Martin Sticker
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Martin Sticker has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joe Saunders
Durham University
2 shared publications - Marcel van Ackeren
Mansfield College, Oxford
2 shared publications Corinna Mieth
Ruhr University Bochum
1 shared publication- Corinna Mieth
Institute for Philosophy, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
1 shared publication Daniel Wenz
1 shared publication- David Bakhurst
Queen’s University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- p. 1-22
The Formula of Humanity and Mistreatment of Migrants: Instrumentalization, Indifference, and Hostility
We argue that Kant’s Formula of Humanity (FH) should be expanded to provide a more nuanced analysis of complex real-world cases of mistreatment. Our specific focus is mistreatment of migrants. Migrants are not only mistreated due to their perceived instrumental value (as a mere means) but also by treating them as of no value (as a mere thing) or mistreating them due to perceived instrumental or intrinsic disvalue (as a mere threat). The well-known prohibition against instrumentalization must be supplemented by prohibitions against certain forms of indifference and certain forms of hostility. In our article, we outline these additional categories of mistreatment and explain how they relate to each other and to the prohibition against treatment as a mere means. Our goal is to show how these categories can account for a number of ethically significant phenomena that the FH as it stands does not explicitly cover.
- 7 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- p. 1-22
Open AccessThe Formula of Humanity and Mistreatment of Migrants: Instrumentalization, Indifference, and Hostility
We argue that Kant’s Formula of Humanity (FH) should be expanded to provide a more nuanced analysis of complex real-world cases of mistreatment. Our specific focus is mistreatment of migrants. Migrants are not only mistreated due to their perceived instrumental value (as a mere means) but also by treating them as of no value (as a mere thing) or mistreating them due to perceived instrumental or intrinsic disvalue (as a mere threat). The well-known prohibition against instrumentalization must be supplemented by prohibitions against certain forms of indifference and certain forms of hostility. In our article, we outline these additional categories of mistreatment and explain how they relate to each other and to the prohibition against treatment as a mere means. Our goal is to show how these categories can account for a number of ethically significant phenomena that the FH as it stands does not explicitly cover.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Universidad Iberoamericana, A. C. in Revista de Filosofía Universidad Iberoamericana
- Vol. 58 (161) , 198-247
Kant y los trabajos basura – Ser un mero medio y ser un verdadero medio
En años recientes ha habido una gran discusión pública y académica acerca de los trabajos inútiles, siguiendo la concepción de David Graeber sobre los trabajos basura. Immanuel Kant sostiene que debemos ser medios para otras personas y que es un deber ser de provecho para otros. Tanto Graeber como Kant se preocupan por el tipo de daño que a menudo es ignorado en la ética y filosofía política contemporánea, a saber, la inutilidad impuesta o forzada. El fenómeno de los trabajos basura puede ayudarnos a entender mejor lo que está implicado en el deber de ser de provecho para otros o de fungir como medio para otras personas. En este artículo sostengo que, para Kant, los agentes deben ser verdaderos medios para otros. Propongo que, para ser un verdadero medio, un agente debe funcionar como un medio para los fines de los demás, independientemente de si al hacerlo está motivado por el respeto a la ley moral. A esta interpretación del ser de provecho la llamaré Beneficencia Externa. Una de las razones por las que los trabajos basura son moralmente problemáticos es que impiden el ejercicio de la beneficencia externa.
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Universidad Iberoamericana, A. C. in Revista de Filosofía Universidad Iberoamericana
- Vol. 58 (161) , 198-247
Open AccessKant y los trabajos basura – Ser un mero medio y ser un verdadero medio
En años recientes ha habido una gran discusión pública y académica acerca de los trabajos inútiles, siguiendo la concepción de David Graeber sobre los trabajos basura. Immanuel Kant sostiene que debemos ser medios para otras personas y que es un deber ser de provecho para otros. Tanto Graeber como Kant se preocupan por el tipo de daño que a menudo es ignorado en la ética y filosofía política contemporánea, a saber, la inutilidad impuesta o forzada. El fenómeno de los trabajos basura puede ayudarnos a entender mejor lo que está implicado en el deber de ser de provecho para otros o de fungir como medio para otras personas. En este artículo sostengo que, para Kant, los agentes deben ser verdaderos medios para otros. Propongo que, para ser un verdadero medio, un agente debe funcionar como un medio para los fines de los demás, independientemente de si al hacerlo está motivado por el respeto a la ley moral. A esta interpretación del ser de provecho la llamaré Beneficencia Externa. Una de las razones por las que los trabajos basura son moralmente problemáticos es que impiden el ejercicio de la beneficencia externa.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 90
The Formula of Humanity and AI Use
Aylsworth and Castro have argued that, following Kant’s Formula of Humanity, using ChatGPT to write humanities essays constitutes a violation of a duty to cultivate one’s humanity. I first turn to a critical evaluation of their argument and then point to a further dimension in which the FH has a bearing on the ethics of AI use. My positive contribution is to propose that Kant’s Formula of Humanity can contribute to the ethics of LLM use when we focus on the prohibition against treating others as mere means. Kant’s practical philosophy is in an excellent position to capture both the danger of treating others as mere means and to account for the value of being a means. AI may endanger both: the status of some workers as ends rather than mere means and the ability of workers to function as ends on their own terms.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 90
Open AccessThe Formula of Humanity and AI Use
Aylsworth and Castro have argued that, following Kant’s Formula of Humanity, using ChatGPT to write humanities essays constitutes a violation of a duty to cultivate one’s humanity. I first turn to a critical evaluation of their argument and then point to a further dimension in which the FH has a bearing on the ethics of AI use. My positive contribution is to propose that Kant’s Formula of Humanity can contribute to the ethics of LLM use when we focus on the prohibition against treating others as mere means. Kant’s practical philosophy is in an excellent position to capture both the danger of treating others as mere means and to account for the value of being a means. AI may endanger both: the status of some workers as ends rather than mere means and the ability of workers to function as ends on their own terms.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (4) , 1326-1342
Treating as a Mere Enemy
I argue that Kant's Formula of Humanity should incorporate the category of treating as a mere enemy in the form of a strict prohibition against this form of mistreatment. My proposed expansion will allow Kantian ethics to account for persons being mistreated due to their instrumental disvalue or perceived danger. Treating persons as mere enemies can take the form of murder and genocide, but also of exclusion and marginalization. I explain why we need this category on top of the prohibition against treating as mere means and the broader command to treat others as ends. Moreover, I analyse the different types of mere enemies (devils and vermin) that we find in ideology and discourse leading up to some of the most disturbing moral violations. Finally, I look at the complex interplays between mere enemies and mere means.
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 33 (4) , 1326-1342
Open AccessTreating as a Mere Enemy
I argue that Kant's Formula of Humanity should incorporate the category of treating as a mere enemy in the form of a strict prohibition against this form of mistreatment. My proposed expansion will allow Kantian ethics to account for persons being mistreated due to their instrumental disvalue or perceived danger. Treating persons as mere enemies can take the form of murder and genocide, but also of exclusion and marginalization. I explain why we need this category on top of the prohibition against treating as mere means and the broader command to treat others as ends. Moreover, I analyse the different types of mere enemies (devils and vermin) that we find in ideology and discourse leading up to some of the most disturbing moral violations. Finally, I look at the complex interplays between mere enemies and mere means.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Kant on Being a Useful Member of the World and Universal Basic Income
I argue that there are Kantian grounds to endorse a Universal Basic Income (UBI) and that Kant’s practical philosophy can contribute to current debates about the ethics of UBI. I will make two points that mutually support each other. Firstly, there is a pro tanto argument for Kantians to work towards a UBI. A UBI, more so than conditional welfare schemes, enables agents to live up to their duty to be a useful member of the world. This should be conceptualized as an indirect duty to implement a UBI. Secondly, Kant’s ethics suggests a way to tackle the most pressing ethical objection against a UBI, the unfairness or surfer objection. The requirement that agents be useful for others is ethical and thus cannot be enforced externally. Yet, there is rational pressure on agents to do their part. Kant and UBI advocates can learn a great deal from each other.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by University of Michigan Library in Ergo An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 12
Open AccessKant on Being a Useful Member of the World and Universal Basic Income
I argue that there are Kantian grounds to endorse a Universal Basic Income (UBI) and that Kant’s practical philosophy can contribute to current debates about the ethics of UBI. I will make two points that mutually support each other. Firstly, there is a pro tanto argument for Kantians to work towards a UBI. A UBI, more so than conditional welfare schemes, enables agents to live up to their duty to be a useful member of the world. This should be conceptualized as an indirect duty to implement a UBI. Secondly, Kant’s ethics suggests a way to tackle the most pressing ethical objection against a UBI, the unfairness or surfer objection. The requirement that agents be useful for others is ethical and thus cannot be enforced externally. Yet, there is rational pressure on agents to do their part. Kant and UBI advocates can learn a great deal from each other.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Kant-Studien
- Vol. 115 (4) , 545-550
Paul Guyer: Kant’s Impact on Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2024. ISBN: 9780199592456.
Article Paul Guyer: Kant’s Impact on Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2024. ISBN: 9780199592456. was published on December 31, 2024 in the journal Kant-Studien (volume 115, issue 4).
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Kant-Studien
- Vol. 115 (4) , 545-550
Open AccessPaul Guyer: Kant’s Impact on Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2024. ISBN: 9780199592456.
Article Paul Guyer: Kant’s Impact on Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2024. ISBN: 9780199592456. was published on December 31, 2024 in the journal Kant-Studien (volume 115, issue 4).
- Open Access
- 4 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 29 (2) , 239-247
Working Oneself Up and Universal Basic Income
I respond to a challenge raised by Jordan Pascoe: Kant’s conception of obtaining full citizenship through working oneself up necessarily condemns some people to passive citizenship. I argue that we should not focus on work to establish universal full citizenship. Rather, a Universal Basic Income, an income paid regularly to everyone and without conditions, can secure everyone’s full citizenship. Moreover, I argue that such a scheme is more Kantian in nature than hitherto assumed.
- 4 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Kantian Review
- Vol. 29 (2) , 239-247
Open AccessWorking Oneself Up and Universal Basic Income
I respond to a challenge raised by Jordan Pascoe: Kant’s conception of obtaining full citizenship through working oneself up necessarily condemns some people to passive citizenship. I argue that we should not focus on work to establish universal full citizenship. Rather, a Universal Basic Income, an income paid regularly to everyone and without conditions, can secure everyone’s full citizenship. Moreover, I argue that such a scheme is more Kantian in nature than hitherto assumed.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 75-76
Correction to: Kant on the Normativity of Obligatory Ends
- 23 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 75-76
Open AccessCorrection to: Kant on the Normativity of Obligatory Ends
- Open Access
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 53-73
Kant on the Normativity of Obligatory Ends
I propose a novel way to understand the stringency of Kant’s conception of beneficence. This novel understanding can ground our intuition that we do not have to forego (almost) all pursuit of our personal ends. I argue that we should understand the application of imperfect duties to specific cases according to the framework set by the adoption and promotion of ends. Agents have other ends than obligatory ones and they must weigh obligatory ends against these other ends. Obligatory ends are special among ends only insofar as their adoption is not optional. My reading of the normative status of imperfect duties affords a way of thinking about beneficence modelled on the everyday ways in which agents pursue their personal projects and weigh different ends against each other. This establishes a middle-ground between an extremely demanding conception of beneficence and an overly latitudinarian one. Furthermore, it helps us understand why we do not have to be maximally beneficent and why there is a bias towards the near in our thinking about rescue cases.
- 3 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Ethics
- Vol. 28 (1) , 53-73
Open AccessKant on the Normativity of Obligatory Ends
I propose a novel way to understand the stringency of Kant’s conception of beneficence. This novel understanding can ground our intuition that we do not have to forego (almost) all pursuit of our personal ends. I argue that we should understand the application of imperfect duties to specific cases according to the framework set by the adoption and promotion of ends. Agents have other ends than obligatory ones and they must weigh obligatory ends against these other ends. Obligatory ends are special among ends only insofar as their adoption is not optional. My reading of the normative status of imperfect duties affords a way of thinking about beneficence modelled on the everyday ways in which agents pursue their personal projects and weigh different ends against each other. This establishes a middle-ground between an extremely demanding conception of beneficence and an overly latitudinarian one. Furthermore, it helps us understand why we do not have to be maximally beneficent and why there is a bias towards the near in our thinking about rescue cases.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 26 (2) , 169-175
Kant and Global Poverty: Guest Editors’ Introduction to Special Issue
- 1 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 26 (2) , 169-175
Open AccessKant and Global Poverty: Guest Editors’ Introduction to Special Issue