Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Aidan R. Vining has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Ten Principles of Cost-Benefit Analysis and Five Barriers to Its Wider Use

    by Aidan Vining

    This paper lays out 10 important principles of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and also five barriers to its wider use, particularly ones related to potential adjustments to individuals’ valuations of impacts, recognizing that CBA is an aid, not necessarily an input, to public policy decision making. The principles are: (i) CBA assesses allocative efficiency, not social welfare. (ii) CBA is based on methodological individualism. (iii) Individuals act approximately rationally in a neoclassical sense, with some important exceptions. (iv) Property right allocations are normally exogenous to CBA. (v) All individuals are equal, based on positive or negative impacts of policy. (vi) Aggregate willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-to-accept (WTA) primarily determines social surplus. (vii) Individuals value present consumption more than the same unit of future consumption. (viii) CBA follows a “no-envy” rule in estimating surplus. (ix) The nation is the default boundary for spatial standing but subnational jurisdictions with constitutional authority may also have legitimacy. (x) A constitutional-contractarianist principle can also justify expansion of spatial scope to supranational contexts. This paper addresses five barriers to wider use of CBA as a policy decision-making aid. There are three measurement problems that justify adjustments: lack of plausible monetary estimates, the legitimacy or not of aggregating heterogeneous preferences and discrepancies between WTP and WTA valuations for the same good. There are two more serious problems: discordance between the neoclassical and behavioral economics view of the overall efficacy of individual choice in some circumstances and the presence of physiological addiction.

  • Listed public–private enterprises: stock market information, agency costs and productive efficiency outcomes

    by Aidan Vining, Mark Moore, Claude Laurin

    Purpose: This paper addresses the social value of commercial enterprises that are jointly owned by a government and private sector investors and where the shares are listed on a stock exchange: thus, “listed public–private enterprises” (LPPEs). The theoretical part of the paper addresses how differences in ownership patterns influence the behavior and performance of LPPEs.Design/methodology/approach: We develop a conceptual taxonomy, drawing on the empirical evidence on the behavior and performance of public–private hybrid enterprises and on the application of agency theory to that evidence. The taxonomy discussion predicts how different ownership patterns affect enterprise productive efficiency and the ability of governments to achieve social goals through LPPEs. We review the empirical literature on government enterprise ownership and on the concentration of private share ownership to deduce how these matter for owner and managerial behavior and productive efficiency. We review the literature that considers the informational content that listing of an enterprise's shares on a stock exchange can provide to enterprise owners, managers and other domestic audiences with a policy interest. We employ a social welfare perspective to derive policy implications as to when the LPPE governance structure is most appropriate.Findings: We show how the monitoring and performance weaknesses of state ownership are offset by some private ownership, particularly when combined with listing on a stock exchange. We demonstrate the effects of different governance structures on enterprise productive efficiency. We find that the LPPE structure is particularly appropriate as an alternative to nationalization or to full privatization and regulation of natural monopoly public utilities, and as an alternative to full private ownership and taxation of non-renewable natural resource extractive enterprises.Originality/value: This paper explicitly addresses the question of why and how the combination of government ownership, private investor ownership and listing on an exchange is socially valuable in providing information on productive efficiency to governments.


  • Open Access

    The Value of High School Graduation in the United States: Per-Person Shadow Price Estimates for Use in Cost–Benefit Analysis

    by Aidan R. Vining, David L. Weimer

    One way for jurisdictions with limited analytic resources to increase their capability for doing cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is to use existing shadow prices, or “plug-ins”, for important social impacts. This article contributes to the further development of one important shadow price: the value of an additional high school graduation in the United States. Specifically, how valuable to a student, government, and the rest of society in aggregate is a high school graduation? The analysis builds on the method developed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy and presents numerical updates and extensions to their analysis. For the U.S., the estimated net present value (the social value) using a 3 percent real discount rate of this shadow price is approximately $300,000 per each additional graduate. In appropriate circumstances, this value can be “plugged-in” to CBAs of policies that either directly or indirectly seeks to increase the number of students who graduate from high school.


  • Open Access

    What Is Public Agency Strategic Analysis (PASA) and How Does It Differ from Public Policy Analysis and Firm Strategy Analysis?

    by Aidan R. Vining

    Public agency strategic analysis (PASA) is different from public policy analysis because public agency executives face numerous constraints that those performing “unconstrained” policy analysis do not. It is also different from private sector strategic analysis. But because of similar constraints and realities, some generic and private sector strategic analysis techniques can be useful to those carrying out PASA, if appropriately modified. Analysis of the external agency environment (external forces) and internal value creation processes (“value chains”, “modular assembly” processes or “multi-sided intermediation platforms”) are the most important components of PASA. Also, agency executives must focus on feasible alternatives. In sum, PASA must be practical. But public executives need to take seriously public value, and specifically social efficiency, when engaging in PASA. Unless they do so, their strategic analyses will not have normative legitimacy because enhancing public value is not the same as in some versions of public value or in agency “profit maximization”. Although similarly constrained, normatively appropriate public agency strategic analysis is not “giving clients what they want” or “making the public sector business case”. PASA must be both practical and principled.


  • The longer-run performance effects of agencification: theory and evidence from Québec agencies

    by Aidan R. Vining, Claude Laurin, David Weimer

    Although governments worldwide are increasingly choosing to deliver services through organisations with greater autonomy than traditional bureaus, the implicit assumption that such agencification contributes to long-run efficiency remains largely untested. Agencification gives agency managers more autonomy and access to incentive mechanisms that lead to greater efficiency if they are not offset by inefficiencies resulting from managerial discretion. We test the hypothesis that agencification improves efficiency by examining the longer-run performance of 13 agencies in the province of Québec, Canada over approximately 10 years. We find that these agencies experienced long-term productivity gains, but that these gains reached a plateau over the time period studied. In addition, we describe changes in several measures of performance. A survey of the managers of these agencies indicates that they perceive agencification as having a substantive impact, but worry about the sustainability of autonomy and their capacity to show continued gains in measured performance over time.


  • THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT MIXED ENTERPRISES

    by Aidan R. Vining, Anthony E. Boardman, Mark A. Moore

    This paper addresses some of the gaps in both classification and theory pertaining to local government MEs and presents tentative predictions concerning the performance of local MEs. As a preliminary, we identify the different forms of entities with ME characteristics and place them within a comprehensive taxonomy. Most local MEs provide local public goods. Consequently, their primary goal should be to improve social welfare. This goal should drive both theory development and the evaluation of ME performance. We present three principal‐agent models that offer contrasting theories of ME performance with differing assumptions about the motivations and behaviour of the relevant actors: (1) a ‘best of both worlds’ model; (2) a ‘worst of both worlds’ model, and (3) a ‘profit collusion world’ model. We indirectly test these models by reviewing and assessing the empirical performance of MEs, focusing on their social welfare effects, or using related measures of performance where we have no direct evidence on social welfare effects. Finally, we draw on the theory and empirical evidence to make some predictions about the behaviour and performance of local MEs.


  • THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

    by Anthony E. Boardman, Aidan R. Vining

    ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.