David Tse
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
David Tse has a total of 189 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ertem Nusret Tas
Stanford University
16 shared publications - Joachim Neu
Stanford University
16 shared publications - Amir Salman Avestimehr
Wireless Foundations UC Berkeley Berkeley California USA
8 shared publications - Govinda M. Kamath
Department of Electrical Engineering Stanford University
8 shared publications - Sreeram Kannan
University of Washington at Seattle
8 shared publications - Guy Bresler
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences University of California Berkeley
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2999-3013
BABE: Verifying Proofs on Bitcoin Made 1000x Cheaper
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2999-3013
Open AccessBABE: Verifying Proofs on Bitcoin Made 1000x Cheaper
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3100-3114
BitVM3: Efficient Bitcoin Bridges via Garbled Circuits
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3100-3114
Open AccessBitVM3: Efficient Bitcoin Bridges via Garbled Circuits
- 22 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-50
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
- 22 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-50
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 363-377
Nakamoto Consensus under Bounded Processing Capacity
For Nakamoto's longest-chain consensus protocol, whose proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) variants power major blockchains such as Bitcoin and Cardano, we revisit the classic problem of the security--performance tradeoff: Given a network of nodes with finite communication- and computation-resources, against what fraction of adversary power is Nakamoto consensus (NC) secure for a given block production rate? State-of-the-art analyses of NC fail to answer this question, because their bounded-delay model does not capture the rate limits to nodes' processing of blocks, which cause congestion when blocks are released in quick succession. We develop a new analysis technique to prove a refined security--performance tradeoff for PoW NC in a bounded-capacity model. In this model, we show that, in contrast to the classic bounded-delay model, Nakamoto's private attack is no longer the worst attack, and a new attack we call the teasing strategy, that exploits congestion, is strictly worse. In PoS, equivocating blocks can exacerbate congestion, making traditional PoS NC insecure except at very low block production rates. To counter such equivocation spamming, we present a variant of PoS NC we call Blanking NC (BlaNC), which achieves the same resilience as PoW NC.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 363-377
Open AccessNakamoto Consensus under Bounded Processing Capacity
For Nakamoto's longest-chain consensus protocol, whose proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) variants power major blockchains such as Bitcoin and Cardano, we revisit the classic problem of the security--performance tradeoff: Given a network of nodes with finite communication- and computation-resources, against what fraction of adversary power is Nakamoto consensus (NC) secure for a given block production rate? State-of-the-art analyses of NC fail to answer this question, because their bounded-delay model does not capture the rate limits to nodes' processing of blocks, which cause congestion when blocks are released in quick succession. We develop a new analysis technique to prove a refined security--performance tradeoff for PoW NC in a bounded-capacity model. In this model, we show that, in contrast to the classic bounded-delay model, Nakamoto's private attack is no longer the worst attack, and a new attack we call the teasing strategy, that exploits congestion, is strictly worse. In PoS, equivocating blocks can exacerbate congestion, making traditional PoS NC insecure except at very low block production rates. To counter such equivocation spamming, we present a variant of PoS NC we call Blanking NC (BlaNC), which achieves the same resilience as PoW NC.
- Open Access
Light Clients for Lazy Blockchains
Lazy blockchains decouple consensus from transaction verification and execution to increase throughput. Although they can contain invalid transactions (e.g., double spends) as a result, these can easily be filtered out by full nodes that check if there have been previous conflicting transactions. However, creating light (SPV) clients that do not see the whole transaction history becomes a challenge: A record of a transaction on the chain does not necessarily entail transaction confirmation. In this paper, we devise a protocol that enables the creation of efficient light clients for lazy blockchains. The number of interaction rounds and the communication complexity of our protocol are logarithmic in the blockchain execution time. Our construction is based on a bisection game that traverses the Merkle tree containing the ledger of all - valid or invalid - transactions. We prove that our proof system is succinct, complete and sound, and empirically demonstrate the feasibility of our scheme.
Open AccessLight Clients for Lazy Blockchains
Lazy blockchains decouple consensus from transaction verification and execution to increase throughput. Although they can contain invalid transactions (e.g., double spends) as a result, these can easily be filtered out by full nodes that check if there have been previous conflicting transactions. However, creating light (SPV) clients that do not see the whole transaction history becomes a challenge: A record of a transaction on the chain does not necessarily entail transaction confirmation. In this paper, we devise a protocol that enables the creation of efficient light clients for lazy blockchains. The number of interaction rounds and the communication complexity of our protocol are logarithmic in the blockchain execution time. Our construction is based on a bisection game that traverses the Merkle tree containing the ledger of all - valid or invalid - transactions. We prove that our proof system is succinct, complete and sound, and empirically demonstrate the feasibility of our scheme.
- Open Access
Goldfish: No More Attacks on Ethereum?!
The LMD GHOST consensus protocol is a critical component of proof-of-stake Ethereum. In its current form, this protocol is brittle, as evidenced by recent attacks and patching attempts. We propose Goldfish, a new protocol that satisfies key properties required of a drop-in replacement for LMD GHOST: Goldfish is secure in the sleepy model, assuming a majority of the validators follows the protocol. Goldfish is reorg resilient so that honestly produced blocks are guaranteed inclusion in the ledger, and it supports fast confirmation with expected confirmation latency independent of the desired security level. Subsampling validators can improve the communication efficiency of Goldfish, and Goldfish is composable with finality/accountability gadgets. Crucially, Goldfish is structurally similar to LMD GHOST, providing a credible path to adoption in Ethereum. Attacks on LMD GHOST exploit lack of coordination among honest validators, typically provided by a locking mechanism in classical BFT protocols. However, locking requires votes from a quorum of all participants and is not compatible with fluctuating participation. Goldfish is powered by a novel coordination mechanism to synchronize the honest validators' actions. Experiments with our prototype implementation of Goldfish suggest practicality.
Open AccessGoldfish: No More Attacks on Ethereum?!
The LMD GHOST consensus protocol is a critical component of proof-of-stake Ethereum. In its current form, this protocol is brittle, as evidenced by recent attacks and patching attempts. We propose Goldfish, a new protocol that satisfies key properties required of a drop-in replacement for LMD GHOST: Goldfish is secure in the sleepy model, assuming a majority of the validators follows the protocol. Goldfish is reorg resilient so that honestly produced blocks are guaranteed inclusion in the ledger, and it supports fast confirmation with expected confirmation latency independent of the desired security level. Subsampling validators can improve the communication efficiency of Goldfish, and Goldfish is composable with finality/accountability gadgets. Crucially, Goldfish is structurally similar to LMD GHOST, providing a credible path to adoption in Ethereum. Attacks on LMD GHOST exploit lack of coordination among honest validators, typically provided by a locking mechanism in classical BFT protocols. However, locking requires votes from a quorum of all participants and is not compatible with fluctuating participation. Goldfish is powered by a novel coordination mechanism to synchronize the honest validators' actions. Experiments with our prototype implementation of Goldfish suggest practicality.
- Open Access
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains consistency, as long as less than a certain fraction of validators are malicious, even in partially-synchronous environments that allow for temporary violations of assumed network delay bounds. Accountable safety means that in any case of inconsistency, a certain fraction of validators can be identified to have provably violated the protocol. Earlier works have developed impossibility results and protocol constructions for these properties separately. We show that accountable safety implies finality, thereby unifying earlier results.
Open AccessShort Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains consistency, as long as less than a certain fraction of validators are malicious, even in partially-synchronous environments that allow for temporary violations of assumed network delay bounds. Accountable safety means that in any case of inconsistency, a certain fraction of validators can be identified to have provably violated the protocol. Earlier works have developed impossibility results and protocol constructions for these properties separately. We show that accountable safety implies finality, thereby unifying earlier results.