Dov H. Levin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Dov H. Levin has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wilfred Ming Chow
University of Hong Kong
3 shared publications - Atsushi Tago
Waseda University
1 shared publication - Benjamin Miller
Department of Health and Exercise Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado
1 shared publication Paul Musgrave
University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, USA
1 shared publication- Paul Musgrave
Georgetown University in Qatar , Doha, Qatar
1 shared publication Robert F Trager
University of California, Los Angeles
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 November 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 23 (1)
Does Symbolic Public Gift Diplomacy Work? The Case of Panda Diplomacy
What are the effects of symbolic diplomatic gifts on the recipient public? Countries frequently try to shape public attitudes toward themselves in foreign countries by giving various diplomatic gifts. Such diplomatic gifts range from the material (such as COVID-19 vaccines) to the symbolic. While the effects of material diplomatic gifts on the recipient’s public opinion toward it have been a growing topic of research, symbolic diplomatic gifts have received little systematic study. This paper examines one common yet understudied type of such symbolic diplomatic gifts, China’s panda diplomacy, using a survey experiment in the US, one common foci for such diplomatic gifts. We find that panda diplomacy can be an effective tool on the margin, increasing support for friendly relations with China and improving the China’s image on one key aspect. We also find that an exogenous negative shock to US–China relations had only limited attenuating impact on its effects.
- 10 November 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 23 (1)
Open AccessDoes Symbolic Public Gift Diplomacy Work? The Case of Panda Diplomacy
What are the effects of symbolic diplomatic gifts on the recipient public? Countries frequently try to shape public attitudes toward themselves in foreign countries by giving various diplomatic gifts. Such diplomatic gifts range from the material (such as COVID-19 vaccines) to the symbolic. While the effects of material diplomatic gifts on the recipient’s public opinion toward it have been a growing topic of research, symbolic diplomatic gifts have received little systematic study. This paper examines one common yet understudied type of such symbolic diplomatic gifts, China’s panda diplomacy, using a survey experiment in the US, one common foci for such diplomatic gifts. We find that panda diplomacy can be an effective tool on the margin, increasing support for friendly relations with China and improving the China’s image on one key aspect. We also find that an exogenous negative shock to US–China relations had only limited attenuating impact on its effects.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Whataboutism in International Diplomacy: Shaping Third-Party Public Attitudes Toward U.S. Foreign Policy
How does whataboutism influence the attitudes of third-party and allied audiences during international diplomatic exchanges? States openly accused of misconduct often employ whataboutism, deflecting criticism by highlighting the accuser’s own transgressions. Although policymakers frequently discuss whataboutism, research on its effects—especially on third-party publics—is limited. This study addresses the gap by examining via survey experiments a “hard case”: the impact of whataboutism targeting the U.S. on Japanese and the British publics, two steadfast U.S. allies. Our findings reveal that whataboutism significantly undermines support for the critic’s actions and diminishes the willingness of these populations to back sanctions led by the critic against states engaging in whataboutism. These results, the first empirical evidence of whataboutism’s effects on third-party allied publics, highlight whataboutism’s potency in shaping international public opinion, even among audiences from nations closely aligned with the critic country, potentially constraining U.S. foreign policy options.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Whataboutism in International Diplomacy: Shaping Third-Party Public Attitudes Toward U.S. Foreign Policy
How does whataboutism influence the attitudes of third-party and allied audiences during international diplomatic exchanges? States openly accused of misconduct often employ whataboutism, deflecting criticism by highlighting the accuser’s own transgressions. Although policymakers frequently discuss whataboutism, research on its effects—especially on third-party publics—is limited. This study addresses the gap by examining via survey experiments a “hard case”: the impact of whataboutism targeting the U.S. on Japanese and the British publics, two steadfast U.S. allies. Our findings reveal that whataboutism significantly undermines support for the critic’s actions and diminishes the willingness of these populations to back sanctions led by the critic against states engaging in whataboutism. These results, the first empirical evidence of whataboutism’s effects on third-party allied publics, highlight whataboutism’s potency in shaping international public opinion, even among audiences from nations closely aligned with the critic country, potentially constraining U.S. foreign policy options.
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 51 (3) , 425-454
How Low Can You Go? The Effects of Low Credibility False Flag Incidents on International and Domestic Approval for Interstate Wars 1
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Interactions
- Vol. 51 (3) , 425-454
How Low Can You Go? The Effects of Low Credibility False Flag Incidents on International and Domestic Approval for Interstate Wars 1
- Open Access
- 10 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 21 (2)
To What End? Policy Objectives and US Public Support for Political Warfare
Research regarding military interventions suggests that the objective of an intervention (such as whether it is carried out for humanitarian or power-political ends) substantially influences public support. It is unknown, however, whether that holds for political warfare strategies such as electoral interventions. In a series of survey experiments, we evaluate how different objectives affect US audiences’ support for foreign electoral interventions, both overall and in relation to other forms of political warfare, such as sanctions and covert regime change. Humanitarian objectives elicit greater support than those carried out to stave off threats to US leadership or to promote US economic interests. Furthermore, religious identity affects support for interventions undertaken for humanitarian ends, with the congruence between the identity of respondents and victims substantially influencing support. Finally, support for partisan electoral interventions and other forms of political warfare varies in relation to each other and in relation to interventions’ objectives.
- 10 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 21 (2)
Open AccessTo What End? Policy Objectives and US Public Support for Political Warfare
Research regarding military interventions suggests that the objective of an intervention (such as whether it is carried out for humanitarian or power-political ends) substantially influences public support. It is unknown, however, whether that holds for political warfare strategies such as electoral interventions. In a series of survey experiments, we evaluate how different objectives affect US audiences’ support for foreign electoral interventions, both overall and in relation to other forms of political warfare, such as sanctions and covert regime change. Humanitarian objectives elicit greater support than those carried out to stave off threats to US leadership or to promote US economic interests. Furthermore, religious identity affects support for interventions undertaken for humanitarian ends, with the congruence between the identity of respondents and victims substantially influencing support. Finally, support for partisan electoral interventions and other forms of political warfare varies in relation to each other and in relation to interventions’ objectives.
- 26 September 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Introducing PEIG 2.0: Sixty-nine years of partisan electoral interventions 1946–2014
In this article we introduce an updated version of the Partisan Electoral Intervention by Great-powers (PEIG) dataset, which collects data on situations where a foreign power tries to determine the election results in another country. This version expands the temporal coverage of PEIG into much of the Post-Cold War era and checks for possible unconfirmed or undetected cases in the period covered by PEIG 1.0, leading to an expanded PEIG 2.0 dataset with a 25.5% increase in temporal coverage and a 37.4% increase in the overall number of electoral intervention cases. After describing the PEIG dataset update process, we describe the patterns of electoral interventions in the Post-Cold War era in comparison with the Cold War era. We then examine the possibility of shifts in their effects in the Post-Cold War era by replicating one key result using the previous version of PEIG, finding no such effect.
- 26 September 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Introducing PEIG 2.0: Sixty-nine years of partisan electoral interventions 1946–2014
In this article we introduce an updated version of the Partisan Electoral Intervention by Great-powers (PEIG) dataset, which collects data on situations where a foreign power tries to determine the election results in another country. This version expands the temporal coverage of PEIG into much of the Post-Cold War era and checks for possible unconfirmed or undetected cases in the period covered by PEIG 1.0, leading to an expanded PEIG 2.0 dataset with a 25.5% increase in temporal coverage and a 37.4% increase in the overall number of electoral intervention cases. After describing the PEIG dataset update process, we describe the patterns of electoral interventions in the Post-Cold War era in comparison with the Cold War era. We then examine the possibility of shifts in their effects in the Post-Cold War era by replicating one key result using the previous version of PEIG, finding no such effect.
- Open Access
- 18 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 119 (1) , 314-331
Muddying the Waters: How Perceived Foreign Interference Affects Public Opinion on Protest Movements
Does foreign interference help or harm protest movements? An extensive literature has debated this question but focuses on observational data, obscuring a crucial mechanism for protest success: its effect on public attitudes. We argue that public accusations of foreign meddling damage protest groups by reducing public support. In survey experiments conducted in the United States and Canada, we find that credible accusations of foreign interference erode support by discrediting protester groups among sympathizers and inflaming nationalist fears. Indeed, such accusations delegitimize protest movements even among those sympathetic to the cause. Conditional factors, such as the type of foreign assistance or the identity of the meddling state, have no impact. These findings reveal how referencing foreign backing is a potent discrediting tactic—it influences public opinion, a critical determinant for protest outcomes.
- 18 April 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 119 (1) , 314-331
Open AccessMuddying the Waters: How Perceived Foreign Interference Affects Public Opinion on Protest Movements
Does foreign interference help or harm protest movements? An extensive literature has debated this question but focuses on observational data, obscuring a crucial mechanism for protest success: its effect on public attitudes. We argue that public accusations of foreign meddling damage protest groups by reducing public support. In survey experiments conducted in the United States and Canada, we find that credible accusations of foreign interference erode support by discrediting protester groups among sympathizers and inflaming nationalist fears. Indeed, such accusations delegitimize protest movements even among those sympathetic to the cause. Conditional factors, such as the type of foreign assistance or the identity of the meddling state, have no impact. These findings reveal how referencing foreign backing is a potent discrediting tactic—it influences public opinion, a critical determinant for protest outcomes.
- Open Access
- 18 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (1) , 103-133
The Diplomacy of Whataboutism and US Foreign Policy Attitudes
Does whataboutism work in global affairs? When states face international criticism, they often respond with whataboutism: accusing their critics of similar faults. Despite its prevalence in policy discussions, whataboutism remains an understudied influence strategy. This study investigates how states use whataboutism to shape American public opinion across various international issues. We find, using survey experiments, that whataboutism mitigates the negative impacts of criticism by reducing public approval of US positions and backing for punitive actions. Whataboutist critiques referencing similar, recent misdeeds have more power to shape opinions. However, the identity of the whataboutist state does not significantly affect effectiveness. US counter-messaging often fails to diminish the effects of whataboutism. These results show that whataboutism can be a potent rhetorical tool in international relations and that it warrants greater attention from international relations scholars.
- 18 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (1) , 103-133
Open AccessThe Diplomacy of Whataboutism and US Foreign Policy Attitudes
Does whataboutism work in global affairs? When states face international criticism, they often respond with whataboutism: accusing their critics of similar faults. Despite its prevalence in policy discussions, whataboutism remains an understudied influence strategy. This study investigates how states use whataboutism to shape American public opinion across various international issues. We find, using survey experiments, that whataboutism mitigates the negative impacts of criticism by reducing public approval of US positions and backing for punitive actions. Whataboutist critiques referencing similar, recent misdeeds have more power to shape opinions. However, the identity of the whataboutist state does not significantly affect effectiveness. US counter-messaging often fails to diminish the effects of whataboutism. These results show that whataboutism can be a potent rhetorical tool in international relations and that it warrants greater attention from international relations scholars.
- 7 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 38 (5) , 816-834
Is sunlight the best counterintelligence technique? the effectiveness of covert operation exposure in blunting the Russian intervention in the 2020 U.S. election
In runup to 2020 U.S. elections U.S. intelligence agencies tried to prevent Russian covert operations from affecting the results. Various methods were used including the exposure of detected covert Russian activities. The question of the actual effects of this counterintelligence operation however remains open. This study examines the effects of the exposure strategy on target public using a novel method. I find strong evidence that U.S. intelligence agencies efforts to expose the Russian hand succeeded in blunting the effects of the targeted covert activities. This indicates that the exposure counterintelligence strategy is a potent tool for defanging covert foreign election interference/partisan electoral interventions.
- 7 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 38 (5) , 816-834
Is sunlight the best counterintelligence technique? the effectiveness of covert operation exposure in blunting the Russian intervention in the 2020 U.S. election
In runup to 2020 U.S. elections U.S. intelligence agencies tried to prevent Russian covert operations from affecting the results. Various methods were used including the exposure of detected covert Russian activities. The question of the actual effects of this counterintelligence operation however remains open. This study examines the effects of the exposure strategy on target public using a novel method. I find strong evidence that U.S. intelligence agencies efforts to expose the Russian hand succeeded in blunting the effects of the targeted covert activities. This indicates that the exposure counterintelligence strategy is a potent tool for defanging covert foreign election interference/partisan electoral interventions.
- 2 September 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 67 (5) , 828-857
The Meddling American Voter? How Norms, Interests, and Great Power Rivalries Affect U.S. Public Support for Partisan Electoral Interventions Abroad
Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries’ elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public’s views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.
- 2 September 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 67 (5) , 828-857
The Meddling American Voter? How Norms, Interests, and Great Power Rivalries Affect U.S. Public Support for Partisan Electoral Interventions Abroad
Foreign electoral interventions have attracted greater attention since the Russian intervention in the 2016 U.S. elections. Even though the United States has a long history of intervening in other countries’ elections, evidence about what drives public support for U.S. foreign electoral intervention is scarce. This paper uses a new set of surveys and experiments to test hypotheses about what drives the American public’s views of U.S. electoral interventions abroad. We find that there is no taboo against such U.S. interference in the American public. However, public support for U.S. election interference is not automatic. Respondents do not support interventions solely to advance U.S. interests or to protect democracy, although they prove more supportive of interventions on behalf of democratic parties that also favor U.S. interests or to protect longstanding democracies. Finally, support for an intervention rises when it is framed as responding to the actions of a great-power rival such as Russia.
- 7 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 28 (3) , 589-615
The art of uncommitment: the costs of peacetime withdrawals from alliance commitments
Are there significant domestic political costs for leaders who disengage from long-standing alliances, costs that discourage such disengagement? Leaders of major powers occasionally look for ways to disengage in non-crisis situations from some long-term commitments to other countries following the legal procedures laid out in the alliance treaty or commitment. However, leaders interested in disengagement from alliances sometimes fear that they will pay domestic disengagement costs, for example, a decline in domestic public support, if they try to withdraw from alliances in that manner in practice. To examine if such fears are justified, we conducted two survey experiments among representative samples of the US public investigating the effects of a presidential decision to end an alliance commitment through the legally prescribed means. We find that disengagement costs exist in general and that some characteristics of the country in question can increase their size and make them more long-lasting. For example, withdrawal from alliances with countries perceived as similar on some key criteria to the United States and as loyal allies, or widespread opposition by experts to this withdrawal, will all increase the size of the disengagement costs and make them more long-lasting. Leaving an existing alliance in peacetime will frequently be a politically losing proposition for American leaders in many plausible situations—one possible reason for the endurance of some US alliances.
- 7 June 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 28 (3) , 589-615
The art of uncommitment: the costs of peacetime withdrawals from alliance commitments
Are there significant domestic political costs for leaders who disengage from long-standing alliances, costs that discourage such disengagement? Leaders of major powers occasionally look for ways to disengage in non-crisis situations from some long-term commitments to other countries following the legal procedures laid out in the alliance treaty or commitment. However, leaders interested in disengagement from alliances sometimes fear that they will pay domestic disengagement costs, for example, a decline in domestic public support, if they try to withdraw from alliances in that manner in practice. To examine if such fears are justified, we conducted two survey experiments among representative samples of the US public investigating the effects of a presidential decision to end an alliance commitment through the legally prescribed means. We find that disengagement costs exist in general and that some characteristics of the country in question can increase their size and make them more long-lasting. For example, withdrawal from alliances with countries perceived as similar on some key criteria to the United States and as loyal allies, or widespread opposition by experts to this withdrawal, will all increase the size of the disengagement costs and make them more long-lasting. Leaving an existing alliance in peacetime will frequently be a politically losing proposition for American leaders in many plausible situations—one possible reason for the endurance of some US alliances.