Ronald Wendner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ronald Wendner has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Karl Farmer
8 shared publications- Kirill Borissov
European Univ St Petersburg, Dept Econ, Nongovt Educ Inst, St Petersburg, Russia
3 shared publications - Mikhail Pakhnin
Univ Balear Isl, Dept Appl Econ, Palma De Mallorca, Spain
3 shared publications Christian Groth
2 shared publicationsLawrence H. Goulder
2 shared publications- Sugata Ghosh
Brunel University of London, Uxbridge, UK
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 30 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 398-414
Cooperating with yourself
- 30 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 398-414
Cooperating with yourself
- Open Access
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 114
General equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 114
Open AccessGeneral equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency
- Open Access
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 28 (7) , 1594-1634
Conspicuous leisure, time allocation, and obesity Kuznets curves
Our growth model explores the complex relationship between income, obesity, and changes in exercise-related behavior. Combining Becker’s theory of time allocation (The Economic Journal 75(299), 493–517, 1965) with Veblen’s theory of conspicuous leisure (The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1st ed. New York: Macmillan, 1899), we determine conditions for dynamic and static obesity Kuznets curves. Considering food consumption and exercise choices, we show that dynamic and static Kuznets curves result from the rising opportunity cost of exercise and peer influence, both increasing with income. Focusing on calorie expenditure, we investigate the rise and slowdown in obesity prevalence in the USA and the correlation between obesity and income per worker. Our numerical simulations indicate that, as the economy grows, exercise choices slow down the rise in obesity prevalence but do not generate a dynamic Kuznets curve in the USA. By contrast, they generate a static Kuznets curve for a population cross section. We discuss policy implications of our findings.
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 28 (7) , 1594-1634
Open AccessConspicuous leisure, time allocation, and obesity Kuznets curves
Our growth model explores the complex relationship between income, obesity, and changes in exercise-related behavior. Combining Becker’s theory of time allocation (The Economic Journal 75(299), 493–517, 1965) with Veblen’s theory of conspicuous leisure (The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1st ed. New York: Macmillan, 1899), we determine conditions for dynamic and static obesity Kuznets curves. Considering food consumption and exercise choices, we show that dynamic and static Kuznets curves result from the rising opportunity cost of exercise and peer influence, both increasing with income. Focusing on calorie expenditure, we investigate the rise and slowdown in obesity prevalence in the USA and the correlation between obesity and income per worker. Our numerical simulations indicate that, as the economy grows, exercise choices slow down the rise in obesity prevalence but do not generate a dynamic Kuznets curve in the USA. By contrast, they generate a static Kuznets curve for a population cross section. We discuss policy implications of our findings.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Present-Biased Envy, Inequality, and Growth
We take into account that envy (relative consumption concerns) is more pronounced in the present than in the future. We consider a Ramsey-type model in which agents differ only in their initial capital endowments but are identical in their exogenous parameters. Agents’ preferences exhibit present-biased envy: agents are naive and care about how their consumption levels compare to that of others in the current period. Our results suggest that present-biased envy affects both the level of inequality and the income level in an economy. First, present-biased envy generates the Matthew effect (the relatively rich get richer while the relatively poor get poorer), leading to a highly unequal long-run distribution of wealth. After some finite time, only those agents who were the wealthiest from the outset own the entire capital stock. All other agents are in the maximum borrowing state and spend their wages to repay the debt. Second, present-biased envy makes agents effectively more impatient, lowering the long-run capital stock and the aggregate income level compared to those in an economy without envy.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPresent-Biased Envy, Inequality, and Growth
We take into account that envy (relative consumption concerns) is more pronounced in the present than in the future. We consider a Ramsey-type model in which agents differ only in their initial capital endowments but are identical in their exogenous parameters. Agents’ preferences exhibit present-biased envy: agents are naive and care about how their consumption levels compare to that of others in the current period. Our results suggest that present-biased envy affects both the level of inequality and the income level in an economy. First, present-biased envy generates the Matthew effect (the relatively rich get richer while the relatively poor get poorer), leading to a highly unequal long-run distribution of wealth. After some finite time, only those agents who were the wealthiest from the outset own the entire capital stock. All other agents are in the maximum borrowing state and spend their wages to repay the debt. Second, present-biased envy makes agents effectively more impatient, lowering the long-run capital stock and the aggregate income level compared to those in an economy without envy.
- Open Access
- 14 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 61 (2) , 311-337
Positional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy
In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.
- 14 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 61 (2) , 311-337
Open AccessPositional preferences and efficiency in a dynamic economy
In an endogenous growth model, we characterize the conditions under which positional preferences for consumption and wealth do not cause inefficiency and derive an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. The concerns for relative consumption and relative wealth partly emanate from social comparisons with people in other countries. We distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a non-welfarist government that does not attach any social value to relative concerns. We also compare the outcome of Nash-competition among local/national governments with the resource allocation implied by a global social optimum both under welfarism and non-welfarism.
- Open Access
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Conspicuous Leisure, Time Allocation, and Obesity Kuznets Curves
We build a theoretical model to explain the complex patterns of income and obesity, accounting for changes in behavior related to exercise. We combine the theory of time allocation with the theory of conspicuous leisure in a growth model, assuming that consumption expenditures connected to exercise time are conspicuous, and that conspicuous behavior changes with economic development. As a result, as economies develop, we show that there is a growing wedge between optimal exercise and consumption choices made by individuals with different income levels. We show that this pattern is connected to a dynamic Kuznets curve linking body weight to economic development over time, and a static Kuznets curve linking different steady state levels of income per worker to body weight. Thus, our model helps explain the rise and slowdown in obesity prevalence in the USA, as well as the positive correlation between obesity and income per worker in developing countries, and the negative correlation between obesity and income per worker in industrialized countries. We supplement our theoretical results with numerical simulations of the static and dynamic obesity Kuznets curves for the USA. We show that while exercise choices have contributed to a slowdown in the rise in obesity prevalence, there is to this date no dynamic Kuznets curve pattern for obesity in the USA. By contrast, we find the existence of a static Kuznets curve: the steady state level of average body weight increases with the per worker stock of capital up to a level of 186.5 pounds, corresponding to a capital stock 25% higher than the current steady state US capital stock, and decreases thereafter. We discuss policy implications of our findings.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessConspicuous Leisure, Time Allocation, and Obesity Kuznets Curves
We build a theoretical model to explain the complex patterns of income and obesity, accounting for changes in behavior related to exercise. We combine the theory of time allocation with the theory of conspicuous leisure in a growth model, assuming that consumption expenditures connected to exercise time are conspicuous, and that conspicuous behavior changes with economic development. As a result, as economies develop, we show that there is a growing wedge between optimal exercise and consumption choices made by individuals with different income levels. We show that this pattern is connected to a dynamic Kuznets curve linking body weight to economic development over time, and a static Kuznets curve linking different steady state levels of income per worker to body weight. Thus, our model helps explain the rise and slowdown in obesity prevalence in the USA, as well as the positive correlation between obesity and income per worker in developing countries, and the negative correlation between obesity and income per worker in industrialized countries. We supplement our theoretical results with numerical simulations of the static and dynamic obesity Kuznets curves for the USA. We show that while exercise choices have contributed to a slowdown in the rise in obesity prevalence, there is to this date no dynamic Kuznets curve pattern for obesity in the USA. By contrast, we find the existence of a static Kuznets curve: the steady state level of average body weight increases with the per worker stock of capital up to a level of 186.5 pounds, corresponding to a capital stock 25% higher than the current steady state US capital stock, and decreases thereafter. We discuss policy implications of our findings.
- Open Access
- 30 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Positional Preferences and Efficiency in a Dynamic Economy
Based on an endogenous growth model, this paper characterizes the conditions under which positional preferences do not give rise to intertemporal distortions as well as derives an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. In our model, individuals can be positional both in terms of their consumption and wealth, the relative concerns partly reflect comparisons with people in other countries, and we distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a paternalist government that does not respect positional preferences. We also extend the analysis to a multi-country framework and show that Nash-competition among local paternalist governments leads to a global social optimum, whereas Nash-competition among local welfarist governments does not.
- 30 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPositional Preferences and Efficiency in a Dynamic Economy
Based on an endogenous growth model, this paper characterizes the conditions under which positional preferences do not give rise to intertemporal distortions as well as derives an optimal tax policy response in cases where these conditions are not satisfied. In our model, individuals can be positional both in terms of their consumption and wealth, the relative concerns partly reflect comparisons with people in other countries, and we distinguish between a (conventional) welfarist government and a paternalist government that does not respect positional preferences. We also extend the analysis to a multi-country framework and show that Nash-competition among local paternalist governments leads to a global social optimum, whereas Nash-competition among local welfarist governments does not.
- Open Access
- 24 September 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Charity As Income Redistribution: A Model With Optimal Taxation, Status, and Social Stigma
In light of the increasing inequality in many countries, this paper analyzes redistributive charitable giving from the rich to the poor in a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. Our framework integrates public and private redistribution, the warm glow of giving and stigma of receiving charitable donations, and status concerns emanating from social comparisons with respect to charitable donations and private consumption. Whether charity should be taxed or supported largely depends on the relative strengths of the warm glow of giving and the stigma of receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities caused by charitable donations. In addition, imposing stigma on the mimicker (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) strengthens the case for subsidizing charity. We also consider a case where the government is unable to target the charitable giving through a direct tax instrument, and we examine how the optimal marginal income tax structure should be adjusted in response to charitable giving. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the quantitative effects of the aforementioned mechanisms can be substantial.
- 24 September 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCharity As Income Redistribution: A Model With Optimal Taxation, Status, and Social Stigma
In light of the increasing inequality in many countries, this paper analyzes redistributive charitable giving from the rich to the poor in a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. Our framework integrates public and private redistribution, the warm glow of giving and stigma of receiving charitable donations, and status concerns emanating from social comparisons with respect to charitable donations and private consumption. Whether charity should be taxed or supported largely depends on the relative strengths of the warm glow of giving and the stigma of receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities caused by charitable donations. In addition, imposing stigma on the mimicker (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) strengthens the case for subsidizing charity. We also consider a case where the government is unable to target the charitable giving through a direct tax instrument, and we examine how the optimal marginal income tax structure should be adjusted in response to charitable giving. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the quantitative effects of the aforementioned mechanisms can be substantial.
- 23 August 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 21 (5) , 923-944
Public policy, dynamic status preferences, and wealth inequality
This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.
- 23 August 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 21 (5) , 923-944
Public policy, dynamic status preferences, and wealth inequality
This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 70 (1) , 114-140
Positional preferences and efficient capital accumulation when households exhibit a preference for wealth
We study the impact of positional preferences—with respect to wealth in addition to consumption—on endogenous growth, welfare, and corrective taxation. We consider first an AK model, and then introduce public capital. Labour supply is exogenous. We find analytically that the presence of wealth positionality always causes distortions (although a preference for absolute wealth by itself is non-distortionary). Consumption positionality introduces a distortion only if wealth is an argument in the utility function and the marginal degree of positionality in wealth does not match that of consumption. Two corrective tax instruments, a consumption or an income tax, are required for internalization of externalities in an AK set-up; the optimal choice of public investment is an additional instrument when public capital is introduced. Numerical simulations—pointing towards high corrective tax rates and their strong impact on growth and welfare—complement the theoretical analysis.
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 70 (1) , 114-140
Positional preferences and efficient capital accumulation when households exhibit a preference for wealth
We study the impact of positional preferences—with respect to wealth in addition to consumption—on endogenous growth, welfare, and corrective taxation. We consider first an AK model, and then introduce public capital. Labour supply is exogenous. We find analytically that the presence of wealth positionality always causes distortions (although a preference for absolute wealth by itself is non-distortionary). Consumption positionality introduces a distortion only if wealth is an argument in the utility function and the marginal degree of positionality in wealth does not match that of consumption. Two corrective tax instruments, a consumption or an income tax, are required for internalization of externalities in an AK set-up; the optimal choice of public investment is an additional instrument when public capital is introduced. Numerical simulations—pointing towards high corrective tax rates and their strong impact on growth and welfare—complement the theoretical analysis.