Artyom Jelnov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Artyom Jelnov has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pavel Jelnov
Leibniz Universität Hannover
4 shared publications - Yair Tauman
Reichman University, Herzliya, Israel
4 shared publications - Lihi Dery
Ariel University
3 shared publications - Limor Hatsor
Jerusalem College of Technology Israel
3 shared publications Limor Hatsor
Jerusalem College of Technology Jerusalem Israel
2 shared publications- Richard Zeckhauser
Harvard University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 30 (3) , 1-23
Lobbying under conflicting interests
A variation of a cheap talk game is considered in which the preferences of a special interest group conflict with those of a policymaker if she is benevolent; however, she may be corrupt. The interest group, which knows the state of the world, sends a message to the policymaker and may also exert costly lobbying effort for its preferred policy to be adopted. We show that expected welfare, which is the same in all PBE, is decreasing in the probability that the policymaker is corrupt. Surprisingly, it decreases faster when this probability is above one-half, suggesting that corrupt behavior will be tolerated only up to a certain level.
- 5 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economic Design
- Vol. 30 (3) , 1-23
Open AccessLobbying under conflicting interests
A variation of a cheap talk game is considered in which the preferences of a special interest group conflict with those of a policymaker if she is benevolent; however, she may be corrupt. The interest group, which knows the state of the world, sends a message to the policymaker and may also exert costly lobbying effort for its preferred policy to be adopted. We show that expected welfare, which is the same in all PBE, is decreasing in the probability that the policymaker is corrupt. Surprisingly, it decreases faster when this probability is above one-half, suggesting that corrupt behavior will be tolerated only up to a certain level.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 16 (1)
Economics of diagnosis of disabilities among adults and children: evidence from Russia
This paper examines the economic and institutional determinants of disability registration in the Russian Federation between 2018 and 2024, with a particular focus on differences between adults and children. Using regional panel data across 86 regions grouped into eight federal districts, the study employs regression analysis to explore how GRP per capita, physician density, educational conditions, and crisis events affect disability detection and reporting. Results show that adult disability prevalence decreases with higher regional income and healthcare access, reflecting poverty-related morbidity and long-term health risks. In contrast, childhood disability registration is positively associated with regional affluence and physician supply, highlighting the role of diagnostic infrastructure rather than underlying morbidity. During systemic disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, adult disability rates remained relatively stable, while childhood disability detection fell sharply, particularly in less resourced regions. A possible explanation of these findings is that adult disability rates primarily capture structural deprivation and chronic illness, whereas childhood disability reflects the strength and resilience of local diagnostic systems.
- 9 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Health Economics Review
- Vol. 16 (1)
Open AccessEconomics of diagnosis of disabilities among adults and children: evidence from Russia
This paper examines the economic and institutional determinants of disability registration in the Russian Federation between 2018 and 2024, with a particular focus on differences between adults and children. Using regional panel data across 86 regions grouped into eight federal districts, the study employs regression analysis to explore how GRP per capita, physician density, educational conditions, and crisis events affect disability detection and reporting. Results show that adult disability prevalence decreases with higher regional income and healthcare access, reflecting poverty-related morbidity and long-term health risks. In contrast, childhood disability registration is positively associated with regional affluence and physician supply, highlighting the role of diagnostic infrastructure rather than underlying morbidity. During systemic disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, adult disability rates remained relatively stable, while childhood disability detection fell sharply, particularly in less resourced regions. A possible explanation of these findings is that adult disability rates primarily capture structural deprivation and chronic illness, whereas childhood disability reflects the strength and resilience of local diagnostic systems.
- 12 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 38 (2) , 249-264
Advantageous candidates and the selection process
I study elections where some candidates have an advantage unrelated to their competence. Although this advantage is negligible in general elections, it is significant during candidate selection by parties. Further, the built-in advantages of some candidates may be a measure of the political system’s inefficiency. The selection of candidates by a party is a crucial institution for this inefficiency to exist. Theoretically, I show that the preciseness of the party’s estimation of candidates’ chances of winning a general election has a non-monotonic effect.
- 12 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 38 (2) , 249-264
Advantageous candidates and the selection process
I study elections where some candidates have an advantage unrelated to their competence. Although this advantage is negligible in general elections, it is significant during candidate selection by parties. Further, the built-in advantages of some candidates may be a measure of the political system’s inefficiency. The selection of candidates by a party is a crucial institution for this inefficiency to exist. Theoretically, I show that the preciseness of the party’s estimation of candidates’ chances of winning a general election has a non-monotonic effect.
- Open Access
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 43 (1) , 2
To be on the Winning Side
The paradox of voting and strategic voting can be explained by the concept of ’casual responsibility’ in voting, as proposed by Goldman (Soc Philos Policy 16(2):201–217, 1999) This concept suggests that a voter feels ‘responsible’ for the candidate she votes for, even if her vote is not decisive. I present a formal model that is inspired by this theory. The model assumes that a voter’s utility from a winning candidate is higher if she votes for him, and lower if she votes for a candidate she dislikes. This model effectively explains the paradox of voting and the occurrence of strategic voting, even when the additional utility of ’being on the side of the winner’ is negligible.
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 43 (1) , 2
Open AccessTo be on the Winning Side
The paradox of voting and strategic voting can be explained by the concept of ’casual responsibility’ in voting, as proposed by Goldman (Soc Philos Policy 16(2):201–217, 1999) This concept suggests that a voter feels ‘responsible’ for the candidate she votes for, even if her vote is not decisive. I present a formal model that is inspired by this theory. The model assumes that a voter’s utility from a winning candidate is higher if she votes for him, and lower if she votes for a candidate she dislikes. This model effectively explains the paradox of voting and the occurrence of strategic voting, even when the additional utility of ’being on the side of the winner’ is negligible.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 205593-205600
Platform Policies and Quality Class: When are Hotels Prone to Rating Manipulation?
Online platforms depend on trust and reputation, yet these are open to manipulation. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of rating manipulation that accounts for platform enforcement policies, market competition, and class differentiation among service providers. The model shows that stricter sanctions can paradoxically increase incentives to manipulate by reducing competition, while greater competition reduces manipulation. To illustrate the model’s applicability, we analyze hotel reviews from Bangkok collected from Agoda, where only verified customers can post reviews, and TripAdvisor, where reviews are open to all users. The empirical results confirm that lower-class hotels are more prone to manipulation than higher-class hotels, consistent with theoretical predictions. Together, the theoretical and empirical findings provide insights for the design of trust and reputation systems in online platforms, highlighting trade-offs between enforcement, competition, and the integrity of ratings.
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 205593-205600
Open AccessPlatform Policies and Quality Class: When are Hotels Prone to Rating Manipulation?
Online platforms depend on trust and reputation, yet these are open to manipulation. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of rating manipulation that accounts for platform enforcement policies, market competition, and class differentiation among service providers. The model shows that stricter sanctions can paradoxically increase incentives to manipulate by reducing competition, while greater competition reduces manipulation. To illustrate the model’s applicability, we analyze hotel reviews from Bangkok collected from Agoda, where only verified customers can post reviews, and TripAdvisor, where reviews are open to all users. The empirical results confirm that lower-class hotels are more prone to manipulation than higher-class hotels, consistent with theoretical predictions. Together, the theoretical and empirical findings provide insights for the design of trust and reputation systems in online platforms, highlighting trade-offs between enforcement, competition, and the integrity of ratings.
- Open Access
- 8 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (5)
Lobbying as a Signal
A model of political competition is considered, in which a candidate who will provide favors to a lobbyist in exchange for a campaign donation, may be perceived as more competent than a rival candidate who has not received a donation and therefore will work solely on behalf of the public. We characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game and show that: (i) the lobbyist is able to exploit the political system to serve his own interests, although lobbying may benefit voters as well; and (ii) donating to both candidates—which is frequently observed in political campaigns—is possible only under competition among lobbyists or under asymmetric information regarding voters' preferences.
- 8 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 27 (5)
Open AccessLobbying as a Signal
A model of political competition is considered, in which a candidate who will provide favors to a lobbyist in exchange for a campaign donation, may be perceived as more competent than a rival candidate who has not received a donation and therefore will work solely on behalf of the public. We characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game and show that: (i) the lobbyist is able to exploit the political system to serve his own interests, although lobbying may benefit voters as well; and (ii) donating to both candidates—which is frequently observed in political campaigns—is possible only under competition among lobbyists or under asymmetric information regarding voters' preferences.
- Open Access
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1023-1031
Addictive Treatment
A treatment prescribed by an incompetent expert can cause long-term damage. However, this damage may not be recognized in the short term. I propose a theoretical model in which an incompetent expert can act dishonestly. Specifically, she can prescribe an improper treatment, which seems to be effective in the short-term but has long-term negative side effects. I show that, surprisingly, the possibility of dishonest behavior may encourage consumers to approach experts and enhance social welfare.
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1023-1031
Open AccessAddictive Treatment
A treatment prescribed by an incompetent expert can cause long-term damage. However, this damage may not be recognized in the short term. I propose a theoretical model in which an incompetent expert can act dishonestly. Specifically, she can prescribe an improper treatment, which seems to be effective in the short-term but has long-term negative side effects. I show that, surprisingly, the possibility of dishonest behavior may encourage consumers to approach experts and enhance social welfare.
- 4 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 100 (3) , 619-633
Mandatory vaccination
- 4 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 100 (3) , 619-633
Mandatory vaccination
- 14 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 517-534
Partial credence goods on review platforms
- 14 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 517-534
Partial credence goods on review platforms
- Open Access
Industrial symbiosis: How to apply successfully
The premise of industrial symbiosis IS is that advancing a circular economy that reuses byproducts as inputs in production is valuable for the environment. We challenge this premise in a simple model. Ceteris paribus, IS is an environmentally friendly approach; however, implementing IS may introduce increased pollution into the market equilibrium. The reason for this is that producers' incentives for recycling can be triggered by the income gained from selling recycled waste in the secondary market, and thereby may not align with environmental protection. That is, producers may boost production and subsequent pollution to sell byproducts without internalizing the pollution emitted in the primary industry or the recycling process. We compare the market solution to the social optimum and identify a key technology parameter - the share of reused byproducts that may have mutual benefits for firms, consumers, and the environment.
Open AccessIndustrial symbiosis: How to apply successfully
The premise of industrial symbiosis IS is that advancing a circular economy that reuses byproducts as inputs in production is valuable for the environment. We challenge this premise in a simple model. Ceteris paribus, IS is an environmentally friendly approach; however, implementing IS may introduce increased pollution into the market equilibrium. The reason for this is that producers' incentives for recycling can be triggered by the income gained from selling recycled waste in the secondary market, and thereby may not align with environmental protection. That is, producers may boost production and subsequent pollution to sell byproducts without internalizing the pollution emitted in the primary industry or the recycling process. We compare the market solution to the social optimum and identify a key technology parameter - the share of reused byproducts that may have mutual benefits for firms, consumers, and the environment.