KWKimberley A. Wade

Kimberley A. Wade

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Kimberley A. Wade has a total of 65 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Susceptibility to misinformation in witnesses with symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and trauma exposure

    by Lily C. Erner, Prerika R. Sharma, Laura Jobson, Kimberley A. Wade

    Within the general population, approximately 6% of people will have posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 15% will have depression at one point in their life, yet little is known about how symptoms of PTSD and depression affect people’s ability to accurately report details of a witnessed traumatic event. Studies exploring the relationship between psychopathology and eyewitness memory have primarily focussed on memory distortions that arise from internal cognitive processes (i.e. spreading activation). We examined the relationship between psychopathology and memory distortions resulting from external suggestion (i.e. misinformation). A total of 327 community participants completed measures of PTSD symptoms, depression symptoms, and exposure to traumatic events before viewing a film depicting a graphic car accident and being exposed to misinformation. Participants then completed cued recall and recognition memory tests. While higher PTSD symptomology was associated with poorer overall memory performance, the association between PTSD symptomology and the misinformation effect was not significant. Previous trauma exposure was also not significantly associated with the misinformation effect. However, for participants who reported no prior exposure to a transportation accident, the misinformation effect decreased as depression symptom scores increased. By contrast, for participants who reported prior exposure to a transportation accident, the misinformation effect remained stable across depression symptom scores. These results advance theory on psychopathology and memory distortions by revealing that prevailing frameworks (e.g. associative activation theory) may need further refining to better account for the complex associations between psychopathology and misinformation susceptibility. The results have practical implications for clinical and forensic settings.

  • Open Access

    Reducing the Impact of AI-Generated Misinformation on Memory and Perception of a Police Incident

    by Emily Rebecca Spearing, Levana Garreffa, Kimberley A. Wade, Deryn Strange, Ullrich K. H. Ecker

    Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly used to generate police-incident reports. Yet such systems can produce errors, which may detrimentally impact legal processes. The current study examined the impact of an AI-generated report on memory and perceptions of a police incident, and whether safeguards can reduce those impacts. Participants (N = 432) read an accurate summary of a domestic-violence incident; 24 hours later, they read an AI-generated report that was either accurate or contained misinformation, before completing memory tests and rating their perceptions of the incident. Two safeguards were tested: (1) active error-monitoring, and (2) watching body-worn camera footage. Misinformation significantly impaired memory and influenced perceptions of the incident—especially in participants who strongly identified with police—and the safeguards were largely effective at reducing these impacts. Findings demonstrate the risks of generative-AI usage in forensic settings, requiring the implementation of appropriate safeguards for combatting its detrimental effects.

  • Open Access

    Eyewitness suspect identification: six claims regarding the state of the science

    by D. Stephen Lindsay, John T. Wixted, Ryan J. Fitzgerald, Ira E. Hyman, Laura Mickes, Kimberley A. Wade

    Psychological science on eyewitness suspect identification has a long and rich history. A few decades ago, modal expert opinion emphasised eyewitnesses' fallibility, and it was widely held that identifications made with high confidence are only slightly more likely to be accurate than those made with low confidence. The authors of this invited Contemporary Discussion agree that current science compels a more nuanced perspective in which the relationship between eyewitnesses' confidence and their accuracy varies predictably depending on specifics of how the suspect was selected, how the identification test was designed, when and how it was administered, and when confidence was assessed. We tender claims regarding conditions under which we believe lineup identification responses can be strongly inculpating. We also articulate claims regarding conditions under which we believe identification responses can be strongly exculpating. While most of the claims described herein were previously advanced by individual scientists, what is new - and important - is that they now reflect an emerging scientific consensus. We do not assert that every claim is firmly established, but we advance arguments for believing they are true. In addition, we propose multiple lines of laboratory and field studies aimed at advancing understanding of these issues.


  • Open Access

    Error rates for high confidence eyewitness identifications

    by Ryan J. Fitzgerald, Ira E. Hyman, Kimberley A. Wade

    Eyewitness identification of strangers is vulnerable to error, even if the eyewitness reports high confidence at the initial police identification procedure. In support of this claim, we report a new meta-analysis of data from actual criminal investigations. This analysis shows that when eyewitnesses were tested in the field by a blind lineup administrator, 1/8 of the high confidence identifications were known errors, i.e., mistaken identifications of lineup fillers. We argue that these field data are more informative than the available wrongful conviction data because in the latter eyewitness confidence at the initial identification procedure was almost never recorded. Our claim is also supported by lab data, which show that error rates for high-confidence identifications of the suspect can range from 0 to 40%, depending on the level of bias against the suspect. We highlight three types of suspect bias: appearance-based suspicion, social media contamination, and misplaced prior familiarity.


  • Open Access

    Identifying voices using confidence judgments under deadline pressure

    by Nikolas Pautz, Harry Robert McSweeney Purser, Josh P Davis, Kimberley A. Wade, Kirsty McDougall, Harriet M J Smith

    Voice identification from categorical lineups can be error-prone. Here we test whether Brewer et al. (2012)’s radical alternative to categorical face lineups also improves classification accuracy for earwitnesses. Brewer et al. (2012)’s procedure requires witnesses to rate, under deadline pressure, how confident they are that each lineup member matches their memory for the perpetrator. Participants (N=803) attempted to identify a ‘perpetrator’ from a categorical voice lineup, a confidence-based voice lineup with deadlines, or a confidence-based voice lineup without deadlines. Taking the results of the accuracy and signal detection analyses together, we do not conclude that confidence-based lineups optimise voice identification accuracy. Neither the deadline nor the no-deadline confidence-based procedures appear to be a promising alternative to categorical voice lineups. These results further highlight the need to test procedures for faces and voices separately, rather than assuming that patterns of performance observed for faces will also be observed for voices.

  • Open Access

    Still Lost in the Mall—False Memories Happen and That's What Matters

    by Kimberley A. Wade, Paul Riesthuis, Charlotte Bücken, Henry Otgaar, Elizabeth F. Loftus

    For more than 25 years, psychologists have explored how people can develop rich false memories. Murphy et al. (2023) replicated the original “lost in the mall” study (Loftus and Pickrell 1995), demonstrating that 35% of participants developed false beliefs or memories. Andrews and Brewin (in press) reanalyzed Murphy et al.'s data, concluding that participants who developed false memories reported 25% of the suggested details and 50% of their reports were potentially real memories. Based on this, Andrews and Brewin posited that only 4% of Murphy et al.'s participants developed false memories. We take issue with Andrews and Brewin's conclusions. Given human memory is reconstructive, we should expect participants' reports to contain remnants of accurate memories, self or schematic knowledge, or speculation. Moreover, even low false memory rates can be practically important. What matters is that suggestive influences can lead to substantial memory distortions and even plant new events that had not occurred.


  • Open Access

    Correction: Distress reactions and susceptibility to misinformation for an analogue trauma event

    by Prerika R. Sharma, Emily R. Spearing, Kimberley A. Wade, Laura Jobson

  • Open Access

    Distress reactions and susceptibility to misinformation for an analogue trauma event

    by Prerika R. Sharma, Emily R. Spearing, Kimberley A. Wade, Laura Jobson

    Accuracy of memory is critical in legal and clinical contexts. These contexts are often linked with high levels of emotional distress and social sources that can provide potentially distorting information about stressful events. This study investigated how distress was associated with susceptibility to misinformation about a trauma analogue event. We employed an experimental design whereby in Phase 1, participants (N = 243, aged 20–72, 122 females, 117 males, 4 gender diverse) watched a trauma film (car crash) and heard an audio summary that contained misinformation (misled items), true reminders (consistent items), and no reminders (control items) about the film. Participants rated their total distress, and symptoms of avoidance, intrusions, and hyperarousal, in response to the film. They then completed cued recall, recognition, and source memory tasks. One week later in Phase 2, participants (N = 199) completed the same measures again. Generalised linear mixed models were used. A significant misinformation effect was found, and importantly, participants with higher distress levels showed a smaller misinformation effect, owing to especially poor memory for consistent items compared to their less distressed counterparts. Distress was also associated with improved source memory for misled items. Avoidance of the film’s reminders was associated with a smaller misinformation effect during immediate retrieval and a larger misinformation effect during delayed retrieval. Findings suggest that distress is associated with decreased susceptibility to misinformation in some cases, but also associated with poorer memory accuracy in general. Limitations are discussed, and the need for further research is highlighted.