MZMohammad Saleh Zarepour

Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Mohammad Saleh Zarepour has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    One Book, Many Gains: On Saemi’s Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    Over the past twenty years, many scholars have argued that the analytic philosophy of religion is unhealthy for the following reasons, among others: Most analytic philosophers of religion are Christian theists or are significantly influenced by Christianity more than by any other religion. Most of the field's central problems have arisen through engagement with Christian beliefs. Most philosophical theories developed in defence of religious belief are proposed from a Christian perspective, and most arguments against religious belief are primarily targeted at Christianity. Until very recently, all the leading journals in the field were Christianity-oriented, and most of the major funded research projects centred on themes inspired by or formed in reaction to Christianity. 1 In recent years, a collective awareness has emerged among analytic philosophers of religion that the aforementioned biases and lack of diversity are prevalent in the field. Although there is no consensus on how harmful these issues are to the field, many philosophers of religion believe that change is needed anyway. Even if there is no agreement on its precise extent, it seems indisputable that the field should be more diverse. The field is, to a debatable-though not dismissible-extent, sick and in need of urgent treatment. 2 However, bringing about any progressive change in this regard is challenging. And this is partly because it requires sympathetic collaboration among various parties, including the funding bodies (many of which have not previously been interested in non-Christian philosophy of religion), the Christianity-inspired majority of philosophers of religion, and the minority primarily influenced by non-Christian religious traditions. Funding bodies must be receptive to projects planned to run from non-Christian perspectives. The Christianity-inspired majority should be open to the development of approaches that do not focus primarily on Christianity, whether in support or opposition, and must foster opportunities for such growth (e.g., by welcoming presentations inspired by underrepresented traditions at major philosophy of religion conferences, dedicating special issues of leading journals to papers on these traditions,

  • Open Access

    PSR, Modal Collapse, and Open Future in Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    It has been contended that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) implies necessitarianism—that is, the view that everything occurs out of necessity. Discussing a well‐known argument for this claim developed by contemporary metaphysicians, I show that Ibn Sīnā has anticipated a counterpart of this argument, and that is precisely why he is usually described as a necessitarian. This raises a puzzle because he also appears to endorse the existence of contingencies in the world. In particular, he seems to believe that the future is open, not only epistemically and alethically but also ontically. This means that there are future states of affairs that are genuinely contingent and the truth values of the propositions expressing these states are not determined now. Focusing on Ibn Sīnā's commitment to the Coexistence Principle—according to which the cause coexists with the effect—I will provide a solution to the aforementioned puzzle.


  • Open Access

    The Existence and Nature of Deities

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour


  • Avicenna on empty intentionality: a case study in analytical Avicennianism

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna’s views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of ‘empty intentionality’. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed.


  • Open Access

    Counting to infinity, successive addition, and the length of the past

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    The Successive Addition Argument (SAA) is one of the arguments proposed by the defenders of the Kalām Cosmological Argument to support the claim that the universe has a beginning. The main premise of SAA states that a collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite. This premise is challenged by an argument originally proposed by Fred Dretske. According to Dretske’s Argument (DA), the scenario of a counter who starts counting numbers and never stops can provide a counterexample to the main premise of SAA. I argue that neither DA nor its past-oriented counterpart—which discusses the scenario of a counter who has always been counting negative integers from the infinite past—can play a decisive role in our evaluation of the strength of the arguments that are intended to establish the finitude of the past based on the impossibility of an actually infinite number of successive additions.


  • Relationality of intentionality

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.


  • Open Access

    AVICENNA ON GRASPING MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    According to Avicenna, some of the objects of mathematics exist and some do not. Every existing mathematical object is a non-sensible connotational attribute of a physical object and can be perceived by the faculty of estimation. Non-existing mathematical objects can be represented and perceived by the faculty of imagination through separating and combining parts of the images of existing mathematical objects that are previously perceived by estimation. In any case, even non-existing mathematical objects should be considered as properties of material entities. They can never be grasped as fully immaterial entities. Avicenna believes that we cannot grasp any mathematical concepts unless we first have some specific perceptual experiences. It is only through the ineliminable and irreplaceable operation of the faculties of estimation and imagination upon some sensible data that we can grasp mathematical concepts. This shows that Avicenna endorses some sort of concept empiricism about mathematics.


  • Infinite Magnitudes, Infinite Multitudes, and the Beginning of the Universe

    by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

    W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Puryear claims, because there can be no justification for the claim that actual infinite magnitudes are impossible. I argue, against Puryear, that there can be such a justification. I claim, nevertheless, that, for reasons entirely different from Puryear’s, the finitude of the past cannot be established based either on the impossibility of actual infinite multitudes or on the impossibility of actual infinite magnitudes. My arguments in this paper draw on insights from al-Kindī and Avicenna.