JKJerry W. Kim

Jerry W. Kim

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Jerry W. Kim has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Caught in the Revolving Door: Firm-Government Employee Mobility as a Fleeting Regulatory Advantage

    by Ivana V. Katic, Jerry W. Kim

    How does the exchange of employees between regulatory agencies and regulated firms (i.e., the firm-government revolving door) affect firm regulatory outcomes? Existing work has mostly found a positive impact of revolving door hiring on firm outcomes, but it has overlooked potential limitations of this corporate political activity (CPA) tactic. We argue that the advantages firms can gain from hiring former regulators are bound by the timing of revolving door employment relative to the regulatory process. Within the context of agribiotechnology and its main regulator, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we study regulators who move to in-house and contract lobbying positions (i.e., exit revolving door). We find that firms receive better regulatory outcomes (i.e., faster regulatory approval for new crops) only prior to the regulators’ move to in-house lobbying, consistent with the regulatory capture perspective. Moreover, this revolving door was only valuable in the time period immediately before the mobility event. Additionally, contrary to the belief that former regulators provide firms with expertise and social capital as lobbyists, we find that firms did not gain any advantage after regulators became lobbyists. Taken together, our results suggest that revolving doors can be an effective business political mobilization strategy, albeit one that has limited success in shaping firm government outcomes, much like other types of CPA. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1669 .


  • Halos and Egos: Rankings and Interspecialty Deference in Multispecialty U.S. Hospitals

    by Jerry W. Kim

    This paper examines how media rankings shift patterns of collaboration and deference between professional groups within organizations. Diversified and multidisciplinary organizations such as universities and hospitals often face distinct subunit evaluations that can influence coordination on interdependent tasks. Using patient-level treatment data for more than five million in-patient stays, I find that changes in the “best hospitals” rankings do not meaningfully shift treatment patterns by physicians in hospitals. However, when specialties were ranked in the top echelons (i.e., top 10) or had high categorical prestige, they were less likely to involve other specialties (i.e., ego effect) and had a higher chance of performing procedures on patients admitted in other specialties (i.e., halo effect). These effects were mostly confined to minor (i.e., less invasive) procedures, implying that the impact of external rankings on patient outcomes is relatively benign.This paper was accepted by Olav Sorenson, organizations.


  • Executive Compensation, Fat Cats, and Best Athletes

    by Jerry W. Kim, Bruce Kogut, Jae-Suk Yang

    Income gains in the top 1 percent are the primary cause for the rapid growth in U.S. inequality since the late 1970s. Managers and executives of firms account for a large proportion of these top earners. Chief executive officers (CEOs), in particular, have seen their compensation increase faster than the growth in firm size. We propose that changes in the macro patterns of the distribution of CEO compensation resulted from a process of diffusion within localized networks, propagating higher pay among corporate executives. We compare three possible explanations for diffusion: director board interlocks, peer groups, and educational networks. The statistical results indicate that corporate director networks facilitate social comparisons that generate the observed pay patterns. Peer and education network effects do not survive a novel endogeneity test that we execute. A key implication is that local diffusion through executive network structures partially explains the changes in macro patterns of income distribution found in the inequality data.


  • Seeing Stars: Matthew Effects and Status Bias in Major League Baseball Umpiring

    by Jerry W. Kim, Brayden G King

    This paper tests the assumption that evaluators are biased to positively evaluate high-status individuals, irrespective of quality. Using unique data from Major League Baseball umpires' evaluation of pitch quality, which allow us to observe the difference in a pitch's objective quality and in its perceived quality as judged by the umpire, we show that umpires are more likely to overrecognize quality by expanding the strike zone, and less likely to underrecognize quality by missing pitches in the strike zone for high-status pitchers. Ambiguity and the pitcher's reputation as a “control pitcher” moderate the effect of status on umpire judgment. Furthermore, we show that umpire errors resulting from status bias lead to actual performance differences for the pitcher and team. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1967 . This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.


  • Innovation, Strategy, and Hypercompetition

    by Rita Gunther McGrath, Jerry Kim

    From the perspective of the field of strategic management, innovation has traditionally been regarded as tangential to the primary concerns of the field. Strategy sought to understand how firms might achieve a sustainable competitive advantage, or long period of out-performance relative to a comparison set. With the advent of hypercompetition, in which competitive advantages are transient, an increasing amount of economic activity does not reflect the assumptions of either the industrial organization stream of strategy research or even the more recent firm-focused resource or capabilities-based view. Specific implications for integrating an innovation perspective in strategy research include new approaches to measuring performance; a new focus for strategy analysis that considers firms within networks of individuals and other organizations; and a new role for general managers. Ironically, our research suggests that strategy may well benefit by returning to its traditional roots as a field that searches for answers relevant to general managers.


  • Arbiter of science: Institutionalization and status effects in FDA drug review 1990–2004

    by Jerry W. Kim

    In this article the author proposes that firm status has a significant effect on the regulatory evaluation process. Regulators rely on external signals of quality such as status to resolve uncertainty, and the tendency to be infused with ‘value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’ (Selznick, 1957) causes status positions in institutionalized domains to be particularly salient. Using review times for 839 New Drug Applications approved by the Food and Drug Administration between 1990 and 2004, the author finds that firms with higher status in the scientific knowledge domain receive faster approval for their drugs. The effect of status strengthened when products address underserved disease areas, and when following a major product withdrawal in the industry. Status in areas unrelated to the therapy category had a stronger effect on approval speed than therapy-specific status, implying that status effects are driven by values in addition to technical concerns.


  • Executive Compensation, Fat Cats and Best Athletes

    by Jerry Kim, Bruce Kogut, Jae-Suk Yang

    The income gains in the top 1 percent are the primary cause for the rapid growth in U.S. inequality since the late 1970s. Managers and executives of firms account for a large proportion of these top earners. Chief executive officers (CEOs) in particular have seen their compensation increase faster than the growth in firm size. We propose that changes in the macro patterns of the distribution of CEO compensation resulted from a process of diffusion within localized networks, propagating higher pay among corporate executives. We compare three candidate explanations for diffusion: director board interlocks, peer groups, and educational networks. The statistical results indicate that corporate director networks facilitate social comparisons that generate the observed pay patterns. Peer and education network effects do not survive a novel endogeneity test that we propose and estimate. A key implication is that local diffusion through executive network structures explains the changes in the macro patterns of income distribution evidenced in the inequality data.


  • Where do alliances come from?

    by Jerry W. Kim, Monica C. Higgins


  • WHERE DO ALLIANCES COME FROM? THE EFFECTS OF UPPER ECHELONS ON ALLIANCE FORMATION.

    by Jerry W. Kim, Monica C. Higgins

    Alliances with established organizations provide young firms with access to resources necessary for survival. Previous organizational research has focused on prior alliance activity as a driver of alliance formation. Yet, in the context of young firms which have limited track records, such explanations do not suffice. This paper proposes an alternative mechanism of alliance formation that focuses on the individuals that form the upper echelon of a firm. We theorize that the career affiliations of top managers facilitate the formation of alliances by acting as a signal of legitimacy, status, and substance. Utilizing a typology of upper echelon experience that distinguishes between upstream, horizontal, and downstream employment-based affiliations, we propose that the prominence of upper echelon affiliations signal a firm's quality and legitimacy, which in turn promotes alliance formation. We further unpeel this general proposition to examine the specific ways in which these signals transpire, suggesting that status dynamics and homophily tendencies determine the formation of prominent and specific types of alliances. We test our ideas with an event-history dataset of 3,200 career histories of top managers who took biotechnology firms public between 1979 and 1996, and find that firms possessing more upper echelon affiliations with prominent downstream and horizontal organizations have a higher rate of forming alliances. Further, we find that the better the match between the type of employment affiliation and the type of alliance partner, the greater the rate of alliance formation. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for organizational research on young entrepreneurial firms.