Ronghuo Zheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ronghuo Zheng has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Gaoqing Zhang
University of Minnesota
2 shared publicationsVolker Laux
University of Texas at Austin - McCombs School of Business
2 shared publicationsAysa Dordzhieva
University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication- Aysa Dordzhieva1 shared publication
- Carlos Corona
The Ohio State University
1 shared publication - Carlos Corona
Ohio State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-20
Whistleblowing and Internal Communication
We investigate how incentives provided by whistleblowing programs affect the likelihood of whistleblowing, firm value, and social welfare in the presence of endogenous internal communication. Specifically, we focus on a myopic manager’s ex post decision on internal communication with the employee. An informed employee plays a dual role: working to fix the defect internally or acting as a whistleblower to expose the misconduct if the manager withholds defect information from the public. We find that, when the whistleblowing reward is relatively small, providing stronger incentives increases the likelihood of whistleblowing and can help improve firm value and social welfare. However, once rewards become excessively large and compromise internal communication, contrary to conventional wisdom, the likelihood of whistleblowing declines and both firm value and social welfare decline too. We also characterize the optimal whistleblowing rewards designed by strategic regulators seeking to maximize firm value or social welfare. JEL Classifications: D83; G30; G34; M40.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-20
Whistleblowing and Internal Communication
We investigate how incentives provided by whistleblowing programs affect the likelihood of whistleblowing, firm value, and social welfare in the presence of endogenous internal communication. Specifically, we focus on a myopic manager’s ex post decision on internal communication with the employee. An informed employee plays a dual role: working to fix the defect internally or acting as a whistleblower to expose the misconduct if the manager withholds defect information from the public. We find that, when the whistleblowing reward is relatively small, providing stronger incentives increases the likelihood of whistleblowing and can help improve firm value and social welfare. However, once rewards become excessively large and compromise internal communication, contrary to conventional wisdom, the likelihood of whistleblowing declines and both firm value and social welfare decline too. We also characterize the optimal whistleblowing rewards designed by strategic regulators seeking to maximize firm value or social welfare. JEL Classifications: D83; G30; G34; M40.
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1629-1677
Public Disclosure of Private Meetings: Does Observing Peers’ Information Acquisition Affect Analysts’ Attention Allocation?
We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short‐term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow‐up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow‐up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first‐mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre‐mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short‐term information environments of unvisited peer firms.
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1629-1677
Public Disclosure of Private Meetings: Does Observing Peers’ Information Acquisition Affect Analysts’ Attention Allocation?
We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short‐term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow‐up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow‐up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first‐mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre‐mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short‐term information environments of unvisited peer firms.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Supplier Performance and CEO Compensation Contracts: Theory and Evidence
This study examines how a firm’s strategic interactions with its suppliers influence its executive compensation contracts. We develop a parsimonious model demonstrating that a firm’s board can link CEO pay positively to supplier performance as a commitment mechanism to encourage supplier investment in production capacity. Our empirical analysis provides evidence consistent with this prediction, indicating that managerial incentives, on average, reflect not only the interests of the firm but also those of its supply base. Cross-sectional results reveal that positive incentive weights on supplier performance are larger for firms whose suppliers operate closer to full capacity, for firms with more financially constrained suppliers, and for firms with major suppliers. Additionally, we find that suppliers increase their capital expenditures after their customers’ CEO compensation is positively linked to supplier performance.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSupplier Performance and CEO Compensation Contracts: Theory and Evidence
This study examines how a firm’s strategic interactions with its suppliers influence its executive compensation contracts. We develop a parsimonious model demonstrating that a firm’s board can link CEO pay positively to supplier performance as a commitment mechanism to encourage supplier investment in production capacity. Our empirical analysis provides evidence consistent with this prediction, indicating that managerial incentives, on average, reflect not only the interests of the firm but also those of its supply base. Cross-sectional results reveal that positive incentive weights on supplier performance are larger for firms whose suppliers operate closer to full capacity, for firms with more financially constrained suppliers, and for firms with major suppliers. Additionally, we find that suppliers increase their capital expenditures after their customers’ CEO compensation is positively linked to supplier performance.
- Open Access
- 5 February 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (2) , 457-481
Optimal Reporting Systems in Bank Runs
We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank’s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank’s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.
- 5 February 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (2) , 457-481
Open AccessOptimal Reporting Systems in Bank Runs
We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank’s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank’s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (5) , 3660-3679
Does Transportation Mean Transplantation? Impact of New Airline Routes on Sharing of Cadaveric Kidneys
Every year, nearly 5,000 patients die while waiting for kidney transplants, and yet an estimated 3,500 procured kidneys are discarded. Such a polarized coexistence of dire scarcity and massive wastefulness has been mainly driven by insufficient pooling of cadaveric kidneys across geographic regions. Although numerous policy initiatives are aimed at broadening organ pooling, they rarely account for a key friction—efficient airline transportation, ideally direct flights, is necessary for long-distance sharing, because of the time-sensitive nature of kidney transplantation. Conceivably, transplant centers may be reluctant to accept kidney offers from far-off locations without direct flights. In this paper, we estimate the effect of the introduction of new airline routes on broader kidney sharing. By merging the U.S. airline transportation and kidney transplantation data sets, we create a unique sample tracking (1) the evolution of airline routes connecting all the U.S. airports and (2) kidney transplants between donors and recipients connected by these airports. We estimate the introduction of a new airline route increases the number of shared kidneys by 7.3%. We also find a net increase in the total number of kidney transplants and a decrease in the organ discard rate with the introduction of new routes. Notably, the posttransplant survival rate remains largely unchanged, although average travel distance increases after the introduction of new airline routes. Our results are robust to alternative empirical specifications and have important implications for improving access to the U.S. organ transplantation system. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 1 May 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (5) , 3660-3679
Does Transportation Mean Transplantation? Impact of New Airline Routes on Sharing of Cadaveric Kidneys
Every year, nearly 5,000 patients die while waiting for kidney transplants, and yet an estimated 3,500 procured kidneys are discarded. Such a polarized coexistence of dire scarcity and massive wastefulness has been mainly driven by insufficient pooling of cadaveric kidneys across geographic regions. Although numerous policy initiatives are aimed at broadening organ pooling, they rarely account for a key friction—efficient airline transportation, ideally direct flights, is necessary for long-distance sharing, because of the time-sensitive nature of kidney transplantation. Conceivably, transplant centers may be reluctant to accept kidney offers from far-off locations without direct flights. In this paper, we estimate the effect of the introduction of new airline routes on broader kidney sharing. By merging the U.S. airline transportation and kidney transplantation data sets, we create a unique sample tracking (1) the evolution of airline routes connecting all the U.S. airports and (2) kidney transplants between donors and recipients connected by these airports. We estimate the introduction of a new airline route increases the number of shared kidneys by 7.3%. We also find a net increase in the total number of kidney transplants and a decrease in the organ discard rate with the introduction of new routes. Notably, the posttransplant survival rate remains largely unchanged, although average travel distance increases after the introduction of new airline routes. Our results are robust to alternative empirical specifications and have important implications for improving access to the U.S. organ transplantation system. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- 14 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 74 (1)
Signaling private information via accounting system design
- 14 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 74 (1)
Signaling private information via accounting system design
- 16 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 207-245
No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts
This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.
- 16 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 207-245
No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts
This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 71 (1)
Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 71 (1)
Word-of-mouth communication, noise-driven volatility, and public disclosure
- Open Access
- 30 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Reporting Rules in Bank Runs
We study the role of reporting rules in the context of bank runs. In our model, a financial institution receives an early but imprecise estimate of the performance of its investment and issues a report subject to a reporting rule. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting rule requires full disclosure when the financial institution's early estimate is sufficiently unfavorable, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, the threshold below which the financial institution reports should be tailored to the financial institution's exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the optimal reporting threshold is non-monotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards for asset impairments.
- 30 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessReporting Rules in Bank Runs
We study the role of reporting rules in the context of bank runs. In our model, a financial institution receives an early but imprecise estimate of the performance of its investment and issues a report subject to a reporting rule. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting rule requires full disclosure when the financial institution's early estimate is sufficiently unfavorable, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, the threshold below which the financial institution reports should be tailored to the financial institution's exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the optimal reporting threshold is non-monotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards for asset impairments.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Signaling Entrepreneurial Vision via Information System Design
Earnings reports are informative about a firm’s current performance but convey little information about the prospects of the firm’s long-term vision. We show that entrepreneurs can signal favorable private information about their long-term prospects by choosing an accounting system that upward biases current earnings. An upward biased accounting system causes investors to overinvest in the firm’s projects, which increases the cost of capital, all else equal. But the mere fact that the entrepreneur is willing to adopt such a system signals a booming long-term prospect, which ultimately allows the entrepreneur to raise capital at a lower cost. We also study the effects of regulation that restricts the maximum allowable accounting bias and find that stricter regulation first decreases and then increases investment efficiency. Regulation that maximizes investment efficiency is not necessarily socially optimal when entrepreneurs must take costly actions to develop a long-term vision in the first place, because such regulation can reduce incentives to take these actions.
- 9 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessSignaling Entrepreneurial Vision via Information System Design
Earnings reports are informative about a firm’s current performance but convey little information about the prospects of the firm’s long-term vision. We show that entrepreneurs can signal favorable private information about their long-term prospects by choosing an accounting system that upward biases current earnings. An upward biased accounting system causes investors to overinvest in the firm’s projects, which increases the cost of capital, all else equal. But the mere fact that the entrepreneur is willing to adopt such a system signals a booming long-term prospect, which ultimately allows the entrepreneur to raise capital at a lower cost. We also study the effects of regulation that restricts the maximum allowable accounting bias and find that stricter regulation first decreases and then increases investment efficiency. Regulation that maximizes investment efficiency is not necessarily socially optimal when entrepreneurs must take costly actions to develop a long-term vision in the first place, because such regulation can reduce incentives to take these actions.