SSSteve Sauerwald

Steve Sauerwald

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Steve Sauerwald has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Political Directors and the Recruitment of Foreign Workers

    by Steve Sauerwald, Peter Norlander

    Companies strive to gain a competitive advantage by recruiting highly qualified employees. One way to achieve this goal is by recruiting foreign workers, frequently through the H-1B visa program. However, immigration has become a contentious political issue in the United States, making it more difficult to recruit foreign workers. We examine how politicians on the board influence recruitment strategies aimed at attracting foreign workers. Studying the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election and President Donald Trump’s “Buy American, Hire American” policy, we estimate the impact of political directors on recruiting strategies. By analyzing the near-universe of job advertisements in the United States, we develop novel firm-level measures of employment barriers for foreign workers. We find that the presence of political directors increased the employment barriers for foreign workers after Trump’s inauguration. We also argue that the information processing capabilities of the board moderate this effect: diverse boards and boards with Human Resources committees decrease the employment barriers for foreign workers, whereas shareholder meetings during periods of heightened political risk increase these employment barriers.


  • Symbolic Shareholder Democracy: Toward a Behavioral Understanding of the Role of Shareholder Voting in CEO Dismissals

    by Alina G. Andrei, J. (Hans) van Oosterhout, Steve Sauerwald

    We investigate the effect of expressive shareholder dissent voting, in which shareholders use their votes symbolically to express their discontent with management, on subsequent chief executive officer (CEO) dismissals. Using the routine but highly symbolic executive board discharge proposal voted on at the annual shareholder meetings of German firms, we argue that the board of directors understands these votes as a “vote of confidence in management” that challenges the CEO’s mandate to lead the firm. Arguing that board chairs are uniquely positioned to take up the stance of a steward of the firm and its leadership, we examine how independent and family board chairs moderate the board’s response to expressive voting dissent. Using a sample of German public firms over the period 2008–2015, we find that expressive voting dissent increases the chance of CEO dismissal increasingly with the level of dissent expressed. Contrary to prevailing agency theoretical expectations, we do not find that independent chairs are more responsive to expressive voting dissent, nor that this relationship is strengthened by the degree of minority institutional investor ownership of the firm. Consistent with the symbolic perspective on shareholder voting that we seek to develop, however, we find that family chairs are more likely to lead the board to dismiss the CEO due to the intrinsic disvalue they incur from symbolic leadership legitimacy challenges in their firms, and that the positive effect of having a family chair on the dissent induced chance of CEO dismissal is strengthened by the level of family ownership in the firm.Funding: A University of Illinois at Chicago Summer Research Grant is gratefully acknowledged for S. Sauerwald.


  • Multistakeholder Agency: Stakeholder Benefit Alignment and National Institutional Contexts

    by Victor Zitian Chen, Patricio Duran, Steve Sauerwald, Michael A. Hitt, Marc van Essen

    The alignment among multiple stakeholder benefits is a valuable performance indicator for the benefits generated by a firm for various stakeholders. Our research seeks to augment stakeholder-agency theory with an institutional perspective to analyze how national institutions affect stakeholder benefit alignment. We suggest that the current development of stakeholder-agency theory has overlooked the alignment of different stakeholders’ benefits and the external institutional contexts as critical determinants in ensuring such alignment. We conceptualize stakeholder benefit alignment as a positive relationship between different stakeholder groups’ benefits, and propose an institutional framework grounded in relative stakeholder salience. Using this framework, we argue that stakeholder benefits are better aligned when national institutions enhance the ease of withdrawal, legal protection, and private enforcement for intrinsically less salient stakeholders, and when a long-term oriented culture characterizes a society. We found supportive evidence by employing a meta-analytic approach based on 530 correlations from 94 primary studies representing 23 economies. Our study adds new insights to the stakeholder-agency literature by conceptualizing and quantitatively examining the degree of alignment across different stakeholder benefit dimensions, focusing on national formal and informal institutions as boundary conditions.


  • Evaluating Board Candidates: A Threat-Contingency Model of Shareholder Dissent Against Female Director Candidates

    by Arjun Mitra, Corinne Post, Steve Sauerwald

    Given the growing corporate social responsibility (CSR) pressures to increase board gender diversity and the scrutiny afforded to firms that fail to appoint female directors, one may expect shareholders to vote with greater support for women (than for men) nominated to boards. However, diversity management research suggests that pressures to improve female representation in organizations and in leadership roles may also backfire. We propose a threat-contingency model of shareholder dissent against female director candidates to explain when shareholders will be more or less likely to dissent against female (relative to male) directors. Specifically, we advance CSR legitimacy threats and agency threats as conditions contextualizing shareholder dissent against female director candidates. Using a sample of 50,202 director elections at 1,104 public firms from 2003 to 2015, we find that female directors receive less dissent from shareholders; further, low female board representation intensifies this leniency as CSR legitimacy threats become more salient. However, when firm-related agency threats occur (e.g., firm underperformance and media controversies), shareholders’ leniency toward female director candidates dissipates, and when directors themselves present agency threats (e.g., director attendance problems and nonindependence), shareholders evaluate female directors more harshly than male directors. Underlining the relevance of our theory, our supplementary analyses show that shareholder dissent increases the probability of director turnover. These findings contribute to theory and research on women on boards, firm responses to institutional pressures, and shareholder dissent.


  • CEO outside directorships and managerial efficiency: The role of host board capital

    by Canan C. Mutlu, Sunay Mutlu, Steve Sauerwald

    Research Question/Issue: Do CEO outside board directorships improve or reduce CEO managerial efficiency? What is the role of host board capital in this relationship?Research Findings/Insights: We explore the value of CEO outside directorships on managerial efficiency by identifying a unique empirical setting where a CEO's number of outside board seats is exogenously decreased by a merger that eliminates the board of a host firm the CEO is serving on. Using this event as our empirical instrument, we find that outside directorships decrease a CEO's managerial efficiency while host board capital reduces this effect.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Proponents view outside board service as a valuable leadership development tool to mentor the CEO while others promulgating an agency view argue that outside board service detracts from the CEO's ability to improve the efficiency of the home firm as it leads to busyness of the CEO. We shed light on this debate by arguing that CEO outside directorships might reduce CEO's managerial efficiency; however, this effect might be contingent on the characteristics of the host board.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our findings offer insights to practitioners about the value of multiple directorships and the importance of the host board capital while informing policy makers about the potential restrictions on outside board assignments.


  • Gender Differences in Pay Levels: An Examination of the Compensation of University Presidents

    by Dane P. Blevins, Steve Sauerwald, Jenny M. Hoobler, Christopher J. Robertson

    Our paper studies how gender and organizational status affect a university president’s compensation. Similar to previous findings, we hypothesize that women will receive less pay than men. However, we go beyond a dyadic view of individual differences to examine gender’s impact on compensation, and we explicate the importance of institutional forces in understanding the gender pay gap. In doing so, we rely on organizational status and hypothesize that the gender pay gap will be less pronounced as a university’s status rises. Although we find that the gender pay gap persists within the university president context, we also find that as a university’s status rises, the pay gap declines. Moreover, our findings show that the gender pay gap disappears at higher-status universities. Hence, accounting for where the glass ceiling is broken is an important consideration in understanding the gender pay gap. In sum, by integrating a broader institutional perspective to explain gender differences in pay levels, our paper demonstrates the importance of contextualizing gender to better understand its effects on compensation. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1266 .