Arjun Mitra
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Arjun Mitra has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Steve Sauerwald
C. T. Bauer College of Business, University of Houston, Houston, USA
2 shared publications - Brent Lyons
Schulich School of Business, York U
1 shared publication Camellia Bryan
Schulich School of Business
1 shared publication- Conor Callahan
University of Illinois Chicago
1 shared publication - Corinne Post
Villanova University
1 shared publication - David F. Arena
College of Business The University of Texas at Arlington Arlington Texas USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 195 (3) , 615-629
Ethics of Care and Employees: The Impact of Female Board Representation and Top Management Leadership on Human Capital Development Policies
- 17 April 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 195 (3) , 615-629
Ethics of Care and Employees: The Impact of Female Board Representation and Top Management Leadership on Human Capital Development Policies
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2022 (1)
Changing the Default: Allying with Marginalized Identities for Social Change
This symposium discusses the perpetuation of societal defaults—assumptions favoring the majority category as opposed to specified linguistics which explicitly state the category—and how they mainta...
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2022 (1)
Changing the Default: Allying with Marginalized Identities for Social Change
This symposium discusses the perpetuation of societal defaults—assumptions favoring the majority category as opposed to specified linguistics which explicitly state the category—and how they mainta...
- 30 March 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Relations
- Vol. 75 (5) , 956-988
No family left behind: Flexibility i-deals for employees with stigmatized family identities
Most contemporary employers offer some policies to facilitate work–family (WF) balance for their employees. However, do the policies designed to help everyone suffice for unique employees with stigmatized social identities and non-traditional family structures? We conceptualize stigmatized family identity (SFI) to provide key insights on distinct WF issues experienced by such employees, and potential solutions in the form of person-specific work arrangements called idiosyncratic deals (i-deals). First, we define the construct of SFI, and exemplify its different types arising from the intersection of sexual orientation/gender identity/race and a non-traditional family structure. Second, we integrate literatures on WF and stigma to theorize the broad spectrum of WF issues and ensuing effects on job outcomes of employees with SFIs. Finally, we advance theory by developing a multi-level framework highlighting the importance of flexibility i-deals for employees with SFIs. Our framework identifies boundary conditions at individual, team, and organizational levels that can encourage (or deter) such employees from seeking i-deals. In doing so, we also explore the importance of privilege when it comes to SFI employees seeking i-deals.
- 30 March 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Relations
- Vol. 75 (5) , 956-988
No family left behind: Flexibility i-deals for employees with stigmatized family identities
Most contemporary employers offer some policies to facilitate work–family (WF) balance for their employees. However, do the policies designed to help everyone suffice for unique employees with stigmatized social identities and non-traditional family structures? We conceptualize stigmatized family identity (SFI) to provide key insights on distinct WF issues experienced by such employees, and potential solutions in the form of person-specific work arrangements called idiosyncratic deals (i-deals). First, we define the construct of SFI, and exemplify its different types arising from the intersection of sexual orientation/gender identity/race and a non-traditional family structure. Second, we integrate literatures on WF and stigma to theorize the broad spectrum of WF issues and ensuing effects on job outcomes of employees with SFIs. Finally, we advance theory by developing a multi-level framework highlighting the importance of flexibility i-deals for employees with SFIs. Our framework identifies boundary conditions at individual, team, and organizational levels that can encourage (or deter) such employees from seeking i-deals. In doing so, we also explore the importance of privilege when it comes to SFI employees seeking i-deals.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 32 (1) , 86-110
Evaluating Board Candidates: A Threat-Contingency Model of Shareholder Dissent Against Female Director Candidates
Given the growing corporate social responsibility (CSR) pressures to increase board gender diversity and the scrutiny afforded to firms that fail to appoint female directors, one may expect shareholders to vote with greater support for women (than for men) nominated to boards. However, diversity management research suggests that pressures to improve female representation in organizations and in leadership roles may also backfire. We propose a threat-contingency model of shareholder dissent against female director candidates to explain when shareholders will be more or less likely to dissent against female (relative to male) directors. Specifically, we advance CSR legitimacy threats and agency threats as conditions contextualizing shareholder dissent against female director candidates. Using a sample of 50,202 director elections at 1,104 public firms from 2003 to 2015, we find that female directors receive less dissent from shareholders; further, low female board representation intensifies this leniency as CSR legitimacy threats become more salient. However, when firm-related agency threats occur (e.g., firm underperformance and media controversies), shareholders’ leniency toward female director candidates dissipates, and when directors themselves present agency threats (e.g., director attendance problems and nonindependence), shareholders evaluate female directors more harshly than male directors. Underlining the relevance of our theory, our supplementary analyses show that shareholder dissent increases the probability of director turnover. These findings contribute to theory and research on women on boards, firm responses to institutional pressures, and shareholder dissent.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 32 (1) , 86-110
Evaluating Board Candidates: A Threat-Contingency Model of Shareholder Dissent Against Female Director Candidates
Given the growing corporate social responsibility (CSR) pressures to increase board gender diversity and the scrutiny afforded to firms that fail to appoint female directors, one may expect shareholders to vote with greater support for women (than for men) nominated to boards. However, diversity management research suggests that pressures to improve female representation in organizations and in leadership roles may also backfire. We propose a threat-contingency model of shareholder dissent against female director candidates to explain when shareholders will be more or less likely to dissent against female (relative to male) directors. Specifically, we advance CSR legitimacy threats and agency threats as conditions contextualizing shareholder dissent against female director candidates. Using a sample of 50,202 director elections at 1,104 public firms from 2003 to 2015, we find that female directors receive less dissent from shareholders; further, low female board representation intensifies this leniency as CSR legitimacy threats become more salient. However, when firm-related agency threats occur (e.g., firm underperformance and media controversies), shareholders’ leniency toward female director candidates dissipates, and when directors themselves present agency threats (e.g., director attendance problems and nonindependence), shareholders evaluate female directors more harshly than male directors. Underlining the relevance of our theory, our supplementary analyses show that shareholder dissent increases the probability of director turnover. These findings contribute to theory and research on women on boards, firm responses to institutional pressures, and shareholder dissent.