Izabela Jelovac
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Izabela Jelovac has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Francesca Barigozzi
University of Bologna - Department of Economics
2 shared publications - Khalid Habbani
Department of Health Organization, Policy and Economics, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2 shared publications David Bardey
1 shared publicationLorenzo Zirulia
1 shared publicationNicolas Houy
University of Lyon Lyon France
1 shared publicationPaula Gonzalez
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 104
Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market – a comment
- 21 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 104
Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market – a comment
- Open Access
Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market-A comment
In this note, we revise the condition in (Regan, 2008), which ensures the occurrence of a generic paradox in her theoretical model. We show that this condition derives from the analysis of an interior solution while it actually excludes the existence of an interior solution. Therefore, this note invalidates the possibility of a generic paradox within the model of (Regan, 2008). However, this conclusion does absolutely not invalidate the results of the rich empirical analysis of the generic paradox in (Regan, 2008).
Open AccessGeneric entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market-A comment
In this note, we revise the condition in (Regan, 2008), which ensures the occurrence of a generic paradox in her theoretical model. We show that this condition derives from the analysis of an interior solution while it actually excludes the existence of an interior solution. Therefore, this note invalidates the possibility of a generic paradox within the model of (Regan, 2008). However, this conclusion does absolutely not invalidate the results of the rich empirical analysis of the generic paradox in (Regan, 2008).
- 14 June 2020
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 29 (S1) , 83-96
Research funding and price negotiation for new drugs
This paper analyzes the negotiation process, which leads to basic research funding and price setting for new drugs in regulated health insurance markets. Its results bring answers to the following questions: Should basic research be privately funded, publicly funded, or produced by an independent lab? Under which conditions is public integration of basic research efficient? How do pharmaceutical prices respond to different organizations of basic research? We show that efficiency and prices are higher when basic research is integrated in the firm that commercializes the drug as compared with independent basic research. In both organizations, the higher the negotiation power of the research labs relative to the one of the public health authority is, the higher the prices and the efficiency are. We thereby confirm the traditional trade‐off between price containment and dynamic efficiency. We identify one important exception to this trade‐off. Indeed, public integration of basic research can result in lowest prices and highest efficiency, as compared with the other possible organizations, in particular when basic and applied research are highly complementary.
- 14 June 2020
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 29 (S1) , 83-96
Research funding and price negotiation for new drugs
This paper analyzes the negotiation process, which leads to basic research funding and price setting for new drugs in regulated health insurance markets. Its results bring answers to the following questions: Should basic research be privately funded, publicly funded, or produced by an independent lab? Under which conditions is public integration of basic research efficient? How do pharmaceutical prices respond to different organizations of basic research? We show that efficiency and prices are higher when basic research is integrated in the firm that commercializes the drug as compared with independent basic research. In both organizations, the higher the negotiation power of the research labs relative to the one of the public health authority is, the higher the prices and the efficiency are. We thereby confirm the traditional trade‐off between price containment and dynamic efficiency. We identify one important exception to this trade‐off. Indeed, public integration of basic research can result in lowest prices and highest efficiency, as compared with the other possible organizations, in particular when basic and applied research are highly complementary.
- 27 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (1) , 49-68
Regulation and altruism
We study optimal contracts in a regulator–agent setting with joint production, altruistic and selfish agents, limited liability, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents sectors of activities such as education and healthcare provision. The agents and the regulator jointly produce an outcome for which they all care to some extent that is varying from agent to agent. Some agents, the altruistic ones, care more than the regulator does while others, the selfish agents, care less. Moral hazard is present due to both the agent's effort and the joint outcome that are not contractible. Adverse selection is present too since the regulator cannot a priori distinguish between altruistic and selfish agents. Contracts consist of a simple transfer from the regulator to the agents together with the regulator's input in the joint production. We show that, under the conditions of our setting and when we face both moral hazard and adverse selection, the regulator maximizes welfare with a menu of contracts, which specify higher transfers for the altruistic agents and higher regulator's inputs for the selfish agents.
- 27 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (1) , 49-68
Regulation and altruism
We study optimal contracts in a regulator–agent setting with joint production, altruistic and selfish agents, limited liability, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents sectors of activities such as education and healthcare provision. The agents and the regulator jointly produce an outcome for which they all care to some extent that is varying from agent to agent. Some agents, the altruistic ones, care more than the regulator does while others, the selfish agents, care less. Moral hazard is present due to both the agent's effort and the joint outcome that are not contractible. Adverse selection is present too since the regulator cannot a priori distinguish between altruistic and selfish agents. Contracts consist of a simple transfer from the regulator to the agents together with the regulator's input in the joint production. We show that, under the conditions of our setting and when we face both moral hazard and adverse selection, the regulator maximizes welfare with a menu of contracts, which specify higher transfers for the altruistic agents and higher regulator's inputs for the selfish agents.
- Open Access
Research funding and price negotiation for new drugs
Pharmaceutical innovations result from the successful achievement of basic research, produced by an upstream lab, and applied research, produced by a downstream lab. We focus on the negotiation process to finance basic research by setting public and private grants and to agree on the final price of a new drug. We show that exclusive funding of basic research is desirable. To increase consumers' surplus and reduce negotiated prices for new drugs, basic and applied research should be integrated if the lab producing applied research has a relatively large bargaining power. When instead the health authority has the larger bargaining power, integration with the producer of basic research increases negotiated prices for new drugs and should be avoided, unless the gain in bargaining power after the integration is extremely high. Pharmaceutical innovations result from the successful achievement of basic research, produced by an upstream lab, and applied research, produced by a downstream lab. We focus on the negotiation process to finance basic research by setting public and private grants and to agree on the final price of a new drug. We show that exclusive funding of basic research is desirable. To increase consumers' surplus and reduce negotiated prices for new drugs, basic and applied research should be integrated if the lab producing applied research has a relatively large bargaining power. When instead the health authority has the larger bargaining power, integration with the producer of basic research increases negotiated prices for new drugs and should be avoided, unless the gain in bargaining power after the integration is extremely high.
Open AccessResearch funding and price negotiation for new drugs
Pharmaceutical innovations result from the successful achievement of basic research, produced by an upstream lab, and applied research, produced by a downstream lab. We focus on the negotiation process to finance basic research by setting public and private grants and to agree on the final price of a new drug. We show that exclusive funding of basic research is desirable. To increase consumers' surplus and reduce negotiated prices for new drugs, basic and applied research should be integrated if the lab producing applied research has a relatively large bargaining power. When instead the health authority has the larger bargaining power, integration with the producer of basic research increases negotiated prices for new drugs and should be avoided, unless the gain in bargaining power after the integration is extremely high. Pharmaceutical innovations result from the successful achievement of basic research, produced by an upstream lab, and applied research, produced by a downstream lab. We focus on the negotiation process to finance basic research by setting public and private grants and to agree on the final price of a new drug. We show that exclusive funding of basic research is desirable. To increase consumers' surplus and reduce negotiated prices for new drugs, basic and applied research should be integrated if the lab producing applied research has a relatively large bargaining power. When instead the health authority has the larger bargaining power, integration with the producer of basic research increases negotiated prices for new drugs and should be avoided, unless the gain in bargaining power after the integration is extremely high.
- 25 November 2018
- Published by Wiley in The World Economy
- Vol. 42 (5) , 1598-1619
Comparing approval procedures for new drugs
We analyse how drug approval procedures influence the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to commercialise new drugs in the presence of international reference pricing. Since 1995, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) coordinates a centralised approval procedure for specific new drugs in the EU. With such a centralised procedure, the EMA grants simultaneous drug approvals for all EU countries. Alongside, non‐centralised procedures coexist for approvals of other new drugs and approvals can be sequential. We focus on the effects of the exogenous timing of drug approvals, either simultaneous or sequential, and we compare the effects of centralised versus non‐centralised procedures on the firms’ incentives to commercialise new drugs in different markets. In a context of international reference pricing, we show that a centralised procedure limits the number of countries where the firm commercialises new drugs, compared to a non‐centralised procedure. We also show in a simplified framework that countries are better off with non‐centralised procedures, while pharmaceutical firms in theory prefer the drug to be approved everywhere as soon as possible, as in an early centralised procedure. This is in line with the stated objective of the EMA to generate savings for the pharmaceutical firms.
- 25 November 2018
- Published by Wiley in The World Economy
- Vol. 42 (5) , 1598-1619
Comparing approval procedures for new drugs
We analyse how drug approval procedures influence the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to commercialise new drugs in the presence of international reference pricing. Since 1995, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) coordinates a centralised approval procedure for specific new drugs in the EU. With such a centralised procedure, the EMA grants simultaneous drug approvals for all EU countries. Alongside, non‐centralised procedures coexist for approvals of other new drugs and approvals can be sequential. We focus on the effects of the exogenous timing of drug approvals, either simultaneous or sequential, and we compare the effects of centralised versus non‐centralised procedures on the firms’ incentives to commercialise new drugs in different markets. In a context of international reference pricing, we show that a centralised procedure limits the number of countries where the firm commercialises new drugs, compared to a non‐centralised procedure. We also show in a simplified framework that countries are better off with non‐centralised procedures, while pharmaceutical firms in theory prefer the drug to be approved everywhere as soon as possible, as in an early centralised procedure. This is in line with the stated objective of the EMA to generate savings for the pharmaceutical firms.
- 12 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 26 (12) , e319-e331
Incentives to patients versus incentives to health care providers: The users' perspective
In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives resulting from their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what consequences such anticipation has on their preferences regarding financial incentives. Our theoretical model explains users' preferences for one or another incentives scheme, disentangling the financial motives (incentives amounts, wealth) from the behavioral ones (perceived GPs' sensitivity to incentives). We empirically test our theoretical predictions using data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patient or provider hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones: users tend to prefer incentives to patients rather than to GPs when the amount of GP incentives is high, when the amount of patient incentives is low, when they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives or when their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.
- 12 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 26 (12) , e319-e331
Incentives to patients versus incentives to health care providers: The users' perspective
In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives resulting from their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what consequences such anticipation has on their preferences regarding financial incentives. Our theoretical model explains users' preferences for one or another incentives scheme, disentangling the financial motives (incentives amounts, wealth) from the behavioral ones (perceived GPs' sensitivity to incentives). We empirically test our theoretical predictions using data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patient or provider hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones: users tend to prefer incentives to patients rather than to GPs when the amount of GP incentives is high, when the amount of patient incentives is low, when they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives or when their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.
- 25 October 2007
- Vol. 13 (4) , 939-52
Do free-of-charge public health services impede cost recovery policies in Khartoum state, Sudan?
We carried out a household survey in Khartoum state in 2001 to analyse the characteristics of those who receive free public health services and to ascertain whether there are any impediments to cost recovery policies for health care use. Data were collected through interviews based on an adapted questionnaire. Those who had other income, always or sometimes had dependents and visited the health services twice in the previous 3 months were more likely to receive free public health services. This does not support claims that beneficiaries of these services are the well-off.
- 25 October 2007
- Vol. 13 (4) , 939-52
Do free-of-charge public health services impede cost recovery policies in Khartoum state, Sudan?
We carried out a household survey in Khartoum state in 2001 to analyse the characteristics of those who receive free public health services and to ascertain whether there are any impediments to cost recovery policies for health care use. Data were collected through interviews based on an adapted questionnaire. Those who had other income, always or sometimes had dependents and visited the health services twice in the previous 3 months were more likely to receive free public health services. This does not support claims that beneficiaries of these services are the well-off.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 75 (2) , 140-158
Household health-seeking behaviour in Khartoum, Sudan: The willingness to pay for public health services if these services are of good quality
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy
- Vol. 75 (2) , 140-158
Household health-seeking behaviour in Khartoum, Sudan: The willingness to pay for public health services if these services are of good quality