 14 February 2018, Nikolaz Cruz carried out a gun attack in a Florida High School, killing 17 people. Among the victims was the 15-year-old school student and junior cadet Peter Wang, who died wh...