Justin Leiby
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Justin Leiby has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joseph F. Brazel
North Carolina State University
3 shared publications - Anna Gold
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
2 shared publications - Christy S. Nielson
The University of Mississippi
1 shared publication - Jacqueline S. Hammersley
University of Georgia
1 shared publication Jasmijn C. Bol
Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, New Orleans, USA
1 shared publicationJoseph F. Brazel
Poole College of Management North Carolina State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 302-314
Analytical procedures
- 1 December 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- p. 1-17
Improving Auditors’ Review of Inconsistent Audit Evidence
SYNOPSIS: We examine whether adopting a promotion focus while reviewing working papers helps audit reviewers identify more inconsistencies among evidence items relative to reviewers adopting a prevention focus. A promotion focus broadens attention and encourages big picture thinking, whereas a prevention focus has the opposite effect. We expect and find that a promotion focus is a good fit for holistically attending to inconsistencies in evidence sets, improving auditor review. Our second experiment extends the first by investigating whether a promotion focus improves responses to a segmented review structure, but we find no effects of review structure while replicating the effects of promotion focus. Further, in Experiment 2 we do not replicate the initial link in our theoretical judgment process between promotion focus and holistic thinking. Overall, our findings indicate that changing the way reviewers approach their task can improve audit quality and that additional research investigating the mechanism is needed. Data Availability: Data are proprietary and not available for sharing.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- p. 1-17
Improving Auditors’ Review of Inconsistent Audit Evidence
SYNOPSIS: We examine whether adopting a promotion focus while reviewing working papers helps audit reviewers identify more inconsistencies among evidence items relative to reviewers adopting a prevention focus. A promotion focus broadens attention and encourages big picture thinking, whereas a prevention focus has the opposite effect. We expect and find that a promotion focus is a good fit for holistically attending to inconsistencies in evidence sets, improving auditor review. Our second experiment extends the first by investigating whether a promotion focus improves responses to a segmented review structure, but we find no effects of review structure while replicating the effects of promotion focus. Further, in Experiment 2 we do not replicate the initial link in our theoretical judgment process between promotion focus and holistic thinking. Overall, our findings indicate that changing the way reviewers approach their task can improve audit quality and that additional research investigating the mechanism is needed. Data Availability: Data are proprietary and not available for sharing.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 64 (2) , 885-922
Inheriting Versus Developing Data Analytic Tests and Auditors’ Professional Skepticism
As the use of audit data analytic tests (ADA) becomes increasingly established in practice, auditors will often confront situations in which they inherit ADA developed by others, as opposed to developing the ADA themselves. Despite the potential benefits of ADA, inheriting ADA could decrease auditors’ skeptical actions by diminishing their psychological ownership of the ADA. In an experiment where an ADA identifies a fraud red flag, we find that auditors who inherited the ADA are less likely to exercise skeptical actions than those who were personally involved in its development. We then provide evidence that informing auditors who inherit an ADA about the test development activities (e.g., a brief memorandum documenting the ADA's development) mitigates the negative effect of inheriting the ADA. Evidence from mediation analyses suggests that these effects are driven by decreased psychological ownership when auditors inherit the ADA.
- 9 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 64 (2) , 885-922
Open AccessInheriting Versus Developing Data Analytic Tests and Auditors’ Professional Skepticism
As the use of audit data analytic tests (ADA) becomes increasingly established in practice, auditors will often confront situations in which they inherit ADA developed by others, as opposed to developing the ADA themselves. Despite the potential benefits of ADA, inheriting ADA could decrease auditors’ skeptical actions by diminishing their psychological ownership of the ADA. In an experiment where an ADA identifies a fraud red flag, we find that auditors who inherited the ADA are less likely to exercise skeptical actions than those who were personally involved in its development. We then provide evidence that informing auditors who inherit an ADA about the test development activities (e.g., a brief memorandum documenting the ADA's development) mitigates the negative effect of inheriting the ADA. Evidence from mediation analyses suggests that these effects are driven by decreased psychological ownership when auditors inherit the ADA.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-8
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
SUMMARY: In this article, we provide a practitioner summary of our paper “Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?” (Brazel, Leiby, and Schaefer 2025; hereafter BLS). Recent research suggests that audit supervisors who reward appropriate skeptical behavior, regardless of the outcome, appear to develop staff that are more likely to detect and convey fraud red flags to their superiors. In BLS, we first identify audit supervisors who are more likely to reward appropriate skepticism. We then investigate which personality traits, knowledge, and incentives are associated with supervisors who reward appropriate professional skepticism even when no misstatement is identified. We find that trait skepticism, especially suspending one’s judgment, drives the evaluations of professional skepticism in our setting. Also, we observe that when supervisors believe that their own audit partner will view the skepticism favorably, they “pay it forward” by rewarding their own staff who engage in skepticism. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: L2; M40; M42; M51.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-8
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
SUMMARY: In this article, we provide a practitioner summary of our paper “Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?” (Brazel, Leiby, and Schaefer 2025; hereafter BLS). Recent research suggests that audit supervisors who reward appropriate skeptical behavior, regardless of the outcome, appear to develop staff that are more likely to detect and convey fraud red flags to their superiors. In BLS, we first identify audit supervisors who are more likely to reward appropriate skepticism. We then investigate which personality traits, knowledge, and incentives are associated with supervisors who reward appropriate professional skepticism even when no misstatement is identified. We find that trait skepticism, especially suspending one’s judgment, drives the evaluations of professional skepticism in our setting. Also, we observe that when supervisors believe that their own audit partner will view the skepticism favorably, they “pay it forward” by rewarding their own staff who engage in skepticism. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: L2; M40; M42; M51.
- Open Access
- 9 August 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (5) , 197-222
Does Status Equal Substance? The Effects of Specialist Social Status on Auditor Assessments of Complex Estimates
Auditing standards require that auditors’ reliance on a specialist is commensurate with the specialist’s competence. In assessing competence, auditors encounter cues diagnostic of the specialist’s social status but less so of competence. In an experiment, we manipulate specialist status and find that auditors mistake status for competence unless they are prompted to separate the constructs. This raises the possibility that auditors could over-rely on high-status specialists. However, auditors also assess high-status specialists as more influential, and when the specialist disagrees with the client, they rely more on high-status specialists because of this perceived influence. Thus, high-status specialists can increase auditors’ willingness to challenge the client by providing a strong ally. Additional analyses suggest that auditors are aware that they rely on the specialist’s influence rather than competence, indicating that auditors do not use the process that auditing standards envision to evaluate and rely on specialists. Data Availability: Data are available upon request. JEL Classifications: M42.
- 9 August 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (5) , 197-222
Open AccessDoes Status Equal Substance? The Effects of Specialist Social Status on Auditor Assessments of Complex Estimates
Auditing standards require that auditors’ reliance on a specialist is commensurate with the specialist’s competence. In assessing competence, auditors encounter cues diagnostic of the specialist’s social status but less so of competence. In an experiment, we manipulate specialist status and find that auditors mistake status for competence unless they are prompted to separate the constructs. This raises the possibility that auditors could over-rely on high-status specialists. However, auditors also assess high-status specialists as more influential, and when the specialist disagrees with the client, they rely more on high-status specialists because of this perceived influence. Thus, high-status specialists can increase auditors’ willingness to challenge the client by providing a strong ally. Additional analyses suggest that auditors are aware that they rely on the specialist’s influence rather than competence, indicating that auditors do not use the process that auditing standards envision to evaluate and rely on specialists. Data Availability: Data are available upon request. JEL Classifications: M42.
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 196 (2) , 439-450
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
- 30 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 196 (2) , 439-450
Who Rewards Appropriate Levels of Professional Skepticism?
- 1 July 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (4) , 131-154
Do Rewards Encourage Professional Skepticism? It Depends
In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the downside risk of skeptical action, which decreases auditors' sensitivity to red flags and their willingness to communicate severe red flags to their managers, compromising audit quality. However, we also find that a supervisor consistently rewarding costly skepticism decreases auditors' risk aversion and increases their skepticism. In sum, auditors believe skeptical action has downside risk. A cultural shift toward credible, consistent rewards for appropriate skepticism likely helps ensure that rewards have their intended effect. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 July 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (4) , 131-154
Do Rewards Encourage Professional Skepticism? It Depends
In three experiments, we find that rewarding professional skepticism can backfire and decrease skepticism on future audit tasks where red flags are present. We focus on rewards for costly skepticism: skepticism that is ex ante appropriate, but generates incremental ex post costs and does not identify a misstatement. Auditors interpret a reward for costly skepticism as a better-than-expected outcome and view subsequent tasks from a risk-averse gain frame. As a result, auditors seek to avoid the downside risk of skeptical action, which decreases auditors' sensitivity to red flags and their willingness to communicate severe red flags to their managers, compromising audit quality. However, we also find that a supervisor consistently rewarding costly skepticism decreases auditors' risk aversion and increases their skepticism. In sum, auditors believe skeptical action has downside risk. A cultural shift toward credible, consistent rewards for appropriate skepticism likely helps ensure that rewards have their intended effect. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 26 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 27 (1) , 122-147
Status motives and agent-to-agent information sharing
- 26 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 27 (1) , 122-147
Status motives and agent-to-agent information sharing
- 18 February 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 40 (3) , 53-72
Challenges to Experimental Audit JDM Research and the Role of Online Platforms in Resolving These Challenges
SUMMARY: We survey experienced experimental researchers to understand their beliefs about the biggest challenges facing audit JDM research. By far, the biggest challenge identified by respondents is access to experienced participants. This creates a major problem as examining important research questions often requires hard-to-access professionals, and the availability of these participants has decreased over time. Other important challenges to audit JDM research include the publication process (including demands for multiple experiments in a single study involving experienced participants) and demonstrating practical contributions. We also compare responses about the challenges facing financial and managerial accounting researchers, in order to better understand the problems that are unique to audit researchers. We discuss how the challenges identified might be either mitigated or exacerbated by the use of various online platforms. We discuss data quality issues and potential solutions, provide suggestions on potential new sources of participants, and possible ways forward for audit JDM research.
- 18 February 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 40 (3) , 53-72
Challenges to Experimental Audit JDM Research and the Role of Online Platforms in Resolving These Challenges
SUMMARY: We survey experienced experimental researchers to understand their beliefs about the biggest challenges facing audit JDM research. By far, the biggest challenge identified by respondents is access to experienced participants. This creates a major problem as examining important research questions often requires hard-to-access professionals, and the availability of these participants has decreased over time. Other important challenges to audit JDM research include the publication process (including demands for multiple experiments in a single study involving experienced participants) and demonstrating practical contributions. We also compare responses about the challenges facing financial and managerial accounting researchers, in order to better understand the problems that are unique to audit researchers. We discuss how the challenges identified might be either mitigated or exacerbated by the use of various online platforms. We discuss data quality issues and potential solutions, provide suggestions on potential new sources of participants, and possible ways forward for audit JDM research.