Carlos Corona
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Carlos Corona has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cyrus Aghamolla
University of Minnesota
1 shared publication - Ronghuo Zheng
The University of Texas at Austin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 207-245
No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts
This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.
- 16 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 207-245
No reliance on guidance: counter‐signaling in management forecasts
This study presents and provides an explanation for a novel stylized fact: both high‐performing and troubled companies withhold issuing earnings guidance. We assume that the manager's ability affects the level of earnings and the accuracy of guidance, but issuing a forecast is costless for all manager types. Managers are thus able to signal their ability through accuracy in their forecasts. While high ability managers would seem to benefit the most from issuing guidance, in equilibrium we find that both high and low ability managers withhold issuing guidance, while intermediate types forecast. Hence, high ability managers counter‐signal in equilibrium, which does not result in a subsequent “punishment” by the market.