RZRonghuo Zheng

Ronghuo Zheng

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ronghuo Zheng has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Whistleblowing and Internal Communication

    by Lin Nan, Ronghuo Zheng

    We investigate how incentives provided by whistleblowing programs affect the likelihood of whistleblowing, firm value, and social welfare in the presence of endogenous internal communication. Specifically, we focus on a myopic manager’s ex post decision on internal communication with the employee. An informed employee plays a dual role: working to fix the defect internally or acting as a whistleblower to expose the misconduct if the manager withholds defect information from the public. We find that, when the whistleblowing reward is relatively small, providing stronger incentives increases the likelihood of whistleblowing and can help improve firm value and social welfare. However, once rewards become excessively large and compromise internal communication, contrary to conventional wisdom, the likelihood of whistleblowing declines and both firm value and social welfare decline too. We also characterize the optimal whistleblowing rewards designed by strategic regulators seeking to maximize firm value or social welfare. JEL Classifications: D83; G30; G34; M40.

  • Public Disclosure of Private Meetings: Does Observing Peers’ Information Acquisition Affect Analysts’ Attention Allocation?

    by Yi Ru, Ronghuo Zheng, Yuan Zou

    We investigate the impact of observing peers’ information acquisition on financial analysts’ allocation of attention. Using the timely disclosure mandate by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange as a setting, we find that, shortly after analysts observe that a firm has been visited by peer analysts, they reduce short‐term attention to that firm, as indicated by a reduced tendency to conduct follow‐up visits. Nonvisiting analysts who do not conduct follow‐up visits are more likely to discontinue coverage of the visited firm. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the timely disclosure reveals the first‐mover advantage of visiting analysts, leading nonvisiting ones to reallocate their limited attention. We also find that, compared with the pre‐mandate period, the information environments of visited firms deteriorate immediately after an analyst's visit but not over the longer term. Further evidence suggests that the timely disclosure mandate has positive externalities in the form of increased immediate attention to and improved short‐term information environments of unvisited peer firms.


  • Open Access

    Supplier Performance and CEO Compensation Contracts: Theory and Evidence

    by Ronghuo Zheng, Zhe (Michael) Guo, Meng Yan

    This study examines how a firm’s strategic interactions with its suppliers influence its executive compensation contracts. We develop a parsimonious model demonstrating that a firm’s board can link CEO pay positively to supplier performance as a commitment mechanism to encourage supplier investment in production capacity. Our empirical analysis provides evidence consistent with this prediction, indicating that managerial incentives, on average, reflect not only the interests of the firm but also those of its supply base. Cross-sectional results reveal that positive incentive weights on supplier performance are larger for firms whose suppliers operate closer to full capacity, for firms with more financially constrained suppliers, and for firms with major suppliers. Additionally, we find that suppliers increase their capital expenditures after their customers’ CEO compensation is positively linked to supplier performance.

  • Open Access

    Optimal Reporting Systems in Bank Runs

    by Gaoqing Zhang, Ronghuo Zheng

    We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank’s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank’s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.


  • Does Transportation Mean Transplantation? Impact of New Airline Routes on Sharing of Cadaveric Kidneys

    by Guihua Wang, Ronghuo Zheng, Tinglong Dai

    Every year, nearly 5,000 patients die while waiting for kidney transplants, and yet an estimated 3,500 procured kidneys are discarded. Such a polarized coexistence of dire scarcity and massive wastefulness has been mainly driven by insufficient pooling of cadaveric kidneys across geographic regions. Although numerous policy initiatives are aimed at broadening organ pooling, they rarely account for a key friction—efficient airline transportation, ideally direct flights, is necessary for long-distance sharing, because of the time-sensitive nature of kidney transplantation. Conceivably, transplant centers may be reluctant to accept kidney offers from far-off locations without direct flights. In this paper, we estimate the effect of the introduction of new airline routes on broader kidney sharing. By merging the U.S. airline transportation and kidney transplantation data sets, we create a unique sample tracking (1) the evolution of airline routes connecting all the U.S. airports and (2) kidney transplants between donors and recipients connected by these airports. We estimate the introduction of a new airline route increases the number of shared kidneys by 7.3%. We also find a net increase in the total number of kidney transplants and a decrease in the organ discard rate with the introduction of new routes. Notably, the posttransplant survival rate remains largely unchanged, although average travel distance increases after the introduction of new airline routes. Our results are robust to alternative empirical specifications and have important implications for improving access to the U.S. organ transplantation system. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.


  • No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts

    by Cyrus Aghamolla, Carlos Corona, Ronghuo Zheng

    This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.


  • Open Access

    Reporting Rules in Bank Runs

    by Gaoqing Zhang, Ronghuo Zheng

    We study the role of reporting rules in the context of bank runs. In our model, a financial institution receives an early but imprecise estimate of the performance of its investment and issues a report subject to a reporting rule. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting rule requires full disclosure when the financial institution's early estimate is sufficiently unfavorable, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, the threshold below which the financial institution reports should be tailored to the financial institution's exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the optimal reporting threshold is non-monotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards for asset impairments.

  • Open Access

    Signaling Entrepreneurial Vision via Information System Design

    by Aysa Dordzhieva, Volker Laux, Ronghuo Zheng

    Earnings reports are informative about a firm’s current performance but convey little information about the prospects of the firm’s long-term vision. We show that entrepreneurs can signal favorable private information about their long-term prospects by choosing an accounting system that upward biases current earnings. An upward biased accounting system causes investors to overinvest in the firm’s projects, which increases the cost of capital, all else equal. But the mere fact that the entrepreneur is willing to adopt such a system signals a booming long-term prospect, which ultimately allows the entrepreneur to raise capital at a lower cost. We also study the effects of regulation that restricts the maximum allowable accounting bias and find that stricter regulation first decreases and then increases investment efficiency. Regulation that maximizes investment efficiency is not necessarily socially optimal when entrepreneurs must take costly actions to develop a long-term vision in the first place, because such regulation can reduce incentives to take these actions.