Ertem Nusret Tas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ertem Nusret Tas has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Tse
Stanford University
16 shared publications - Joachim Neu
Stanford University
12 shared publications - Barnabé Monnot
Ethereum Foundation
2 shared publications - Caspar Schwarz-Schilling
Ethereum Foundation
2 shared publications - Fisher Yu
Stanford University Stanford University Stanford University
2 shared publications - Francesco D'Amato
Ethereum Foundation, Berlin, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1417-1431
Doubly Aggregatable Signatures
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1417-1431
Open AccessDoubly Aggregatable Signatures
- 6 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 397-426
Optimal Good-Case Latency for Sleepy Consensus
- 22 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-50
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
- 22 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-50
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3227-3241
Atomic and Fair Data Exchange via Blockchain
We introduce a blockchain Fair Data Exchange (FDE) protocol, enabling a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically: the client receives the file if and only if the server receives an agreed-upon payment. We put forth a new definition for a cryptographic scheme that we name verifiable encryption under committed key (VECK), and we propose two instantiations for this scheme. Our protocol relies on a blockchain to enforce the atomicity of the exchange and uses VECK to ensure that the client receives the correct data (matching an agreed-upon commitment) before releasing the payment for the decrypting key. Our protocol is trust-minimized and requires only constant-sized on-chain communication, concretely 3 signatures, 1 verification key, and 1 secret key, with most of the data stored and communicated off-chain. It also supports exchanging only a subset of the data, can amortize the server's work across multiple clients, and offers a general framework to design alternative FDE protocols using different commitment schemes. A prominent application of our protocol is the Danksharding data availability scheme on Ethereum, which commits to data via KZG polynomial commitments. We also provide an open-source implementation for our protocol with both instantiations for VECK, demonstrating our protocol's efficiency and practicality on Ethereum.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3227-3241
Open AccessAtomic and Fair Data Exchange via Blockchain
We introduce a blockchain Fair Data Exchange (FDE) protocol, enabling a storage server to transfer a data file to a client atomically: the client receives the file if and only if the server receives an agreed-upon payment. We put forth a new definition for a cryptographic scheme that we name verifiable encryption under committed key (VECK), and we propose two instantiations for this scheme. Our protocol relies on a blockchain to enforce the atomicity of the exchange and uses VECK to ensure that the client receives the correct data (matching an agreed-upon commitment) before releasing the payment for the decrypting key. Our protocol is trust-minimized and requires only constant-sized on-chain communication, concretely 3 signatures, 1 verification key, and 1 secret key, with most of the data stored and communicated off-chain. It also supports exchanging only a subset of the data, can amortize the server's work across multiple clients, and offers a general framework to design alternative FDE protocols using different commitment schemes. A prominent application of our protocol is the Danksharding data availability scheme on Ethereum, which commits to data via KZG polynomial commitments. We also provide an open-source implementation for our protocol with both instantiations for VECK, demonstrating our protocol's efficiency and practicality on Ethereum.
- Open Access
Goldfish: No More Attacks on Ethereum?!
The LMD GHOST consensus protocol is a critical component of proof-of-stake Ethereum. In its current form, this protocol is brittle, as evidenced by recent attacks and patching attempts. We propose Goldfish, a new protocol that satisfies key properties required of a drop-in replacement for LMD GHOST: Goldfish is secure in the sleepy model, assuming a majority of the validators follows the protocol. Goldfish is reorg resilient so that honestly produced blocks are guaranteed inclusion in the ledger, and it supports fast confirmation with expected confirmation latency independent of the desired security level. Subsampling validators can improve the communication efficiency of Goldfish, and Goldfish is composable with finality/accountability gadgets. Crucially, Goldfish is structurally similar to LMD GHOST, providing a credible path to adoption in Ethereum. Attacks on LMD GHOST exploit lack of coordination among honest validators, typically provided by a locking mechanism in classical BFT protocols. However, locking requires votes from a quorum of all participants and is not compatible with fluctuating participation. Goldfish is powered by a novel coordination mechanism to synchronize the honest validators' actions. Experiments with our prototype implementation of Goldfish suggest practicality.
Open AccessGoldfish: No More Attacks on Ethereum?!
The LMD GHOST consensus protocol is a critical component of proof-of-stake Ethereum. In its current form, this protocol is brittle, as evidenced by recent attacks and patching attempts. We propose Goldfish, a new protocol that satisfies key properties required of a drop-in replacement for LMD GHOST: Goldfish is secure in the sleepy model, assuming a majority of the validators follows the protocol. Goldfish is reorg resilient so that honestly produced blocks are guaranteed inclusion in the ledger, and it supports fast confirmation with expected confirmation latency independent of the desired security level. Subsampling validators can improve the communication efficiency of Goldfish, and Goldfish is composable with finality/accountability gadgets. Crucially, Goldfish is structurally similar to LMD GHOST, providing a credible path to adoption in Ethereum. Attacks on LMD GHOST exploit lack of coordination among honest validators, typically provided by a locking mechanism in classical BFT protocols. However, locking requires votes from a quorum of all participants and is not compatible with fluctuating participation. Goldfish is powered by a novel coordination mechanism to synchronize the honest validators' actions. Experiments with our prototype implementation of Goldfish suggest practicality.
- Open Access
Short Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains consistency, as long as less than a certain fraction of validators are malicious, even in partially-synchronous environments that allow for temporary violations of assumed network delay bounds. Accountable safety means that in any case of inconsistency, a certain fraction of validators can be identified to have provably violated the protocol. Earlier works have developed impossibility results and protocol constructions for these properties separately. We show that accountable safety implies finality, thereby unifying earlier results.
Open AccessShort Paper: Accountable Safety Implies Finality
Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains consistency, as long as less than a certain fraction of validators are malicious, even in partially-synchronous environments that allow for temporary violations of assumed network delay bounds. Accountable safety means that in any case of inconsistency, a certain fraction of validators can be identified to have provably violated the protocol. Earlier works have developed impossibility results and protocol constructions for these properties separately. We show that accountable safety implies finality, thereby unifying earlier results.
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 310-326
Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 310-326
Cryptoeconomic Security for Data Availability Committees