Ivana Katic
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ivana Katic has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jerry W. Kim
Rutgers Business School, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey 07102
2 shared publications Amy Hillman
Arizona State University
1 shared publication- Andrea Ivanišević
Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad, 21000 Novi Sad, Serbia
1 shared publication - Borut Buchmeister
University of Maribor, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
1 shared publication - Marjan Leber
Innovation Service Network
1 shared publication Paul Ingram
Columbia Business School, New York, NY, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 January 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 255-262
Revolving door
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 35 (1) , 281-306
Caught in the Revolving Door: Firm-Government Employee Mobility as a Fleeting Regulatory Advantage
How does the exchange of employees between regulatory agencies and regulated firms (i.e., the firm-government revolving door) affect firm regulatory outcomes? Existing work has mostly found a positive impact of revolving door hiring on firm outcomes, but it has overlooked potential limitations of this corporate political activity (CPA) tactic. We argue that the advantages firms can gain from hiring former regulators are bound by the timing of revolving door employment relative to the regulatory process. Within the context of agribiotechnology and its main regulator, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we study regulators who move to in-house and contract lobbying positions (i.e., exit revolving door). We find that firms receive better regulatory outcomes (i.e., faster regulatory approval for new crops) only prior to the regulators’ move to in-house lobbying, consistent with the regulatory capture perspective. Moreover, this revolving door was only valuable in the time period immediately before the mobility event. Additionally, contrary to the belief that former regulators provide firms with expertise and social capital as lobbyists, we find that firms did not gain any advantage after regulators became lobbyists. Taken together, our results suggest that revolving doors can be an effective business political mobilization strategy, albeit one that has limited success in shaping firm government outcomes, much like other types of CPA. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1669 .
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 35 (1) , 281-306
Caught in the Revolving Door: Firm-Government Employee Mobility as a Fleeting Regulatory Advantage
How does the exchange of employees between regulatory agencies and regulated firms (i.e., the firm-government revolving door) affect firm regulatory outcomes? Existing work has mostly found a positive impact of revolving door hiring on firm outcomes, but it has overlooked potential limitations of this corporate political activity (CPA) tactic. We argue that the advantages firms can gain from hiring former regulators are bound by the timing of revolving door employment relative to the regulatory process. Within the context of agribiotechnology and its main regulator, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we study regulators who move to in-house and contract lobbying positions (i.e., exit revolving door). We find that firms receive better regulatory outcomes (i.e., faster regulatory approval for new crops) only prior to the regulators’ move to in-house lobbying, consistent with the regulatory capture perspective. Moreover, this revolving door was only valuable in the time period immediately before the mobility event. Additionally, contrary to the belief that former regulators provide firms with expertise and social capital as lobbyists, we find that firms did not gain any advantage after regulators became lobbyists. Taken together, our results suggest that revolving doors can be an effective business political mobilization strategy, albeit one that has limited success in shaping firm government outcomes, much like other types of CPA. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1669 .
- Top Cited Papers
- 6 December 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Management
- Vol. 49 (6) , 1911-1938
Corporate Political Activity, Reimagined: Revisiting the Political Marketplace
We update the literature on corporate attempts to influence political actors, and thereby shape their governmental outcomes. Doing so allows us to recognize where the field has advanced, where it has not, and, importantly, reimagine an agenda for research moving forward. Our review documents areas of research and levels of analyses within the literature and identifies a core and secondary issues including the overrepresentation of lobbying and campaign contributions, the U.S. context, legislatures as targets of CPA, and firm policy and financial outcomes. We use the review to update the conceptualization of the political marketplace, including the introduction of a new categorization of corporate political activity tactics (CPA) along the dimensions of formality and directness. What we call our political marketplace 2.0 then allows for an expanded agenda for research in the field, moving forward. Our review works together with a companion review on Corporate Political Connections, published in this same issue, to offer a holistic perspective on the boundary between corporations and political actors.
- 6 December 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Management
- Vol. 49 (6) , 1911-1938
Top Cited PapersCorporate Political Activity, Reimagined: Revisiting the Political Marketplace
We update the literature on corporate attempts to influence political actors, and thereby shape their governmental outcomes. Doing so allows us to recognize where the field has advanced, where it has not, and, importantly, reimagine an agenda for research moving forward. Our review documents areas of research and levels of analyses within the literature and identifies a core and secondary issues including the overrepresentation of lobbying and campaign contributions, the U.S. context, legislatures as targets of CPA, and firm policy and financial outcomes. We use the review to update the conceptualization of the political marketplace, including the introduction of a new categorization of corporate political activity tactics (CPA) along the dimensions of formality and directness. What we call our political marketplace 2.0 then allows for an expanded agenda for research in the field, moving forward. Our review works together with a companion review on Corporate Political Connections, published in this same issue, to offer a holistic perspective on the boundary between corporations and political actors.
- 13 April 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 57 (6) , 1010-1044
Income Inequality and Subjective Well-Being: Toward an Understanding of the Relationship and Its Mechanisms
Income inequality is emerging as the socioeconomic topic of our era. Yet there is no clear conclusion as to how income inequality affects the most comprehensive human outcome measure, subjective well-being (SWB). This study provides an explanation for the relationship between income inequality and SWB, by delving into its mechanisms, including egalitarian preferences, perceived fairness, social comparison concerns, as well as perceived social mobility. In a rigorous analysis using a large cross-country dataset, and accounting for the nested structure of the data, as well as controlling for a variety of individual and country characteristics, we find that SWB is higher where income inequality is higher. Importantly, we also find support for this relationship being moderated by perceptions of poverty being caused by unfairness, an individual’s relative socioeconomic standing, as well as beliefs about hard work leading to success. Our study highlights the dire need for further scholarly attention to income inequality and its complex effects on SWB.
- 13 April 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 57 (6) , 1010-1044
Income Inequality and Subjective Well-Being: Toward an Understanding of the Relationship and Its Mechanisms
Income inequality is emerging as the socioeconomic topic of our era. Yet there is no clear conclusion as to how income inequality affects the most comprehensive human outcome measure, subjective well-being (SWB). This study provides an explanation for the relationship between income inequality and SWB, by delving into its mechanisms, including egalitarian preferences, perceived fairness, social comparison concerns, as well as perceived social mobility. In a rigorous analysis using a large cross-country dataset, and accounting for the nested structure of the data, as well as controlling for a variety of individual and country characteristics, we find that SWB is higher where income inequality is higher. Importantly, we also find support for this relationship being moderated by perceptions of poverty being caused by unfairness, an individual’s relative socioeconomic standing, as well as beliefs about hard work leading to success. Our study highlights the dire need for further scholarly attention to income inequality and its complex effects on SWB.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2016
- Published by Production Engineering Institute (PEI), Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Advances in Production Engineering & Management
- Vol. 11 (3) , 173-182
Business plan feedback for cost effective business processes
- 9 September 2016
- Published by Production Engineering Institute (PEI), Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Advances in Production Engineering & Management
- Vol. 11 (3) , 173-182
Open AccessBusiness plan feedback for cost effective business processes
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2015 (1) , 12772
"Antecedents of Employee Mobility between U.S. Reg. Commissions and the Private Sector, 1887-2000"
Despite the high prevalence of the revolving door, a type of employee mobility between firms and their regulators, there is no clarity in terms of the antecedents of this practice. In this paper, I ask: What individual characteristics of regulators make them more likely to be hired away by (directly or indirectly) regulated firms? Using a unique dataset, containing career histories of regulators from 17 U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions from 1887-2000, I find that both expertise and connectedness increase the likelihood of private sector employment post- tenure. In other words, revolving regulators present their new corporate employers with the potential for expertise exchange with the government, as well as for regulatory capture of the state. However, there are important differences across various types of firms. In fact, while professional expertise increases the likelihood of regulators exiting to directly regulated firms, law and consulting, as well as lobbying firms, regulatory expertise and connectedness only influence the likelihood of law and consulting firm employment.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2015 (1) , 12772
"Antecedents of Employee Mobility between U.S. Reg. Commissions and the Private Sector, 1887-2000"
Despite the high prevalence of the revolving door, a type of employee mobility between firms and their regulators, there is no clarity in terms of the antecedents of this practice. In this paper, I ask: What individual characteristics of regulators make them more likely to be hired away by (directly or indirectly) regulated firms? Using a unique dataset, containing career histories of regulators from 17 U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions from 1887-2000, I find that both expertise and connectedness increase the likelihood of private sector employment post- tenure. In other words, revolving regulators present their new corporate employers with the potential for expertise exchange with the government, as well as for regulatory capture of the state. However, there are important differences across various types of firms. In fact, while professional expertise increases the likelihood of regulators exiting to directly regulated firms, law and consulting, as well as lobbying firms, regulatory expertise and connectedness only influence the likelihood of law and consulting firm employment.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2013 (1) , 12899
Caught in the revolving door: firm-government ties as determinants of regulatory outcomes
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2013 (1) , 12899
Caught in the revolving door: firm-government ties as determinants of regulatory outcomes