Andrew Chubb
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Andrew Chubb has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ronan Tse-Min Fu
Academia Sinica
2 shared publications - Tommy Shih
Lund University
2 shared publications - Barbara Yoxon
Lancaster University
1 shared publication - David Denemark
University of Western Australia
1 shared publication Diarmuid Cooney-O'Donoghue
1 shared publicationDiarmuid Cooney-O’dOnoghue
Monash University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- p. 1-25
Chinese public opinion’s role in the South China Sea: evidence from an expert survey
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- p. 1-25
Open AccessChinese public opinion’s role in the South China Sea: evidence from an expert survey
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (4)
Authoritarian Public Opinion and Threat Credibility
S: Does public opinion make an authoritarian state’s threats more credible? This research note offers the first systematic cross-national evidence on how authoritarian public opinion shapes external assessments of threat credibility. In a preregistered survey experiment, 787 experts across nine countries evaluated China’s military and economic threats during a crisis, first when issued in private, then after Beijing went public. Respondents were randomly assigned to see either an official statement from the Chinese government, online nationalist outrage, or anti-foreign street protests. Going public increased observers’ estimations of China’s likelihood of using force and economic punishment by an average of 5–10 points on a 100-point scale. Expressions of nationalist outrage from the Chinese public boosted this effect by 30–40 percent, relative to an official statement alone. Online nationalist mobilization generated similar effects to anti-foreign street protests, suggesting a significantly broader role for authoritarian public opinion than previous scholarship has identified.
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (4)
Open AccessAuthoritarian Public Opinion and Threat Credibility
S: Does public opinion make an authoritarian state’s threats more credible? This research note offers the first systematic cross-national evidence on how authoritarian public opinion shapes external assessments of threat credibility. In a preregistered survey experiment, 787 experts across nine countries evaluated China’s military and economic threats during a crisis, first when issued in private, then after Beijing went public. Respondents were randomly assigned to see either an official statement from the Chinese government, online nationalist outrage, or anti-foreign street protests. Going public increased observers’ estimations of China’s likelihood of using force and economic punishment by an average of 5–10 points on a 100-point scale. Expressions of nationalist outrage from the Chinese public boosted this effect by 30–40 percent, relative to an official statement alone. Online nationalist mobilization generated similar effects to anti-foreign street protests, suggesting a significantly broader role for authoritarian public opinion than previous scholarship has identified.
- 16 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- p. 1-33
Authoritarian Public Opinion, Vividness, and International Crisis Signaling
- 16 June 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- p. 1-33
Authoritarian Public Opinion, Vividness, and International Crisis Signaling
- Open Access
- 9 June 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Intuitive deterrence theorists…with feelings? Perceptions of Chinese resolve in a crisis
Recent experimental research has found citizens to be “intuitive deterrence theorists” who judge the resolve of foreign states based on their capabilities, material stakes, past behavior and costly signals. Yet there are good reasons to expect that subjective feelings toward the specific country in question—variables that are difficult to capture in genericized experimental designs—could also condition such judgements. We test this proposition using original 2022 data from an 11 country survey on China ( N = 13,051), and a three-pronged measure of resolve that disaggregates its military, economic and general aspects. On the one hand, citizens’ estimations of China's resolve in a crisis scenario do correlate with their perceptions of its military and economic capabilities, consistent with the expectations of deterrence theory. On the other hand, negative subjective feelings toward China were a similarly powerful predictor of higher estimations of its resolve. The results suggest that where states seek to convey a resolved image to foreign audiences, negatively disposed individuals will be more likely to perceive it, potentially entrenching opposition to compromise.
- 9 June 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
Open AccessIntuitive deterrence theorists…with feelings? Perceptions of Chinese resolve in a crisis
Recent experimental research has found citizens to be “intuitive deterrence theorists” who judge the resolve of foreign states based on their capabilities, material stakes, past behavior and costly signals. Yet there are good reasons to expect that subjective feelings toward the specific country in question—variables that are difficult to capture in genericized experimental designs—could also condition such judgements. We test this proposition using original 2022 data from an 11 country survey on China ( N = 13,051), and a three-pronged measure of resolve that disaggregates its military, economic and general aspects. On the one hand, citizens’ estimations of China's resolve in a crisis scenario do correlate with their perceptions of its military and economic capabilities, consistent with the expectations of deterrence theory. On the other hand, negative subjective feelings toward China were a similarly powerful predictor of higher estimations of its resolve. The results suggest that where states seek to convey a resolved image to foreign audiences, negatively disposed individuals will be more likely to perceive it, potentially entrenching opposition to compromise.
- Open Access
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review
- p. 1-29
Who would defend Kinmen and Matsu (and what is Wuchiu?): Taiwanese public opinion on outlying islands
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review
- p. 1-29
Open AccessWho would defend Kinmen and Matsu (and what is Wuchiu?): Taiwanese public opinion on outlying islands
- Open Access
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Journal of International Law
- Vol. 36 (4) , 891-925
International Law as a Driver of Confrontation? UNCLOS and China’s Policy in the South China Sea
Could international law contribute to interstate maritime conflicts? A close tracing of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) policies in the South China Sea suggests so. China’s early interactions with the emerging maritime legal order in the 1970s expanded the scope of its interests from disputed island territories to comprehensive jurisdiction over vast swathes of maritime space. Ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996 prompted Beijing to develop new bureaucratic and enforcement capabilities designed to realize sweeping claims inspired by, though not limited to, UNCLOS entitlements. When these capabilities came to fruition in the mid-2000s, they enabled a sustained, increasingly coercive push for control over the PRC’s maritime periphery, which has continued to the present. Four representative cases of China’s new and ongoing patterns of behaviour demonstrate in specific detail how China’s interactions with the legal regime have contributed to its confrontational on-water behaviour. In short, the PRC’s campaign to control vast swathes of East Asian maritime space was rooted in the party-state’s internalization of concepts of maritime rights through the UNCLOS process, coupled with a rejection of its corresponding limitations.
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Journal of International Law
- Vol. 36 (4) , 891-925
Open AccessInternational Law as a Driver of Confrontation? UNCLOS and China’s Policy in the South China Sea
Could international law contribute to interstate maritime conflicts? A close tracing of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) policies in the South China Sea suggests so. China’s early interactions with the emerging maritime legal order in the 1970s expanded the scope of its interests from disputed island territories to comprehensive jurisdiction over vast swathes of maritime space. Ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996 prompted Beijing to develop new bureaucratic and enforcement capabilities designed to realize sweeping claims inspired by, though not limited to, UNCLOS entitlements. When these capabilities came to fruition in the mid-2000s, they enabled a sustained, increasingly coercive push for control over the PRC’s maritime periphery, which has continued to the present. Four representative cases of China’s new and ongoing patterns of behaviour demonstrate in specific detail how China’s interactions with the legal regime have contributed to its confrontational on-water behaviour. In short, the PRC’s campaign to control vast swathes of East Asian maritime space was rooted in the party-state’s internalization of concepts of maritime rights through the UNCLOS process, coupled with a rejection of its corresponding limitations.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 17 January 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Studies in International Education
- Vol. 29 (2) , 300-318
Processing the Geopolitics of Global Science: Emerging National-Level Advisory Structures
This paper analyses three governments’ institutional advisory mechanisms designed to shape and support universities and individual researchers’ decisions regarding international academic collaboration. Although ostensibly country-agnostic, increasing geopolitical tensions with China have catalyzed the creation of these new structures. Each mechanism seeks to address the complex trade-offs in international research collaboration caused by the complicated relationship between China and other advanced science nations. We compare the National Contact Point for Knowledge Security in the Netherlands; the Research Collaboration Advice Team and associated “Trusted Research” campaign in the United Kingdom (UK); and Australia's “University Foreign Interference Taskforce” process. The paper finds similarities in their goals - elevating national interest and security as considerations in research collaboration decisionmaking in order to enable it to continue under narrowed conditions - but divergences in their structure, usage and accessibility that produce distinctive strengths and shortcomings.
- 17 January 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Studies in International Education
- Vol. 29 (2) , 300-318
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessProcessing the Geopolitics of Global Science: Emerging National-Level Advisory Structures
This paper analyses three governments’ institutional advisory mechanisms designed to shape and support universities and individual researchers’ decisions regarding international academic collaboration. Although ostensibly country-agnostic, increasing geopolitical tensions with China have catalyzed the creation of these new structures. Each mechanism seeks to address the complex trade-offs in international research collaboration caused by the complicated relationship between China and other advanced science nations. We compare the National Contact Point for Knowledge Security in the Netherlands; the Research Collaboration Advice Team and associated “Trusted Research” campaign in the United Kingdom (UK); and Australia's “University Foreign Interference Taskforce” process. The paper finds similarities in their goals - elevating national interest and security as considerations in research collaboration decisionmaking in order to enable it to continue under narrowed conditions - but divergences in their structure, usage and accessibility that produce distinctive strengths and shortcomings.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Human Rights Practice
- Vol. 16 (3) , 770-793
Transnational Human Rights Violations: Addressing the Evolution of Globalized Repression through National Human Rights Institutions
Transnational Human Rights Violations (THRV) are infringements of individual rights that originate outside the jurisdiction in which they take effect. Ranging from violent and criminal forms of transnational repression through to coercion against targets’ family members abroad, digital surveillance, and legal intimidation, THRVs today generate widespread and systemic constraints on the exercise of human rights in jurisdictions around the world. At present, however, targets of THRVs typically find few avenues through which to raise complaints, receive assistance or pursue redress. This article proposes a new domestic institutional mechanism to directly address this situation. It first examines the mutually reinforcing, additive effects of transnational surveillance, coercion and censorship in the digital era. Next, it identifies relevant human rights standards showing state responsibilities to monitor and counter THRVs within their jurisdiction, and the growing recognition of additive, systemic effects of THRVs on broad populations. The third section examines policy responses in the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, and international organizations, noting that none has adequately addressed the contemporary nature and scope of THRVs as international standards require. The final section argues that to meet their obligations, states should establish Transnational Rights Protection Offices (TRPOs) to provide a clear contact point for targets to raise complaints and receive support; monitor and report on the situation of THRVs taking effect within the state’s jurisdiction; advise and inform government departments on THRV issues; and develop evidence-based policy recommendations. We conclude by laying out the rationale for its institutional status within National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs).
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Human Rights Practice
- Vol. 16 (3) , 770-793
Open AccessTransnational Human Rights Violations: Addressing the Evolution of Globalized Repression through National Human Rights Institutions
Transnational Human Rights Violations (THRV) are infringements of individual rights that originate outside the jurisdiction in which they take effect. Ranging from violent and criminal forms of transnational repression through to coercion against targets’ family members abroad, digital surveillance, and legal intimidation, THRVs today generate widespread and systemic constraints on the exercise of human rights in jurisdictions around the world. At present, however, targets of THRVs typically find few avenues through which to raise complaints, receive assistance or pursue redress. This article proposes a new domestic institutional mechanism to directly address this situation. It first examines the mutually reinforcing, additive effects of transnational surveillance, coercion and censorship in the digital era. Next, it identifies relevant human rights standards showing state responsibilities to monitor and counter THRVs within their jurisdiction, and the growing recognition of additive, systemic effects of THRVs on broad populations. The third section examines policy responses in the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, and international organizations, noting that none has adequately addressed the contemporary nature and scope of THRVs as international standards require. The final section argues that to meet their obligations, states should establish Transnational Rights Protection Offices (TRPOs) to provide a clear contact point for targets to raise complaints and receive support; monitor and report on the situation of THRVs taking effect within the state’s jurisdiction; advise and inform government departments on THRV issues; and develop evidence-based policy recommendations. We conclude by laying out the rationale for its institutional status within National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs).
- Open Access
- 6 March 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Scientific collaboration amid geopolitical tensions: a comparison of Sweden and Australia
Significant collaborations with research partners in China are seen in many Western countries. With increasing geopolitical tensions governments, research institutions and individuals are increasingly called upon to address a proliferating array of risks and challenges associated with scientific collaboration with China. The situation is characterised by two parallel, intertwined processes. On the one hand, scientific research is characterised by openness and the ambition to do good for humanity. On the other hand an increased focus on knowledge securitization. How responses in different countries develop to this conflict are starting to be apparent, and academic studies are only beginning to describe how these responses look like. To date, the majority of studies focusing on how concerns over collaboration with China shape internationalisation look at the US. A few studies focus on other advanced science nations, for example Australia, UK, or Sweden. But there is limited comparative research on approaches to internationalisation in the context of these geopolitical tensions. This paper bridges the gap by illuminating the dimensions of variation in country-level responses to this situation. Comparing the cases of Sweden and Australia illustrates the wide variation that exists in the agents, methods and goals of responses. The comparison illuminates differences in responses by countries across these three dimensions.
- 6 March 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessScientific collaboration amid geopolitical tensions: a comparison of Sweden and Australia
Significant collaborations with research partners in China are seen in many Western countries. With increasing geopolitical tensions governments, research institutions and individuals are increasingly called upon to address a proliferating array of risks and challenges associated with scientific collaboration with China. The situation is characterised by two parallel, intertwined processes. On the one hand, scientific research is characterised by openness and the ambition to do good for humanity. On the other hand an increased focus on knowledge securitization. How responses in different countries develop to this conflict are starting to be apparent, and academic studies are only beginning to describe how these responses look like. To date, the majority of studies focusing on how concerns over collaboration with China shape internationalisation look at the US. A few studies focus on other advanced science nations, for example Australia, UK, or Sweden. But there is limited comparative research on approaches to internationalisation in the context of these geopolitical tensions. This paper bridges the gap by illuminating the dimensions of variation in country-level responses to this situation. Comparing the cases of Sweden and Australia illustrates the wide variation that exists in the agents, methods and goals of responses. The comparison illuminates differences in responses by countries across these three dimensions.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 97 (6) , 2017-2019
China panic: Australia's alternative to pandering and paranoia
A leading historian on Xinjiang, David Brophy is the author of the acclaimed Uyghur nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), a strong critic of China's repression against Uighurs and other ethnic groups, and an active participant in the struggle for Hong Kong's autonomy and many other progressive causes. This record of activism makes Brophy the ideal person to write this comprehensive critique of Australia's ‘China panic’ of the past four years. While trolls in Australia's rowdy China Twitter community have often hurled accusations of complicity with PRC propaganda in Brophy's direction, for serious analysts of China's foreign relations this book is...
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 97 (6) , 2017-2019
China panic: Australia's alternative to pandering and paranoia
A leading historian on Xinjiang, David Brophy is the author of the acclaimed Uyghur nation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), a strong critic of China's repression against Uighurs and other ethnic groups, and an active participant in the struggle for Hong Kong's autonomy and many other progressive causes. This record of activism makes Brophy the ideal person to write this comprehensive critique of Australia's ‘China panic’ of the past four years. While trolls in Australia's rowdy China Twitter community have often hurled accusations of complicity with PRC propaganda in Brophy's direction, for serious analysts of China's foreign relations this book is...