Ronan Tse-Min Fu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ronan Tse-Min Fu has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Chubb
Lancaster University
2 shared publications - Elaine I-Lien Lee
Research Assistant, Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica
2 shared publications Elaine I-Lien Lee
Academia Sinica , 28 Academia Road, Section 2, Nankang, Taipei 115201
1 shared publicationElaine I‐Lien Lee
Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica Taipei Taiwan
1 shared publicationGene Park
Loyola Marymount University , 1 LMU Drive , Los Angeles, CA 90045
1 shared publication- Jacques E. C. Hymans
School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (4)
Authoritarian Public Opinion and Threat Credibility
S: Does public opinion make an authoritarian state’s threats more credible? This research note offers the first systematic cross-national evidence on how authoritarian public opinion shapes external assessments of threat credibility. In a preregistered survey experiment, 787 experts across nine countries evaluated China’s military and economic threats during a crisis, first when issued in private, then after Beijing went public. Respondents were randomly assigned to see either an official statement from the Chinese government, online nationalist outrage, or anti-foreign street protests. Going public increased observers’ estimations of China’s likelihood of using force and economic punishment by an average of 5–10 points on a 100-point scale. Expressions of nationalist outrage from the Chinese public boosted this effect by 30–40 percent, relative to an official statement alone. Online nationalist mobilization generated similar effects to anti-foreign street protests, suggesting a significantly broader role for authoritarian public opinion than previous scholarship has identified.
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (4)
Open AccessAuthoritarian Public Opinion and Threat Credibility
S: Does public opinion make an authoritarian state’s threats more credible? This research note offers the first systematic cross-national evidence on how authoritarian public opinion shapes external assessments of threat credibility. In a preregistered survey experiment, 787 experts across nine countries evaluated China’s military and economic threats during a crisis, first when issued in private, then after Beijing went public. Respondents were randomly assigned to see either an official statement from the Chinese government, online nationalist outrage, or anti-foreign street protests. Going public increased observers’ estimations of China’s likelihood of using force and economic punishment by an average of 5–10 points on a 100-point scale. Expressions of nationalist outrage from the Chinese public boosted this effect by 30–40 percent, relative to an official statement alone. Online nationalist mobilization generated similar effects to anti-foreign street protests, suggesting a significantly broader role for authoritarian public opinion than previous scholarship has identified.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (3)
Do you think David can win against Goliath? Evidence on factors affecting popular perceptions of victory in Taiwan against Chinese aggression
How do citizens form perceptions of victory in war under power asymmetry? Although scholars have extensively studied the objective determinants of war outcomes, we know far less about how citizens subjectively weigh these factors. We examine this question in Taiwan, a demanding test: extreme power asymmetry with China, an available American patron, and a politically engaged citizenry should maximize the pull of external considerations. A prevailing view holds that Taiwanese victory perceptions depend almost exclusively on American military intervention. We challenge this view using two conjoint experiments with over 2400 respondents, extending the conjoint approach to a domain it is well-suited to address but rarely studied. International military support exerts the strongest effect, yet domestic factors collectively carry comparable weight. Military readiness and public morale emerge as the second and third most influential determinants, and together with political unity, these domestic attributes account for over 40% of citizens’ decision calculus. Even where conditions should maximize the pull of external considerations, Taiwanese citizens do more than look outward. They evaluate their own society’s capacity to resist. These findings suggest that weaker states facing powerful adversaries possess meaningful levers for enhancing perceived resilience beyond securing external guarantees.
- 9 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research & Politics
- Vol. 13 (3)
Open AccessDo you think David can win against Goliath? Evidence on factors affecting popular perceptions of victory in Taiwan against Chinese aggression
How do citizens form perceptions of victory in war under power asymmetry? Although scholars have extensively studied the objective determinants of war outcomes, we know far less about how citizens subjectively weigh these factors. We examine this question in Taiwan, a demanding test: extreme power asymmetry with China, an available American patron, and a politically engaged citizenry should maximize the pull of external considerations. A prevailing view holds that Taiwanese victory perceptions depend almost exclusively on American military intervention. We challenge this view using two conjoint experiments with over 2400 respondents, extending the conjoint approach to a domain it is well-suited to address but rarely studied. International military support exerts the strongest effect, yet domestic factors collectively carry comparable weight. Military readiness and public morale emerge as the second and third most influential determinants, and together with political unity, these domestic attributes account for over 40% of citizens’ decision calculus. Even where conditions should maximize the pull of external considerations, Taiwanese citizens do more than look outward. They evaluate their own society’s capacity to resist. These findings suggest that weaker states facing powerful adversaries possess meaningful levers for enhancing perceived resilience beyond securing external guarantees.
- Open Access
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review
- p. 1-29
Who would defend Kinmen and Matsu (and what is Wuchiu?): Taiwanese public opinion on outlying islands
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Pacific Review
- p. 1-29
Open AccessWho would defend Kinmen and Matsu (and what is Wuchiu?): Taiwanese public opinion on outlying islands
- Open Access
- 22 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 43 (4) , 436-456
Strategic partnerships in alliance politics: Introducing the Global Strategic Partnership dataset
Since the 1990s, strategic partnerships have emerged as a new foreign policy tool that allows more flexibility in international cooperation. This paper distinguishes strategic partnerships from alliances and alignments by introducing the Global Strategic Partnership dataset. In addition to presenting the trends in their global proliferation, we examine the patterns of strategic partnerships in the top six countries with the most partnership agreements. We find that the United States significantly increases trade and arms transfers with its non-allied partners compared with its allied partners, suggesting that strategic partnerships can enhance economic and security cooperation in ways that complement traditional alliances.
- 22 October 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 43 (4) , 436-456
Open AccessStrategic partnerships in alliance politics: Introducing the Global Strategic Partnership dataset
Since the 1990s, strategic partnerships have emerged as a new foreign policy tool that allows more flexibility in international cooperation. This paper distinguishes strategic partnerships from alliances and alignments by introducing the Global Strategic Partnership dataset. In addition to presenting the trends in their global proliferation, we examine the patterns of strategic partnerships in the top six countries with the most partnership agreements. We find that the United States significantly increases trade and arms transfers with its non-allied partners compared with its allied partners, suggesting that strategic partnerships can enhance economic and security cooperation in ways that complement traditional alliances.
- 10 December 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
- Vol. 25 (2)
Signaling, interests, and domestic politics: What matters for US credibility in Taiwan
There have been growing calls for a rethink of U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Some argue that the U.S. should signal stronger commitment to Taiwan to deter China and maintain peace. To do so, a growing number of commentators and policymakers advocate that the U.S. provide a clear security guarantee to Taiwan. Others have suggested deploying troops on Taiwanese soil again. These calls beg an empirical question, one central to the study of international politics: how much would such reassurance measures increase confidence that one country would defend another if attacked? We find that an alliance with the U.S. and the deployment of troops on Taiwan would meaningfully increase confidence in the U.S. even when controlling for other factors. By estimating the magnitude of the effect of other variables cited in the literature, we also contribute to the ongoing debate over their relative influence on credibility. Specifically, our evidence suggests that the perceived alignment of interests is the cornerstone of credibility. The degree of division in the domestic politics of the patron state, in this case the U.S., also is a crucial determinant of credibility.
- 10 December 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific
- Vol. 25 (2)
Signaling, interests, and domestic politics: What matters for US credibility in Taiwan
There have been growing calls for a rethink of U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Some argue that the U.S. should signal stronger commitment to Taiwan to deter China and maintain peace. To do so, a growing number of commentators and policymakers advocate that the U.S. provide a clear security guarantee to Taiwan. Others have suggested deploying troops on Taiwanese soil again. These calls beg an empirical question, one central to the study of international politics: how much would such reassurance measures increase confidence that one country would defend another if attacked? We find that an alliance with the U.S. and the deployment of troops on Taiwan would meaningfully increase confidence in the U.S. even when controlling for other factors. By estimating the magnitude of the effect of other variables cited in the literature, we also contribute to the ongoing debate over their relative influence on credibility. Specifically, our evidence suggests that the perceived alignment of interests is the cornerstone of credibility. The degree of division in the domestic politics of the patron state, in this case the U.S., also is a crucial determinant of credibility.
- 29 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 46 (2) , 414-434
The impact of situational context and dispositions on costly signals of reassurance: Experimental evidence from Taiwan
When do costly signals of reassurance enhance trust between nations? While previous research has established the role of dispositions in costly signaling, this paper highlights the critical influence of situational context. Employing an interactionist framework, we theorize that the effectiveness of costly signals depends on the complex interplay between situational contexts, such as crises and non‐crises, and individual dispositions, particularly hawkish and dovish orientations. We test our theory through two identical survey experiments fielded among Taiwanese citizens—one conducted during a crisis and the other during a non‐crisis period. Our findings show that during crises, China's costly reassurances are ineffective and even backfire among hawkish individuals. In contrast, China's costly reassuring signals enhance trust in non‐crisis situations, particularly among dovish individuals. Our findings contribute to signaling theory by underscoring important boundary conditions and the value of integrating contextual and psychological factors in analyzing the efficacy of costly signals. Moreover, by demonstrating that backfire effects emerge when hawks encounter reassurance during crises, we provide preliminary evidence on the scope conditions of this phenomenon. These insights offer empirical implications for policymakers, emphasizing the need for tailored reassurance strategies that account for timing and audience to effectively build trust between nations.
- 29 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 46 (2) , 414-434
The impact of situational context and dispositions on costly signals of reassurance: Experimental evidence from Taiwan
When do costly signals of reassurance enhance trust between nations? While previous research has established the role of dispositions in costly signaling, this paper highlights the critical influence of situational context. Employing an interactionist framework, we theorize that the effectiveness of costly signals depends on the complex interplay between situational contexts, such as crises and non‐crises, and individual dispositions, particularly hawkish and dovish orientations. We test our theory through two identical survey experiments fielded among Taiwanese citizens—one conducted during a crisis and the other during a non‐crisis period. Our findings show that during crises, China's costly reassurances are ineffective and even backfire among hawkish individuals. In contrast, China's costly reassuring signals enhance trust in non‐crisis situations, particularly among dovish individuals. Our findings contribute to signaling theory by underscoring important boundary conditions and the value of integrating contextual and psychological factors in analyzing the efficacy of costly signals. Moreover, by demonstrating that backfire effects emerge when hawks encounter reassurance during crises, we provide preliminary evidence on the scope conditions of this phenomenon. These insights offer empirical implications for policymakers, emphasizing the need for tailored reassurance strategies that account for timing and audience to effectively build trust between nations.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Political Geography
- Vol. 57, 49-59
The diffusion of international norms of banknote iconography: A case study of the New Taiwan Dollar
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Political Geography
- Vol. 57, 49-59
The diffusion of international norms of banknote iconography: A case study of the New Taiwan Dollar