Kirill Borissov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kirill Borissov has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mikhail Pakhnin
Univ Balear Isl, Dept Appl Econ, Palma De Mallorca, Spain
10 shared publications - Ram Sewak Dubey
Department of Economics Feliciano School of Business Montclair State University 07043 Montclair NJ USA
5 shared publications - Ronald Wendner
Karl Franzens Univ Graz, Dept Econ, Graz, Austria
3 shared publications - Stéphane Lambrecht3 shared publications
- Aleksey Minabutdinov
CER-ETH Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
2 shared publications Alexander Surkov
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Hypocrisy in a Simple Social Interaction Model
We develop a model of social interaction in which agents hold private beliefs but communicate public statements. We distinguish between two networks: an audience network shaping statements through social pressure and an influence network governing belief updating. This separation drives a wedge between statements and underlying beliefs, so that agents may persistently communicate opinions they do not hold. We provide necessary and sufficient network conditions for the emergence of such hypocrisy. The model generates rich patterns of opinion propagation, including the amplification of messages that agents themselves do not believe, and sheds light on phenomena such as propaganda diffusion, the spiral of silence, and political correctness.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHypocrisy in a Simple Social Interaction Model
We develop a model of social interaction in which agents hold private beliefs but communicate public statements. We distinguish between two networks: an audience network shaping statements through social pressure and an influence network governing belief updating. This separation drives a wedge between statements and underlying beliefs, so that agents may persistently communicate opinions they do not hold. We provide necessary and sufficient network conditions for the emergence of such hypocrisy. The model generates rich patterns of opinion propagation, including the amplification of messages that agents themselves do not believe, and sheds light on phenomena such as propaganda diffusion, the spiral of silence, and political correctness.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Lobachevskii Journal of Mathematics
- Vol. 46 (9) , 4804-4825
Inequality and Growth in a Model with Borrowing Constraints
A simple theoretical model of economic growth and distribution is developed to describe the impact of private credit and debt on growth and inequality. In this model, agents who are assumed to be envious are subject to borrowing constraints. Depending on the stringency of the borrowing constraints, the economy can find itself in one of two regimes: a two-class regime and an egalitarian regime. In the two-class regime, the population is eventually divided into two groups: savers and spenders, where the spenders are eventually caught in the debt trap while the savers own all the capital and debt of the spenders. In the egalitarian regime, capital stock and output are higher in the long run than in the two-class regime. Under certain conditions, tightening the borrowing constraints can shift the economy from the two-class to the egalitarian regime.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Lobachevskii Journal of Mathematics
- Vol. 46 (9) , 4804-4825
Inequality and Growth in a Model with Borrowing Constraints
A simple theoretical model of economic growth and distribution is developed to describe the impact of private credit and debt on growth and inequality. In this model, agents who are assumed to be envious are subject to borrowing constraints. Depending on the stringency of the borrowing constraints, the economy can find itself in one of two regimes: a two-class regime and an egalitarian regime. In the two-class regime, the population is eventually divided into two groups: savers and spenders, where the spenders are eventually caught in the debt trap while the savers own all the capital and debt of the spenders. In the egalitarian regime, capital stock and output are higher in the long run than in the two-class regime. Under certain conditions, tightening the borrowing constraints can shift the economy from the two-class to the egalitarian regime.
- 30 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 398-414
Cooperating with yourself
- 30 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 398-414
Cooperating with yourself
- Open Access
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 114
General equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 114
Open AccessGeneral equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency
- 26 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 26 (3)
Social security, bequests, and social comparisons
We examine the long‐run impact of unfunded social security on capital stock and wealth inequality in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where newborn individuals differ in their inheritance. In our model, individuals' decisions are subject to social comparisons, which can lead to overspending on personal consumption and result in zero bequests left within poor families. In this scenario, unfunded social security increases long‐run wealth inequality by redistributing wealth from poor to rich families, who always leave bequests. However, it increases long‐run capital stock, too. We also show that when none or all of the families leave bequests in the long run, our model predicts negative and neutral effects of social security on capital accumulation, in line with the standard OLG models of Diamond and Barro. Thus, our results emphasize the need to account for heterogeneity in bequest behavior in the analysis of social security.
- 26 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 26 (3)
Social security, bequests, and social comparisons
We examine the long‐run impact of unfunded social security on capital stock and wealth inequality in an overlapping generations (OLG) model where newborn individuals differ in their inheritance. In our model, individuals' decisions are subject to social comparisons, which can lead to overspending on personal consumption and result in zero bequests left within poor families. In this scenario, unfunded social security increases long‐run wealth inequality by redistributing wealth from poor to rich families, who always leave bequests. However, it increases long‐run capital stock, too. We also show that when none or all of the families leave bequests in the long run, our model predicts negative and neutral effects of social security on capital accumulation, in line with the standard OLG models of Diamond and Barro. Thus, our results emphasize the need to account for heterogeneity in bequest behavior in the analysis of social security.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Present-Biased Envy, Inequality, and Growth
We take into account that envy (relative consumption concerns) is more pronounced in the present than in the future. We consider a Ramsey-type model in which agents differ only in their initial capital endowments but are identical in their exogenous parameters. Agents’ preferences exhibit present-biased envy: agents are naive and care about how their consumption levels compare to that of others in the current period. Our results suggest that present-biased envy affects both the level of inequality and the income level in an economy. First, present-biased envy generates the Matthew effect (the relatively rich get richer while the relatively poor get poorer), leading to a highly unequal long-run distribution of wealth. After some finite time, only those agents who were the wealthiest from the outset own the entire capital stock. All other agents are in the maximum borrowing state and spend their wages to repay the debt. Second, present-biased envy makes agents effectively more impatient, lowering the long-run capital stock and the aggregate income level compared to those in an economy without envy.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPresent-Biased Envy, Inequality, and Growth
We take into account that envy (relative consumption concerns) is more pronounced in the present than in the future. We consider a Ramsey-type model in which agents differ only in their initial capital endowments but are identical in their exogenous parameters. Agents’ preferences exhibit present-biased envy: agents are naive and care about how their consumption levels compare to that of others in the current period. Our results suggest that present-biased envy affects both the level of inequality and the income level in an economy. First, present-biased envy generates the Matthew effect (the relatively rich get richer while the relatively poor get poorer), leading to a highly unequal long-run distribution of wealth. After some finite time, only those agents who were the wealthiest from the outset own the entire capital stock. All other agents are in the maximum borrowing state and spend their wages to repay the debt. Second, present-biased envy makes agents effectively more impatient, lowering the long-run capital stock and the aggregate income level compared to those in an economy without envy.
- Open Access
Heterogeneous bequests and social inequalities
We study a growth model with two types of agents who are heterogeneous in their degree of family altruism. We prove that every equilibrium path converges to a unique steady state, and study the effect of altruism on the properties of steady-state equilibrium. We show that aggregate income is positively related to both level of altruism and altruism heterogeneity. When altruism heterogeneity is low, income inequality follows an inverse U-shaped pattern relative to the level of altruism, which is consistent with the crosscountry Kuznets curve. When altruism heterogeneity is high, income inequality monotonically decreases with the level of altruism. Our results suggest that heterogeneous altruism is an important mechanism linking economic growth and income inequality.
Open AccessHeterogeneous bequests and social inequalities
We study a growth model with two types of agents who are heterogeneous in their degree of family altruism. We prove that every equilibrium path converges to a unique steady state, and study the effect of altruism on the properties of steady-state equilibrium. We show that aggregate income is positively related to both level of altruism and altruism heterogeneity. When altruism heterogeneity is low, income inequality follows an inverse U-shaped pattern relative to the level of altruism, which is consistent with the crosscountry Kuznets curve. When altruism heterogeneity is high, income inequality monotonically decreases with the level of altruism. Our results suggest that heterogeneous altruism is an important mechanism linking economic growth and income inequality.
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 215, 167-191
Dissonance minimization and conversation in social networks
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 215, 167-191
Dissonance minimization and conversation in social networks
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics
- Vol. 63 (3) , 337-359
Economic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Discounting
A survey of theoretical economic growth models with agents having different subjective discount factors is proposed. The structure of equilibrium paths in such models, their dynamics and convergence to stationary equilibria, and the relationship with Pareto optimal paths are described. Models with socially determined discount factors in which time preferences are formed endogenously are discussed, and the basic difficulties associated with social choice in the case of heterogeneous discount factors are examined. The models presented in the paper shed light on internal mechanisms of a market economy that lead to the division of society into the rich and the poor.
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Pleiades Publishing Ltd in Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics
- Vol. 63 (3) , 337-359
Economic Growth Models with Heterogeneous Discounting
A survey of theoretical economic growth models with agents having different subjective discount factors is proposed. The structure of equilibrium paths in such models, their dynamics and convergence to stationary equilibria, and the relationship with Pareto optimal paths are described. Models with socially determined discount factors in which time preferences are formed endogenously are discussed, and the basic difficulties associated with social choice in the case of heterogeneous discount factors are examined. The models presented in the paper shed light on internal mechanisms of a market economy that lead to the division of society into the rich and the poor.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Economics and Economic Policy
- Vol. 20 (1) , 233-234
Correction: The capital tax paradox in a greening economy
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in International Economics and Economic Policy
- Vol. 20 (1) , 233-234
Open AccessCorrection: The capital tax paradox in a greening economy