Claudio Calosi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Claudio Calosi has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Cristian Mariani
Università Della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
3 shared publications - Achille C. Varzi
Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, USA
2 shared publications - Alessandro Giordani
Catholic University of Milan
2 shared publications - Damiano Costa
Institute of Philosophy, Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Jessica Wilson
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
2 shared publications - Sam Baron
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 19 (1) , 23-40
TO MAKE IT WHOLE: PARTS, FUSIONS, AND LOCATIONS
The present paper first distinguishes three different ways in which the logic of parthood and composition on the one hand, and the logic of location on the other might interact. It then goes on to explore several relations between location and composition. In doing so it (i) sheds new light on recent results and (ii) proves new substantive ones along the way.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 19 (1) , 23-40
Open AccessTO MAKE IT WHOLE: PARTS, FUSIONS, AND LOCATIONS
The present paper first distinguishes three different ways in which the logic of parthood and composition on the one hand, and the logic of location on the other might interact. It then goes on to explore several relations between location and composition. In doing so it (i) sheds new light on recent results and (ii) proves new substantive ones along the way.
- Open Access
- 27 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (1) , 45-69
Spacetime emergence and the fear of intimacy
We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for identity but not priority super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.
- 27 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (1) , 45-69
Open AccessSpacetime emergence and the fear of intimacy
We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for identity but not priority super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 54 (6) , 1181-1223
Parts and Participants
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 54 (6) , 1181-1223
Parts and Participants
- Open Access
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (4) , 1-29
Omnipresence: secular and divine
Drawing on recent work on the theory of location, we first develop a general theory of omnipresence, and then apply it to the particular but historically paradigmatic case of divine omnipresence.
- 24 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (4) , 1-29
Open AccessOmnipresence: secular and divine
Drawing on recent work on the theory of location, we first develop a general theory of omnipresence, and then apply it to the particular but historically paradigmatic case of divine omnipresence.
- 25 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 104 (2) , 1-20
Fragmentalism: Putting All the Pieces Together
- 25 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 104 (2) , 1-20
Fragmentalism: Putting All the Pieces Together
- 3 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (8) , 2101-2122
Pluralisms in gunky worlds
- 3 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 182 (8) , 2101-2122
Pluralisms in gunky worlds
- Open Access
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (3) , 1-26
Graded qualities
The idea that qualities can be had partly or to an intermediate degree is controversial among contemporary metaphysicians, but also has a considerable pedigree among philosophers and scientists. In this paper, we first aim to show that metaphysical sense can be made of this idea by proposing a partial taxonomy of metaphysical accounts of graded qualities, focusing on three particular approaches: one which explicates having a quality to a degree in terms of having a property with an in-built degree, another based on the idea that instantiation admits of degrees, and a third which derives the degree to which a quality is had from the aspects of multi-dimensional properties. Our second aim is to demonstrate that the choice between these account can make a substantial metaphysical difference. To make this point, we rely on two case studies (involving quantum observables and values) in which we apply the accounts in order to model apparent cases of metaphysical gradedness.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 205 (3) , 1-26
Open AccessGraded qualities
The idea that qualities can be had partly or to an intermediate degree is controversial among contemporary metaphysicians, but also has a considerable pedigree among philosophers and scientists. In this paper, we first aim to show that metaphysical sense can be made of this idea by proposing a partial taxonomy of metaphysical accounts of graded qualities, focusing on three particular approaches: one which explicates having a quality to a degree in terms of having a property with an in-built degree, another based on the idea that instantiation admits of degrees, and a third which derives the degree to which a quality is had from the aspects of multi-dimensional properties. Our second aim is to demonstrate that the choice between these account can make a substantial metaphysical difference. To make this point, we rely on two case studies (involving quantum observables and values) in which we apply the accounts in order to model apparent cases of metaphysical gradedness.
- Open Access
Spacetime Emergence and the Fear of Intimacy
We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for identity but not priority super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.
Open AccessSpacetime Emergence and the Fear of Intimacy
We provide a reply to the Argument from Intimacy on behalf of defenders of emergent spacetime in theories of quantum gravity. We argue that if one accepts that spacetime regions are nowhere in the sense that they are locations but do not have locations, then the Argument from Intimacy can be resolved. We go on to consider a problem with this response, namely that it is unavailable to super-substantivalists. We argue that this is right for identity but not priority super-substantivalists. We then suggest that there is no cost for our solution here, since identity versions of super-substantivalism face severe challenges in the context of spacetime emergence and so should be rejected anyway.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Physics
- Vol. 54 (6) , 1-24
Relational Quantum Mechanics at the Crossroads
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Physics
- Vol. 54 (6) , 1-24
Open AccessRelational Quantum Mechanics at the Crossroads
- 14 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1-18
Separability and fundamentality
- 14 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1-18
Separability and fundamentality