Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy
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Abstract
We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has dual goals of diversity and meritocracy when choosing from a set of applications. For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a class of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a diversity level. Using this class, we find all subsets of applications on the diversity-merit Pareto frontier. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.Keywords
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