Hongsheng Qi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Hongsheng Qi has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guodong Shi
The University of Sydney
11 shared publications - Daizhan Cheng
Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
10 shared publications - Biqiang Mu
State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Sciences, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
6 shared publications - Bo Li
Institute of Microelectronics of Chinese Academy of Sciences
6 shared publications - Yiguang Hong
Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, China
6 shared publications - Ian R. Petersen
Australian National University
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 28 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Systems Science and Complexity
- Vol. 39 (2) , 857-871
Engineering-Application-Driven Developments in Semi-Tensor Product of Matrices: A Survey
- 28 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Systems Science and Complexity
- Vol. 39 (2) , 857-871
Engineering-Application-Driven Developments in Semi-Tensor Product of Matrices: A Survey
- 22 April 2026
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Unmanned Systems
- Vol. 14 (03) , 605-615
Properties of Eigenvalue/Eigenvector of Hypermatrices
Three properties of the universal (U-) eigenvalues/eigenvectors of hypermatrices are proposed and proved. (1) The eigenvalue/eigenvector of Kronecker product of hypermatrices is the product of eigenvalues/eigenvectors of factor hypermatrices. (2) The similarity of hypermatrices is defined, and then it is proved that the similarity ensures the same eigenvalues/eigenvectors. (3) The Cayley–Hamilton Theorems of Hypermatrix. These properties justify the reasonability of U-engenvalues/eigenvectors.
- 22 April 2026
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Unmanned Systems
- Vol. 14 (03) , 605-615
Properties of Eigenvalue/Eigenvector of Hypermatrices
Three properties of the universal (U-) eigenvalues/eigenvectors of hypermatrices are proposed and proved. (1) The eigenvalue/eigenvector of Kronecker product of hypermatrices is the product of eigenvalues/eigenvectors of factor hypermatrices. (2) The similarity of hypermatrices is defined, and then it is proved that the similarity ensures the same eigenvalues/eigenvectors. (3) The Cayley–Hamilton Theorems of Hypermatrix. These properties justify the reasonability of U-engenvalues/eigenvectors.
- Open Access
Active Inverse Methods in Stackelberg Games with Bounded Rationality
Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly enhance the learning process. In this paper, we extend inverse game theory to active inverse methods. For Stackelberg games with bounded rationality, the leader, acting as a learner, actively chooses actions to better understand the follower's cost functions. First, we develop a method of active learning by leveraging Fisher information to maximize information gain about the unknown parameters and prove the consistency and asymptotic normality. Additionally, when leaders consider its cost, we develop a method of active inverse game to balance exploration and exploitation, and prove the consistency and asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium with quadratic cost functions. Finally, we verify the properties of these methods through simulations in the quadratic case and demonstrate that the active inverse game method can achieve Stackelberg equilibrium more quickly through active exploration.
Open AccessActive Inverse Methods in Stackelberg Games with Bounded Rationality
Inverse game theory is utilized to infer the cost functions of all players based on game outcomes. However, existing inverse game theory methods do not consider the learner as an active participant in the game, which could significantly enhance the learning process. In this paper, we extend inverse game theory to active inverse methods. For Stackelberg games with bounded rationality, the leader, acting as a learner, actively chooses actions to better understand the follower's cost functions. First, we develop a method of active learning by leveraging Fisher information to maximize information gain about the unknown parameters and prove the consistency and asymptotic normality. Additionally, when leaders consider its cost, we develop a method of active inverse game to balance exploration and exploitation, and prove the consistency and asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium with quadratic cost functions. Finally, we verify the properties of these methods through simulations in the quadratic case and demonstrate that the active inverse game method can achieve Stackelberg equilibrium more quickly through active exploration.
- 15 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 71 (2) , 1350-1357
Online Parameter Identification of Cost Functions in Generalized Nash Games
This work studies the online parameter identification of cost functions in a generalized Nash game, where each player’s cost function is influenced by an observable signal and some unknown parameters. A learner can sequentially observe the equilibria reached by the game system as the observable signal changes, and its goal is to identify the unknown parameters in the cost functions. We recast this problem as an online optimization and introduce a novel online parameter identification algorithm. To be specific, we construct a regularized loss function that balances between conservativeness and correctiveness, where the conservativeness term ensures that the renewed estimates do not deviate significantly from the current estimates, while the correctiveness term is captured by the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the generalized Nash equilibrium. For which, the balance is adjusted by a learning rate parameter. We then prove that when the players’ cost functions are linear with respect to the unknown parameters and the learning rate satisfies $\mu _{k} \propto 1/\sqrt{k}$, along with other assumptions, the regret bound of the proposed algorithm is $O(\sqrt{K})$ ($k$ and $K$ represent the current round of online algorithm and the total rounds of games played, respectively). Finally, we conduct numerical simulations on the parameter identification of a Nash–Cournot problem to demonstrate that the performance of our proposed online algorithm is comparable to that of the offline setting.
- 15 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 71 (2) , 1350-1357
Online Parameter Identification of Cost Functions in Generalized Nash Games
This work studies the online parameter identification of cost functions in a generalized Nash game, where each player’s cost function is influenced by an observable signal and some unknown parameters. A learner can sequentially observe the equilibria reached by the game system as the observable signal changes, and its goal is to identify the unknown parameters in the cost functions. We recast this problem as an online optimization and introduce a novel online parameter identification algorithm. To be specific, we construct a regularized loss function that balances between conservativeness and correctiveness, where the conservativeness term ensures that the renewed estimates do not deviate significantly from the current estimates, while the correctiveness term is captured by the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the generalized Nash equilibrium. For which, the balance is adjusted by a learning rate parameter. We then prove that when the players’ cost functions are linear with respect to the unknown parameters and the learning rate satisfies $\mu _{k} \propto 1/\sqrt{k}$, along with other assumptions, the regret bound of the proposed algorithm is $O(\sqrt{K})$ ($k$ and $K$ represent the current round of online algorithm and the total rounds of games played, respectively). Finally, we conduct numerical simulations on the parameter identification of a Nash–Cournot problem to demonstrate that the performance of our proposed online algorithm is comparable to that of the offline setting.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 71 (2) , 823-838
Koopman Theory for Boolean Networks
Networks of agents with logical states, namely Boolean networks, arise in various application domains including biology, computer networks, and social networks. The representation and control of Boolean networks have attracted much attention in recent years. In a parallel line of research, Koopman developed an operator view of nonlinear dynamical systems, which shows that, by making use of observable functions, every nonlinear dynamics can be represented as a (possibly infinite dimensional) linear system. In this article, we present a Koopman theory for Boolean networks. We introduce algebraic operations for logical functions over semirings of binary numbers, defining a semimodule of Boolean functions. The classical Koopman operator and Koopman theory are then established for Boolean networks, where the key ingredient to a linear representation is shown to be Koopman invariance. Next, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for shaping the closed-loop dynamics via feedback into any desired form for Boolean control networks under the Koopman representation, and we develop a feedback control synthesis algorithm to solve this feedback shaping problem. Finally, feedback shaping is applied to a real-world gene regulatory network, and it is demonstrated that the dynamics of such a network may be arbitrarily manipulated by means of feedback control.
- 14 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 71 (2) , 823-838
Koopman Theory for Boolean Networks
Networks of agents with logical states, namely Boolean networks, arise in various application domains including biology, computer networks, and social networks. The representation and control of Boolean networks have attracted much attention in recent years. In a parallel line of research, Koopman developed an operator view of nonlinear dynamical systems, which shows that, by making use of observable functions, every nonlinear dynamics can be represented as a (possibly infinite dimensional) linear system. In this article, we present a Koopman theory for Boolean networks. We introduce algebraic operations for logical functions over semirings of binary numbers, defining a semimodule of Boolean functions. The classical Koopman operator and Koopman theory are then established for Boolean networks, where the key ingredient to a linear representation is shown to be Koopman invariance. Next, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for shaping the closed-loop dynamics via feedback into any desired form for Boolean control networks under the Koopman representation, and we develop a feedback control synthesis algorithm to solve this feedback shaping problem. Finally, feedback shaping is applied to a real-world gene regulatory network, and it is demonstrated that the dynamics of such a network may be arbitrarily manipulated by means of feedback control.
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Systems Science and Complexity
- Vol. 38 (2) , 547-572
Invariant and Dual-Invariant Subspaces of k-Valued Networks
- 1 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Systems Science and Complexity
- Vol. 38 (2) , 547-572
Invariant and Dual-Invariant Subspaces of k-Valued Networks
- 6 December 2024
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Unmanned Systems
- Vol. 14 (01) , 63-77
On Explicit Optimal Strategies for Two Pursuit-evasion Problems under Distance Condition in Frame of Differential Games
This paper studies two pursuit-evasion problems under distance conditions in frame of differential game. In particular, a zero-sum differential game with the objective of distance and a nonzero-sum differential game with objective of both distance and azimuth adjustment are presented. The two players in the games are described by a nonlinear dynamics model subject to both speed and acceleration constraints in the two-dimensional plane. Instead of numerical solutions, the explicit equilibrium solutions of these two differential games are given under the condition that the distance between two players is larger than a certain value. Finally, the simulation results of these two differential games under typical cases demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
- 6 December 2024
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Unmanned Systems
- Vol. 14 (01) , 63-77
On Explicit Optimal Strategies for Two Pursuit-evasion Problems under Distance Condition in Frame of Differential Games
This paper studies two pursuit-evasion problems under distance conditions in frame of differential game. In particular, a zero-sum differential game with the objective of distance and a nonzero-sum differential game with objective of both distance and azimuth adjustment are presented. The two players in the games are described by a nonlinear dynamics model subject to both speed and acceleration constraints in the two-dimensional plane. Instead of numerical solutions, the explicit equilibrium solutions of these two differential games are given under the condition that the distance between two players is larger than a certain value. Finally, the simulation results of these two differential games under typical cases demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
- Open Access
A Multi-Player Potential Game Approach for Sensor Network Localization with Noisy Measurements
Sensor network localization (SNL) is a challenging problem due to its inherent non-convexity and the effects of noise in inter-node ranging measurements and anchor node position. We formulate a non-convex SNL problem as a multi-player non-convex potential game and investigate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) in both the ideal setting without measurement noise and the practical setting with measurement noise. We first show that the NE exists and is unique in the noiseless case, and corresponds to the precise network localization. Then, we study the SNL for the case with errors affecting the anchor node position and the inter-node distance measurements. Specifically, we establish that in case these errors are sufficiently small, the NE exists and is unique. It is shown that the NE is an approximate solution to the SNL problem, and that the position errors can be quantified accordingly. Based on these findings, we apply the results to case studies involving only inter-node distance measurement errors and only anchor position information inaccuracies.
Open AccessA Multi-Player Potential Game Approach for Sensor Network Localization with Noisy Measurements
Sensor network localization (SNL) is a challenging problem due to its inherent non-convexity and the effects of noise in inter-node ranging measurements and anchor node position. We formulate a non-convex SNL problem as a multi-player non-convex potential game and investigate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE) in both the ideal setting without measurement noise and the practical setting with measurement noise. We first show that the NE exists and is unique in the noiseless case, and corresponds to the precise network localization. Then, we study the SNL for the case with errors affecting the anchor node position and the inter-node distance measurements. Specifically, we establish that in case these errors are sufficiently small, the NE exists and is unique. It is shown that the NE is an approximate solution to the SNL problem, and that the position errors can be quantified accordingly. Based on these findings, we apply the results to case studies involving only inter-node distance measurement errors and only anchor position information inaccuracies.
- 6 May 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 5330-5344
Consistency of Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria in Three-Player Leader-Follower Games
There has been significant recent interest in a class of three-player leader-follower game models in many important cybersecurity scenarios. In such a tri-level hierarchical structure, a defender usually serves as a leader, dominating the decision process by the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may not always work, and the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy may provide an alternative choice. Thus, we need to reveal the consistency between SE and NE in the three-player model to help the leader evaluate its strategy impact and avoid a choice dilemma. To this end, we first provide a necessary and sufficient condition such that each SE is an NE, which not only provides access to seek a satisfactory SE but also makes a criterion for an obtained SE. Then, we apply the results for case studies with a unique SE or with at least one SE being an NE. Moreover, when the consistency condition falls short, we give an upper bound of the deviation between SE and NE to help the leader tolerably adopt an SE strategy. Finally, we apply our consistency analysis to practical scenarios, including secure wireless transmission and advanced persistent threat defense.
- 6 May 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 5330-5344
Consistency of Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria in Three-Player Leader-Follower Games
There has been significant recent interest in a class of three-player leader-follower game models in many important cybersecurity scenarios. In such a tri-level hierarchical structure, a defender usually serves as a leader, dominating the decision process by the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may not always work, and the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy may provide an alternative choice. Thus, we need to reveal the consistency between SE and NE in the three-player model to help the leader evaluate its strategy impact and avoid a choice dilemma. To this end, we first provide a necessary and sufficient condition such that each SE is an NE, which not only provides access to seek a satisfactory SE but also makes a criterion for an obtained SE. Then, we apply the results for case studies with a unique SE or with at least one SE being an NE. Moreover, when the consistency condition falls short, we give an upper bound of the deviation between SE and NE to help the leader tolerably adopt an SE strategy. Finally, we apply our consistency analysis to practical scenarios, including secure wireless transmission and advanced persistent threat defense.
- Open Access
Online Parameter Identification of Generalized Non-cooperative Game
This work studies the parameter identification problem of a generalized non-cooperative game, where each player's cost function is influenced by an observable signal and some unknown parameters. We consider the scenario where equilibrium of the game at some observable signals can be observed with noises, whereas our goal is to identify the unknown parameters with the observed data. Assuming that the observable signals and the corresponding noise-corrupted equilibriums are acquired sequentially, we construct this parameter identification problem as online optimization and introduce a novel online parameter identification algorithm. To be specific, we construct a regularized loss function that balances conservativeness and correctiveness, where the conservativeness term ensures that the new estimates do not deviate significantly from the current estimates, while the correctiveness term is captured by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. We then prove that when the players' cost functions are linear with respect to the unknown parameters and the learning rate of the online parameter identification algorithm satisfies \mu_k \propto 1/\sqrt{k}, along with other assumptions, the regret bound of the proposed algorithm is O(\sqrt{K}). Finally, we conduct numerical simulations on a Nash-Cournot problem to demonstrate that the performance of the online identification algorithm is comparable to that of the offline setting.
Open AccessOnline Parameter Identification of Generalized Non-cooperative Game
This work studies the parameter identification problem of a generalized non-cooperative game, where each player's cost function is influenced by an observable signal and some unknown parameters. We consider the scenario where equilibrium of the game at some observable signals can be observed with noises, whereas our goal is to identify the unknown parameters with the observed data. Assuming that the observable signals and the corresponding noise-corrupted equilibriums are acquired sequentially, we construct this parameter identification problem as online optimization and introduce a novel online parameter identification algorithm. To be specific, we construct a regularized loss function that balances conservativeness and correctiveness, where the conservativeness term ensures that the new estimates do not deviate significantly from the current estimates, while the correctiveness term is captured by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. We then prove that when the players' cost functions are linear with respect to the unknown parameters and the learning rate of the online parameter identification algorithm satisfies \mu_k \propto 1/\sqrt{k}, along with other assumptions, the regret bound of the proposed algorithm is O(\sqrt{K}). Finally, we conduct numerical simulations on a Nash-Cournot problem to demonstrate that the performance of the online identification algorithm is comparable to that of the offline setting.