MMMark A. Moore

Mark A. Moore

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Mark A. Moore has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Multijurisdictional and Multimodal Infrastructure Corridors: Supranational Social Value, Assembly and Implementation Barriers

    by Aidan R. Vining, Mark A. Moore, Anthony E. Boardman

    There is very limited theory and policy guidance that specifically relates to multijurisdictional and multimodal (M&;M) infrastructure corridors: those that traverse national boundaries and encompass multiple modes of co-located infrastructure modes. This paper develops a framework for understanding the social welfare costs and benefits—and the barriers to implementing—these corridors. The framework posits the need for both a dedicated assembler and a national (or supranational) sponsor. An assembler provides the platform to match up initial property rights holders, infrastructure mode providers and end users. The sponsor financially and politically backstops an assembler. We decompose the economic necessity for, and advantages of, an assembler and also those that result from some degree of multimodality. We also consider the economic and political barriers to M&;M corridor implementation. To illustrate these, we review the evidence from the very small number of proposed or realised M&;M corridors and closely related projects. Although reliable evidence is scarce, it is consistent with the framework’s implications regarding the need for both an assembler and a sponsor.


  • Listed public–private enterprises: stock market information, agency costs and productive efficiency outcomes

    by Aidan Vining, Mark Moore, Claude Laurin

    Purpose: This paper addresses the social value of commercial enterprises that are jointly owned by a government and private sector investors and where the shares are listed on a stock exchange: thus, “listed public–private enterprises” (LPPEs). The theoretical part of the paper addresses how differences in ownership patterns influence the behavior and performance of LPPEs.Design/methodology/approach: We develop a conceptual taxonomy, drawing on the empirical evidence on the behavior and performance of public–private hybrid enterprises and on the application of agency theory to that evidence. The taxonomy discussion predicts how different ownership patterns affect enterprise productive efficiency and the ability of governments to achieve social goals through LPPEs. We review the empirical literature on government enterprise ownership and on the concentration of private share ownership to deduce how these matter for owner and managerial behavior and productive efficiency. We review the literature that considers the informational content that listing of an enterprise's shares on a stock exchange can provide to enterprise owners, managers and other domestic audiences with a policy interest. We employ a social welfare perspective to derive policy implications as to when the LPPE governance structure is most appropriate.Findings: We show how the monitoring and performance weaknesses of state ownership are offset by some private ownership, particularly when combined with listing on a stock exchange. We demonstrate the effects of different governance structures on enterprise productive efficiency. We find that the LPPE structure is particularly appropriate as an alternative to nationalization or to full privatization and regulation of natural monopoly public utilities, and as an alternative to full private ownership and taxation of non-renewable natural resource extractive enterprises.Originality/value: This paper explicitly addresses the question of why and how the combination of government ownership, private investor ownership and listing on an exchange is socially valuable in providing information on productive efficiency to governments.


  • Social Discount Rates for Seventeen Latin American Countries: Theory and Parameter Estimation

    by Mark A. Moore, Anthony E. Boardman, Aidan R. Vining

    This article presents new estimates of social discount rates (SDRs) for seventeen Latin American countries for use in public project evaluation. We derive the SDRs based on the social rate of time preference method and provide the required parameter values. These rates range from 2.14 percent for Paraguay to 5.83 percent for Chile. The unweighted average recommended rate is 3.77 percent, which is close to the rates mandated by most European countries. We also review current governments’ SDR practices worldwide, including Latin America, and find that the proposed country-specific SDRs are significantly lower and less dispersed across countries than the rates most Latin American countries currently recommend. Using four archetypal projects profiles, we show the potential impact on the net present values of varying important parameters, including growth rates.


  • Risk in Public Sector Project Appraisal: It Mostly Does Not Matter!

    by Mark A. Moore, Anthony E. Boardman, Aidan R. Vining

    Public project appraisal using cost-benefit analysis (CBA) requires analysts to project risky net benefits and to convert these into present values using a social discount rate (SDR). We consider which types of risk matter for CBA. For small projects with only idiosyncratic risks, expected net benefits should be discounted at a risk-free SDR. If projects are large or expected net benefits are correlated with aggregate consumption, the alternatives are to replace expected net benefits with their certainty equivalents (CEs) and to discount these at a risk-free SDR, or to discount expected net benefits using a higher SDR that includes a risk premium. These methods are equivalent under special circumstances that are unlikely; the first approach is the correct one. We examine when replacing expected values with CEs will matter, and how this might be done. For most projects, analysts should discount expected values of net benefits at a risk-free SDR.


  • THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT MIXED ENTERPRISES

    by Aidan R. Vining, Anthony E. Boardman, Mark A. Moore

    This paper addresses some of the gaps in both classification and theory pertaining to local government MEs and presents tentative predictions concerning the performance of local MEs. As a preliminary, we identify the different forms of entities with ME characteristics and place them within a comprehensive taxonomy. Most local MEs provide local public goods. Consequently, their primary goal should be to improve social welfare. This goal should drive both theory development and the evaluation of ME performance. We present three principal‐agent models that offer contrasting theories of ME performance with differing assumptions about the motivations and behaviour of the relevant actors: (1) a ‘best of both worlds’ model; (2) a ‘worst of both worlds’ model, and (3) a ‘profit collusion world’ model. We indirectly test these models by reviewing and assessing the empirical performance of MEs, focusing on their social welfare effects, or using related measures of performance where we have no direct evidence on social welfare effects. Finally, we draw on the theory and empirical evidence to make some predictions about the behaviour and performance of local MEs.


  • Open Access

    The choice of the social discount rate and the opportunity cost of public funds

    by Mark A. Moore, Anthony E. Boardman, Aidan R. Vining

    The decades-old literature on the correct method for choosing and estimating a social discount rate (SDR) has resulted in two, largely opposing viewpoints. This note seeks to clarify the key sources of disagreement between these two camps. One view advocates that the choice should be based chiefly on the social opportunity cost of the return to foregone private capital investment (SOC), and suggests a SDR of around 7%. The other viewpoint, expressed by the authors, argues that the choice should be based on the social rate of time preference (STP), the rate at which society is willing to trade present for future consumption, suggesting a SDR of around 3.5%. Because of the fundamentally normative basis of the SDR choice, neither approach generates testable hypotheses that would allow falsification. For government project evaluation, the choice ultimately depends on the opportunity cost of public funds, which in turn depends on how fiscal policy actually operates. The STP approach contends that governments set targets for deficits and public debt, so that a marginal government project will be tax-financed, largely crowding out current consumption. The SOC belief is that governments set revenue targets, so that any government project will be deficit-financed on the margin, which will largely crowd out private investment. The authors also argue that a SDR based on the STP approach is appropriate for: benefit-cost analysis of government regulations, self-financing government projects, and government cost-effectiveness studies.