Joseph F. Brazel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Joseph F. Brazel has a total of 348 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Keith L. Jones
The University of Kansas
5 shared publications Tammie J. Schaefer
University of Missouri–Kansas City
4 shared publications- Justin Leiby
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
3 shared publications - Tammie J. Schaefer
University of Missouri–Kansas City
3 shared publications Christine Gimbar
DePaul University
2 shared publicationsDaniel Ames
Bryant University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 20 October 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- Vol. 20 (2) , P10-P19
Auditor Use of Benchmarks to Identify Fraud Risks: The Case for Industry Data
SUMMARY: This article provides a practitioner summary of the research study titled “Auditor use of benchmarks to assess fraud risk: The case for industry data” (Brazel, Jones, and Lian 2024 (BJL)). Auditors perform preliminary analytical procedures to identify risks that financial statements are materially misstated due to fraud. Via a survey of practicing auditors, BJL find that auditors rely heavily on prior year balances and relations within the client’s financial data (e.g., ratios) as benchmarks when developing expectations during planning. Meanwhile, the empirical analyses of BJL reveal that, when identifying fraud risks, benchmarks derived from industry data, nonfinancial measures, and cash flows outperform both prior year balances and relations within the client’s financial data. The industry benchmark was the top performer. The article provides examples to demonstrate an approach that practitioners can use to identify fraud risks via industry data. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42; M48.
- 20 October 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- Vol. 20 (2) , P10-P19
Auditor Use of Benchmarks to Identify Fraud Risks: The Case for Industry Data
SUMMARY: This article provides a practitioner summary of the research study titled “Auditor use of benchmarks to assess fraud risk: The case for industry data” (Brazel, Jones, and Lian 2024 (BJL)). Auditors perform preliminary analytical procedures to identify risks that financial statements are materially misstated due to fraud. Via a survey of practicing auditors, BJL find that auditors rely heavily on prior year balances and relations within the client’s financial data (e.g., ratios) as benchmarks when developing expectations during planning. Meanwhile, the empirical analyses of BJL reveal that, when identifying fraud risks, benchmarks derived from industry data, nonfinancial measures, and cash flows outperform both prior year balances and relations within the client’s financial data. The industry benchmark was the top performer. The article provides examples to demonstrate an approach that practitioners can use to identify fraud risks via industry data. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42; M48.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 39 (2) , 59-75
Management’s Communication Style When Disclosing Material Weaknesses in Internal Control
SYNOPSIS: Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires management of publicly traded companies to assess and disclose the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). In our analysis of 200 actual ICFR reports disclosing material weaknesses in internal control, we observe that the most common communication style in our sample is, among other characteristics, a more defensive version of the “reasonable assurance” argument combined with the use of first-person pronouns. In an experiment where we vary management’s communication style with respect to material weakness disclosures, we find that nonprofessional investors are more willing to invest in a company when management uses a version of the “reasonable assurance” argument with fewer characteristics of defensive communication and does not use first-person pronouns. Our findings show a sharp contrast between the communication styles management chooses to use in actual ICFR reports and what we observe experimentally as the most effective communication style. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.
- 24 April 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 39 (2) , 59-75
Open AccessManagement’s Communication Style When Disclosing Material Weaknesses in Internal Control
SYNOPSIS: Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires management of publicly traded companies to assess and disclose the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). In our analysis of 200 actual ICFR reports disclosing material weaknesses in internal control, we observe that the most common communication style in our sample is, among other characteristics, a more defensive version of the “reasonable assurance” argument combined with the use of first-person pronouns. In an experiment where we vary management’s communication style with respect to material weakness disclosures, we find that nonprofessional investors are more willing to invest in a company when management uses a version of the “reasonable assurance” argument with fewer characteristics of defensive communication and does not use first-person pronouns. Our findings show a sharp contrast between the communication styles management chooses to use in actual ICFR reports and what we observe experimentally as the most effective communication style. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M40; M41.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-8
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
SUMMARY: In this article, we provide a practitioner summary of our paper “Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?” (Brazel, Leiby, and Schaefer 2025; hereafter BLS). Recent research suggests that audit supervisors who reward appropriate skeptical behavior, regardless of the outcome, appear to develop staff that are more likely to detect and convey fraud red flags to their superiors. In BLS, we first identify audit supervisors who are more likely to reward appropriate skepticism. We then investigate which personality traits, knowledge, and incentives are associated with supervisors who reward appropriate professional skepticism even when no misstatement is identified. We find that trait skepticism, especially suspending one’s judgment, drives the evaluations of professional skepticism in our setting. Also, we observe that when supervisors believe that their own audit partner will view the skepticism favorably, they “pay it forward” by rewarding their own staff who engage in skepticism. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: L2; M40; M42; M51.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-8
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
SUMMARY: In this article, we provide a practitioner summary of our paper “Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?” (Brazel, Leiby, and Schaefer 2025; hereafter BLS). Recent research suggests that audit supervisors who reward appropriate skeptical behavior, regardless of the outcome, appear to develop staff that are more likely to detect and convey fraud red flags to their superiors. In BLS, we first identify audit supervisors who are more likely to reward appropriate skepticism. We then investigate which personality traits, knowledge, and incentives are associated with supervisors who reward appropriate professional skepticism even when no misstatement is identified. We find that trait skepticism, especially suspending one’s judgment, drives the evaluations of professional skepticism in our setting. Also, we observe that when supervisors believe that their own audit partner will view the skepticism favorably, they “pay it forward” by rewarding their own staff who engage in skepticism. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: L2; M40; M42; M51.
- 25 November 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Forensic Accounting Research
- Vol. 9 (1) , 23-57
Auditor Use of Benchmarks to Assess Fraud Risk: The Case for Industry Data
Auditors perform preliminary analytical procedures to identify unusual or inconsistent relationships between expectations and recorded balances. The results of preliminary analytical procedures help auditors assess the risk that financial statements are materially misstated due to fraud. Via a survey of practicing auditors, we find that auditors rely heavily on prior-year balances and relations within the client’s financial data as benchmarks when developing expectations. Even though auditing standards describe additional benchmarks, which are less susceptible to management manipulation (e.g., industry trends), our survey results indicate that auditors are less apt to employ these benchmarks. Meanwhile, our empirical analyses of revenue frauds reveal that benchmarks derived from industry data, nonfinancial measures, and cash flows outperform both prior-year balances and relations within the client’s financial data. Of the benchmarks we examine, the difference between a company’s revenue growth and the revenue growth of its industry has historically been the best fraud indicator. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42; M48.
- 25 November 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Forensic Accounting Research
- Vol. 9 (1) , 23-57
Auditor Use of Benchmarks to Assess Fraud Risk: The Case for Industry Data
Auditors perform preliminary analytical procedures to identify unusual or inconsistent relationships between expectations and recorded balances. The results of preliminary analytical procedures help auditors assess the risk that financial statements are materially misstated due to fraud. Via a survey of practicing auditors, we find that auditors rely heavily on prior-year balances and relations within the client’s financial data as benchmarks when developing expectations. Even though auditing standards describe additional benchmarks, which are less susceptible to management manipulation (e.g., industry trends), our survey results indicate that auditors are less apt to employ these benchmarks. Meanwhile, our empirical analyses of revenue frauds reveal that benchmarks derived from industry data, nonfinancial measures, and cash flows outperform both prior-year balances and relations within the client’s financial data. Of the benchmarks we examine, the difference between a company’s revenue growth and the revenue growth of its industry has historically been the best fraud indicator. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42; M48.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-12
Using the Review Process to Professionally Develop Auditors
SUMMARY: In this article, we provide a practitioner summary of our paper “Coaching today’s auditors: What causes reviewers to adopt a more developmental approach?” (Andiola, Brazel, Downey, and Schaefer 2024). In our study, we examine workpaper review by supervising audit seniors as a quality control mechanism intended to detect audit preparer (staff) errors in the short term and professionally develop preparers in the long term. We find that reviewers adopt a more developmental approach when reviewing workpapers completed by local preparers. We also observe that, regardless of office affiliation, reviewers are apt to adopt a more developmental approach when preparers are likely to recur. Our results also indicate that reviewers who adopt a more developmental approach exhibit greater coaching in their actual review comments and are also more likely to detect preparers’ errors. We summarize our key findings and discuss practical implications and actionable suggestions for audit practitioners. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: L2; M40; M42; M51.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-12
Using the Review Process to Professionally Develop Auditors
SUMMARY: In this article, we provide a practitioner summary of our paper “Coaching today’s auditors: What causes reviewers to adopt a more developmental approach?” (Andiola, Brazel, Downey, and Schaefer 2024). In our study, we examine workpaper review by supervising audit seniors as a quality control mechanism intended to detect audit preparer (staff) errors in the short term and professionally develop preparers in the long term. We find that reviewers adopt a more developmental approach when reviewing workpapers completed by local preparers. We also observe that, regardless of office affiliation, reviewers are apt to adopt a more developmental approach when preparers are likely to recur. Our results also indicate that reviewers who adopt a more developmental approach exhibit greater coaching in their actual review comments and are also more likely to detect preparers’ errors. We summarize our key findings and discuss practical implications and actionable suggestions for audit practitioners. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: L2; M40; M42; M51.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 38 (3) , 1-12
Recent Research on the Identification, Assessment, and Response to Fraud Risks: Implications for Audit Practice and Topics for Future Research
SYNOPSIS: The financial statement auditor’s identification of fraud risk factors, their assessment of fraud risk, and their fraud risk responses are key to the auditor’s consideration of fraud and fraud detection. Given that the last review of research related to the search for fraud during the audit occurred nearly a decade ago, we provide a summary of recent academic research to update and inform practitioners, researchers, standard setters, regulators, and other stakeholders in the financial reporting process. We categorize and summarize findings from recent academic studies that focus on the auditor’s identification, assessment, and responses to fraud risks. Implications for practice are presented for each of these areas, along with topics and questions for future research. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42; M48.
- 7 August 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 38 (3) , 1-12
Open AccessRecent Research on the Identification, Assessment, and Response to Fraud Risks: Implications for Audit Practice and Topics for Future Research
SYNOPSIS: The financial statement auditor’s identification of fraud risk factors, their assessment of fraud risk, and their fraud risk responses are key to the auditor’s consideration of fraud and fraud detection. Given that the last review of research related to the search for fraud during the audit occurred nearly a decade ago, we provide a summary of recent academic research to update and inform practitioners, researchers, standard setters, regulators, and other stakeholders in the financial reporting process. We categorize and summarize findings from recent academic studies that focus on the auditor’s identification, assessment, and responses to fraud risks. Implications for practice are presented for each of these areas, along with topics and questions for future research. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42; M48.
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 196 (2) , 439-450
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 196 (2) , 439-450
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
- Open Access
- 26 October 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Issues in Accounting Education
- Vol. 38 (4) , 81-108
The ChatGPT Artificial Intelligence Chatbot: How Well Does It Answer Accounting Assessment Questions?
ChatGPT, a language-learning model chatbot, has garnered considerable attention for its ability to respond to users’ questions. Using data from 14 countries and 186 institutions, we compare ChatGPT and student performance for 28,085 questions from accounting assessments and textbook test banks. As of January 2023, ChatGPT provides correct answers for 56.5 percent of questions and partially correct answers for an additional 9.4 percent of questions. When considering point values for questions, students significantly outperform ChatGPT with a 76.7 percent average on assessments compared to 47.5 percent for ChatGPT if no partial credit is awarded and 56.5 percent if partial credit is awarded. Still, ChatGPT performs better than the student average for 15.8 percent of assessments when we include partial credit. We provide evidence of how ChatGPT performs on different question types, accounting topics, class levels, open/closed assessments, and test bank questions. We also discuss implications for accounting education and research.
- 26 October 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Issues in Accounting Education
- Vol. 38 (4) , 81-108
Open AccessThe ChatGPT Artificial Intelligence Chatbot: How Well Does It Answer Accounting Assessment Questions?
ChatGPT, a language-learning model chatbot, has garnered considerable attention for its ability to respond to users’ questions. Using data from 14 countries and 186 institutions, we compare ChatGPT and student performance for 28,085 questions from accounting assessments and textbook test banks. As of January 2023, ChatGPT provides correct answers for 56.5 percent of questions and partially correct answers for an additional 9.4 percent of questions. When considering point values for questions, students significantly outperform ChatGPT with a 76.7 percent average on assessments compared to 47.5 percent for ChatGPT if no partial credit is awarded and 56.5 percent if partial credit is awarded. Still, ChatGPT performs better than the student average for 15.8 percent of assessments when we include partial credit. We provide evidence of how ChatGPT performs on different question types, accounting topics, class levels, open/closed assessments, and test bank questions. We also discuss implications for accounting education and research.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (4) , 131-154
Do Rewards Encourage Professional Skepticism? It Depends
In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the downside risk of skeptical action, which decreases auditors' sensitivity to red flags and their willingness to communicate severe red flags to their managers, compromising audit quality. However, we also find that a supervisor consistently rewarding costly skepticism decreases auditors' risk aversion and increases their skepticism. In sum, auditors believe skeptical action has downside risk. A cultural shift toward credible, consistent rewards for appropriate skepticism likely helps ensure that rewards have their intended effect. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (4) , 131-154
Do Rewards Encourage Professional Skepticism? It Depends
In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the downside risk of skeptical action, which decreases auditors' sensitivity to red flags and their willingness to communicate severe red flags to their managers, compromising audit quality. However, we also find that a supervisor consistently rewarding costly skepticism decreases auditors' risk aversion and increases their skepticism. In sum, auditors believe skeptical action has downside risk. A cultural shift toward credible, consistent rewards for appropriate skepticism likely helps ensure that rewards have their intended effect. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 25 May 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Forensic Accounting Research
- Vol. 6 (1) , 389-405
The Case of Undetected Fraud: Can Audit Firm Policies or Highlighting the Fraud Examiner's Role Reduce Juror Assessments of Auditor Negligence?
This study explores two potential safeguards against liability when auditors exercise professional skepticism, but do not detect a fraud: (1) a firm policy requiring a specific level of professional skepticism in high-risk audit areas, and (2) providing jurors with key differences between the role of a fraud examiner and the role of an auditor as a reference point for judging the auditor's performance. We find that describing a specific firm policy to jurors does not significantly decrease negligence findings for auditors who do not detect a fraud. However, providing the role of a fraud examiner as a reference point (e.g., scope of work, testing approaches) does significantly decrease negligence findings. Encouragingly, we also find some evidence that jurors are apt to decrease negligence findings when auditors exercise higher skepticism, but ultimately do not detect a fraud. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 25 May 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Forensic Accounting Research
- Vol. 6 (1) , 389-405
The Case of Undetected Fraud: Can Audit Firm Policies or Highlighting the Fraud Examiner's Role Reduce Juror Assessments of Auditor Negligence?
This study explores two potential safeguards against liability when auditors exercise professional skepticism, but do not detect a fraud: (1) a firm policy requiring a specific level of professional skepticism in high-risk audit areas, and (2) providing jurors with key differences between the role of a fraud examiner and the role of an auditor as a reference point for judging the auditor's performance. We find that describing a specific firm policy to jurors does not significantly decrease negligence findings for auditors who do not detect a fraud. However, providing the role of a fraud examiner as a reference point (e.g., scope of work, testing approaches) does significantly decrease negligence findings. Encouragingly, we also find some evidence that jurors are apt to decrease negligence findings when auditors exercise higher skepticism, but ultimately do not detect a fraud. Data Availability: Contact the authors.