Pavel Jelnov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Pavel Jelnov has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Artyom Jelnov
Department of Economics and Business Administration, Ariel University, Ariel, Israel
4 shared publications - Lihi Dery
Ariel University
1 shared publication - Marina Bannikova
Departament d’Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain
1 shared publication - Yoram Weiss
Tel Aviv University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Applied Economics
- Vol. 30 (1)
Sunset long shadows: daylight and safety perception
1. The climate and COVID-19 crises have underscored that, despite rapid industrialization, human well-being remains closely tied to natural conditions. Recent years have seen growing interest in ho...
- 9 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Applied Economics
- Vol. 30 (1)
Open AccessSunset long shadows: daylight and safety perception
1. The climate and COVID-19 crises have underscored that, despite rapid industrialization, human well-being remains closely tied to natural conditions. Recent years have seen growing interest in ho...
- Open Access
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 205593-205600
Platform Policies and Quality Class: When are Hotels Prone to Rating Manipulation?
Online platforms depend on trust and reputation, yet these are open to manipulation. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of rating manipulation that accounts for platform enforcement policies, market competition, and class differentiation among service providers. The model shows that stricter sanctions can paradoxically increase incentives to manipulate by reducing competition, while greater competition reduces manipulation. To illustrate the model’s applicability, we analyze hotel reviews from Bangkok collected from Agoda, where only verified customers can post reviews, and TripAdvisor, where reviews are open to all users. The empirical results confirm that lower-class hotels are more prone to manipulation than higher-class hotels, consistent with theoretical predictions. Together, the theoretical and empirical findings provide insights for the design of trust and reputation systems in online platforms, highlighting trade-offs between enforcement, competition, and the integrity of ratings.
- 26 November 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 13, 205593-205600
Open AccessPlatform Policies and Quality Class: When are Hotels Prone to Rating Manipulation?
Online platforms depend on trust and reputation, yet these are open to manipulation. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of rating manipulation that accounts for platform enforcement policies, market competition, and class differentiation among service providers. The model shows that stricter sanctions can paradoxically increase incentives to manipulate by reducing competition, while greater competition reduces manipulation. To illustrate the model’s applicability, we analyze hotel reviews from Bangkok collected from Agoda, where only verified customers can post reviews, and TripAdvisor, where reviews are open to all users. The empirical results confirm that lower-class hotels are more prone to manipulation than higher-class hotels, consistent with theoretical predictions. Together, the theoretical and empirical findings provide insights for the design of trust and reputation systems in online platforms, highlighting trade-offs between enforcement, competition, and the integrity of ratings.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 77, 101992
Influence in economics and aging
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 77, 101992
Open AccessInfluence in economics and aging
- Open Access
The Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
Open AccessThe Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.
- Open Access
- 27 September 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Demographic Economics
- Vol. 89 (2) , 211-252
The marriage age U-shape
In this paper, I address the U-shaped dynamics (a decrease followed by an increase) in the age at first marriage during the twentieth century. First, I show that the U-shaped dynamics have been steeper in Western that in other countries. Second, I find that these dynamics in the West are strongly related to the post-World War II (WWII) economic growth. By contrast, in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries age of marriage was much less correlated across Western countries. I propose a simple model where age of marriage is a function of search frictions and married women's labor force participation. Both factors put together generate U-shaped dynamics as a result of an industrial boom that mimics the post-WWII Western economic development.
- 27 September 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Demographic Economics
- Vol. 89 (2) , 211-252
Open AccessThe marriage age U-shape
In this paper, I address the U-shaped dynamics (a decrease followed by an increase) in the age at first marriage during the twentieth century. First, I show that the U-shaped dynamics have been steeper in Western that in other countries. Second, I find that these dynamics in the West are strongly related to the post-World War II (WWII) economic growth. By contrast, in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries age of marriage was much less correlated across Western countries. I propose a simple model where age of marriage is a function of search frictions and married women's labor force participation. Both factors put together generate U-shaped dynamics as a result of an industrial boom that mimics the post-WWII Western economic development.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics
- Vol. 13 (3) , 141-149
Comparison dimensions and similarity: Addressing individual heterogeneity.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics
- Vol. 13 (3) , 141-149
Comparison dimensions and similarity: Addressing individual heterogeneity.
- 25 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 36 (3-4) , 209-226
Success, Survival and Probabilistic Voting: The Case of a ruling Party
- 25 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 36 (3-4) , 209-226
Success, Survival and Probabilistic Voting: The Case of a ruling Party
- 31 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 80 (6) , 1089-1116
A New Estimator of Search Duration and Its Application to the Marriage Market
- 31 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 80 (6) , 1089-1116
A New Estimator of Search Duration and Its Application to the Marriage Market
- 18 January 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (2)
A Note on Cohabitation and Marriage
Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.
- 18 January 2018
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (2)
A Note on Cohabitation and Marriage
Why do some couples marry, while others prefer cohabitation? The proposed model does not assume utility differences between these two states but assumes separation frictions in marriage and not in cohabitation. We show that high expectations from the relationship lead to marriage even though the utility is drawn from the same distribution as in cohabitation. Moreover, mutual agreement on marriage may take place when the expected utility in partnership is both a private and a common knowledge, although for different sets of expected utility values. Surprisingly, when the expected utility is relatively low, marriage may take place only in the common knowledge environment.