Fabio Lampert
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Fabio Lampert has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pedro Merlussi
Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
3 shared publications D. Harms
Institute of Pathology, University of Kiel
1 shared publication- Frank Berthold
Department of Pediatric Oncology and Hematology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
1 shared publication J. Zieschang
Children's Hospital, University of Cologne
1 shared publicationJohn William Waldrop
University of Notre Dame
1 shared publication- John William Waldrop
University of Notre Dame , USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 55 (2) , 190-208
Free Will and Intensional Operators
Arguments challenging the existence of free will frequently share a common structure, relying on variants of a principle we call C losure , according to which having no choice about a truth is preserved under entailment. We show that, under plausible assumptions, C losure is valid if and only if the ‘no choice’ operator is intensional. By framing the debate in terms of the intensionality of this operator, this paper illuminates previously underappreciated constraints on defenses of C losure -based arguments against the existence of free will.
- 19 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 55 (2) , 190-208
Open AccessFree Will and Intensional Operators
Arguments challenging the existence of free will frequently share a common structure, relying on variants of a principle we call C losure , according to which having no choice about a truth is preserved under entailment. We show that, under plausible assumptions, C losure is valid if and only if the ‘no choice’ operator is intensional. By framing the debate in terms of the intensionality of this operator, this paper illuminates previously underappreciated constraints on defenses of C losure -based arguments against the existence of free will.
- Open Access
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 23 (2) , 439-444
Rigidity and factivity
David Chalmers argued against the claim that for all p , or even for all entertainable p , it is knowable a priori that p iff actually p . Instead of criticizing Chalmers’s argument, I suggest that it can be generalized, in a sense, and in interesting ways, concerning other principles about contingent a priori truths. In particular, I will argue that the puzzle presented by Chalmers runs parallel to others that do not turn on ‘actually’. Furthermore, stronger arguments can be presented that do not turn on apriority either, though they do entail the conclusion of Chalmers’s argument. All such puzzles involve interactions between rigidifying sentence-forming devices with factive operators.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 23 (2) , 439-444
Open AccessRigidity and factivity
David Chalmers argued against the claim that for all p , or even for all entertainable p , it is knowable a priori that p iff actually p . Instead of criticizing Chalmers’s argument, I suggest that it can be generalized, in a sense, and in interesting ways, concerning other principles about contingent a priori truths. In particular, I will argue that the puzzle presented by Chalmers runs parallel to others that do not turn on ‘actually’. Furthermore, stronger arguments can be presented that do not turn on apriority either, though they do entail the conclusion of Chalmers’s argument. All such puzzles involve interactions between rigidifying sentence-forming devices with factive operators.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 134 (533) , 1-32
Freedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori
One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 134 (533) , 1-32
Open AccessFreedom, Omniscience and the Contingent A Priori
One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).
- Open Access
- 22 August 2024
- Published by University of Tartu in Studia Philosophica Estonica
- p. 80-95
What Is This Thing Called Peace?
This article scrutinizes discourse surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war in Western nations, where, despite widespread support for Ukraine, a contingent advocates for peace by rejecting military aid. This “pacifist” stance gains traction through public demonstrations in European countries and political endorsement. However, by opposing military aid while advocating peace, these messages, while ostensibly altruistic, distort genuine efforts for establishing peace in Ukraine. The article argues that recent developments from the philosophy of language, combined with the realities of Russia’s invasion and main war objectives, provide clarity on this phenomenon, making a case for considering such calls for peace as propagandistic, perverting the meaning of the word.
- 22 August 2024
- Published by University of Tartu in Studia Philosophica Estonica
- p. 80-95
Open AccessWhat Is This Thing Called Peace?
This article scrutinizes discourse surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war in Western nations, where, despite widespread support for Ukraine, a contingent advocates for peace by rejecting military aid. This “pacifist” stance gains traction through public demonstrations in European countries and political endorsement. However, by opposing military aid while advocating peace, these messages, while ostensibly altruistic, distort genuine efforts for establishing peace in Ukraine. The article argues that recent developments from the philosophy of language, combined with the realities of Russia’s invasion and main war objectives, provide clarity on this phenomenon, making a case for considering such calls for peace as propagandistic, perverting the meaning of the word.
- Open Access
- 22 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 180 (8) , 2291-2307
A puzzle about moral responsibility
We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid.
- 22 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 180 (8) , 2291-2307
Open AccessA puzzle about moral responsibility
We present a new puzzle about logical truth, necessity, and moral responsibility. We defend one solution to the puzzle. A corollary of our preferred solution is that prominent arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility are invalid.
- 12 April 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Grazer Philosophische Studien
- Vol. 99 (4) , 475-484
Naming and Free Will
Rigidity does interesting philosophical work, with important consequences felt throughout metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on. The authors’ aim in this article is to show that rigidity has yet another role to play, with surprising consequences for the problem of free will and determinism, for the phenomenon of rigidity has the upshot that some metaphysically necessary truths are up to us. The significance of this claim is shown in the context of influential arguments against free will. The authors show that some virtually indisputable inference rules employed in formulations of the Consequence Argument, as well as in fatalistic arguments, fail with a variety of counter-examples. Along the way, the authors compare the present arguments to other, similar arguments made in recent years.
- 12 April 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Grazer Philosophische Studien
- Vol. 99 (4) , 475-484
Naming and Free Will
Rigidity does interesting philosophical work, with important consequences felt throughout metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on. The authors’ aim in this article is to show that rigidity has yet another role to play, with surprising consequences for the problem of free will and determinism, for the phenomenon of rigidity has the upshot that some metaphysically necessary truths are up to us. The significance of this claim is shown in the context of influential arguments against free will. The authors show that some virtually indisputable inference rules employed in formulations of the Consequence Argument, as well as in fatalistic arguments, fail with a variety of counter-examples. Along the way, the authors compare the present arguments to other, similar arguments made in recent years.
- 23 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (3) , 426-434
A puzzle about the fixity of the past
It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many possible responses to the argument.
- 23 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (3) , 426-434
A puzzle about the fixity of the past
It is a widely held principle that no one is able to do something that would require the past to have been different from how it actually is. This principle of the fixity of the past has been presented in numerous ways, playing a crucial role in arguments for logical and theological fatalism, and for the incompatibility of causal determinism and the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that, assuming bivalence, this principle is in conflict with standard views about knowledge and the semantics for ‘actually’. I also consider many possible responses to the argument.
- Open Access
- 14 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 10389-10413
How (not) to construct worlds with responsibility
In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be (at least partly) morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false.
- 14 July 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (3-4) , 10389-10413
Open AccessHow (not) to construct worlds with responsibility
In a recent article, P. Roger Turner and Justin Capes argue that no one is, or ever was, even partly morally responsible for certain world-indexed truths. Here we present our reasons for thinking that their argument is unsound: It depends on the premise that possible worlds are maximally consistent states of affairs, which is, under plausible assumptions concerning states of affairs, demonstrably false. Our argument to show this is based on Bertrand Russell’s original ‘paradox of propositions’. We should then opt for a different approach to explain world-indexed truths whose upshot is that we may be (at least partly) morally responsible for some of them. The result to the effect that there are no maximally consistent states of affairs is independently interesting though, since this notion motivates an account of the nature of possible worlds in the metaphysics of modality. We also register in this article, independently of our response to Turner and Capes, and in the spirit of Russell’s aforementioned paradox and many other versions thereof, a proof of the claim that there is no set of all true propositions one can render false.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 15 (1) , 101-132
THE LOGIC OF SEQUENCE FRAMES
This paper investigates and develops generalizations of two-dimensional modal logics to any finite dimension. These logics are natural extensions of multidimensional systems known from the literature on logics for a priori knowledge. We prove a completeness theorem for propositional n-dimensional modal logics and show them to be decidable by means of a systematic tableau construction.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 15 (1) , 101-132
THE LOGIC OF SEQUENCE FRAMES
This paper investigates and develops generalizations of two-dimensional modal logics to any finite dimension. These logics are natural extensions of multidimensional systems known from the literature on logics for a priori knowledge. We prove a completeness theorem for propositional n-dimensional modal logics and show them to be decidable by means of a systematic tableau construction.
- 3 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 178 (2) , 445-469
Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice
- 3 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 178 (2) , 445-469
Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice