Moti Michaeli
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Moti Michaeli has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel Spiro
Dept. of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
4 shared publications - Andrea Ichino
European University Institute
1 shared publication - Assaf Sarid
University of Haifa
1 shared publication - Daniel L. Chen
Toulouse School of Economics
1 shared publication Daniel Spiro Legitimizing
1 shared publication- Ginevra Marandola
Ministry of Economy and Finance, Italy & University of Bologna , Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Growth
- Vol. 29 (3) , 391-432
On the coevolution of individualism and institutions
- 1 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Growth
- Vol. 29 (3) , 391-432
On the coevolution of individualism and institutions
- 24 September 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 133 (649) , 323-354
Civicness Drain*
Migration may cause, not only a brain drain, but also a ‘civicness’ drain, leading to a poverty trap. Using migration choices of southern Italian high-school students classified as civic if not cheating in a modified die-roll experiment, we uncover a key role of local civicness (average civicness in the class): a civicness drain is observed only at high and low local civicness. We rationalise this pattern with a model in which civic and uncivic types balance hope versus fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences and their beliefs about being considered civic in the place of destination.
- 24 September 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 133 (649) , 323-354
Civicness Drain*
Migration may cause, not only a brain drain, but also a ‘civicness’ drain, leading to a poverty trap. Using migration choices of southern Italian high-school students classified as civic if not cheating in a modified die-roll experiment, we uncover a key role of local civicness (average civicness in the class): a civicness drain is observed only at high and low local civicness. We rationalise this pattern with a model in which civic and uncivic types balance hope versus fear of migration outcomes, taking into account economic gains, risk preferences and their beliefs about being considered civic in the place of destination.
- 18 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 56 (1) , 57-66
On Measuring Welfare ‘Behind a Veil of Ignorance’
- 18 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 56 (1) , 57-66
On Measuring Welfare ‘Behind a Veil of Ignorance’
- 12 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 121, 90-107
Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating
- 12 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 121, 90-107
Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating
- Open Access
Legitimizing Policy
In many settings of political bargaining over policy, agents care not only about getting their will but also about having others approve the chosen policy thus giving it more weight. What is the effect on the bargaining outcome when agents care about such legitimacy of the policy? We study this question theoretically and empirically. We show that the median-voter theorem holds in groups that are ideologically very cohesive and in groups with extreme ideological disagreement. However, in groups with intermediate ideological disagreement, the median-voter theorem does not hold. This is since, on the individual level, ideological disagreement with the median has a non-monotonic effect on the policy. We test our model in a natural experimental setting—U.S. appeals courts—where causal identification is based on random assignment of judges into judicial panels, each consisting of three judges who rule on a case. Here judges care about legitimacy of the policy they write because a norm of consensus prevails and because increased legitimacy reduces the likelihood of the judicial case to be heard by the Supreme Court. The predicted pattern of how policies depend on the participants’ ideologies are corroborated by our empirical tests.
Open AccessLegitimizing Policy
In many settings of political bargaining over policy, agents care not only about getting their will but also about having others approve the chosen policy thus giving it more weight. What is the effect on the bargaining outcome when agents care about such legitimacy of the policy? We study this question theoretically and empirically. We show that the median-voter theorem holds in groups that are ideologically very cohesive and in groups with extreme ideological disagreement. However, in groups with intermediate ideological disagreement, the median-voter theorem does not hold. This is since, on the individual level, ideological disagreement with the median has a non-monotonic effect on the policy. We test our model in a natural experimental setting—U.S. appeals courts—where causal identification is based on random assignment of judges into judicial panels, each consisting of three judges who rule on a case. Here judges care about legitimacy of the policy they write because a norm of consensus prevails and because increased legitimacy reduces the likelihood of the judicial case to be heard by the Supreme Court. The predicted pattern of how policies depend on the participants’ ideologies are corroborated by our empirical tests.
- Open Access
Prescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons
This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which the comparison is being made; under the second, the median contribution is the reference point; and under the third the top contribution is the reference. The first method results in a unique equilibrium and the reference contribution is endogenously low. Each of the latter two methods allows for multiple equilibria differing in contributions made and thus in the strength of the norm to contribute. Comparing the methods we show that the median reference allows for the highest equilibrium contributions and welfare of all methods hence is the preferred method if, among the multiple equilibria, the best one can be selected. However, the bottom-reference is the maximin method, i.e., it provides safe minimal aggregate contribution and welfare that surpass the worst outcome in the other two methods.
Open AccessPrescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons
This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which the comparison is being made; under the second, the median contribution is the reference point; and under the third the top contribution is the reference. The first method results in a unique equilibrium and the reference contribution is endogenously low. Each of the latter two methods allows for multiple equilibria differing in contributions made and thus in the strength of the norm to contribute. Comparing the methods we show that the median reference allows for the highest equilibrium contributions and welfare of all methods hence is the preferred method if, among the multiple equilibria, the best one can be selected. However, the bottom-reference is the maximin method, i.e., it provides safe minimal aggregate contribution and welfare that surpass the worst outcome in the other two methods.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 152-216
From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms
This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm—a mode of behavior followed by many—exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms. (JEL D11, Z12, Z13)
- 1 February 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 152-216
From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms
This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm—a mode of behavior followed by many—exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms. (JEL D11, Z12, Z13)
- 1 December 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 132, 51-65
Norm conformity across societies
- 1 December 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 132, 51-65
Norm conformity across societies
- 4 February 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 56 (3) , 515-547
Riskiness for sets of gambles
- 4 February 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 56 (3) , 515-547
Riskiness for sets of gambles