Laura Razzolini
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Laura Razzolini has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marco Mariani
IRPET Regional Institute for Economic Planning of Tuscany, Florence, Italy
3 shared publications - Oleg Korenok
Virginia Commonwealth University
3 shared publications Patrizia Lattarulo
IRPET—Regional Institute for Economic Planning of Tuscany
3 shared publicationsRajat Deb
3 shared publicationsEdward L. Millner
2 shared publications- Rajat Deb
Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 8 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Behavioral Finance
- Vol. 23 (4) , 408-426
How Dictators Use Information about Recipients
This paper explores the extent to which altruism is influenced by the salient features of the beneficiaries. We investigate how information presented to senders affects their perception of the recipient in a dictator game. In this environment, the starting endowment of a recipient can be inferred from choices the recipient made. Dictators give the same amount to all recipients regardless of the choices they made, despite the revealed preference to send more money to recipients who started with lower endowments. Dictators give very little when they are explicitly told that a recipient started with a high endowment. However, when dictators are only told that the recipient made a choice that indicates they started with a high endowment, dictators do not incorporate that information. Dictators are not more generous to others who made a similar financial choice to themselves, through in-group bias. An implication from our results is that charitable donors are influenced by salient information about recipients and do not try to infer deservingness beyond what is explicitly presented.
- 8 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Behavioral Finance
- Vol. 23 (4) , 408-426
How Dictators Use Information about Recipients
This paper explores the extent to which altruism is influenced by the salient features of the beneficiaries. We investigate how information presented to senders affects their perception of the recipient in a dictator game. In this environment, the starting endowment of a recipient can be inferred from choices the recipient made. Dictators give the same amount to all recipients regardless of the choices they made, despite the revealed preference to send more money to recipients who started with lower endowments. Dictators give very little when they are explicitly told that a recipient started with a high endowment. However, when dictators are only told that the recipient made a choice that indicates they started with a high endowment, dictators do not incorporate that information. Dictators are not more generous to others who made a similar financial choice to themselves, through in-group bias. An implication from our results is that charitable donors are influenced by salient information about recipients and do not try to infer deservingness beyond what is explicitly presented.
- 26 August 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
- Vol. 39 (1) , 244-258
Exploring Encouragement, Treatment, and Spillover Effects Using Principal Stratification, With Application to a Field Experiment on Teens’ Museum Attendance
This paper revisits results from a field experiment, conducted in Florence, Italy, to study the effects of incentives provided to high school teens to motivate them to visit art museums. In the experiment, different classes of students were randomized to three types of encouragement and were offered a free visit to a main museum in the city. Using the principal stratification framework, the paper explores causal pathways that may lead students to increase future visits, as induced by the encouragement received, or by the individual experience of the proposed free museum visit, or by the spillover of classmates’ experience. We do so by estimating and interpreting the causal effects of the three forms of encouragement within the principal strata defined by compliance behaviors. Bayesian inferential methods are used to derive the posterior distributions of weakly identified causal parameters.
- 26 August 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
- Vol. 39 (1) , 244-258
Exploring Encouragement, Treatment, and Spillover Effects Using Principal Stratification, With Application to a Field Experiment on Teens’ Museum Attendance
This paper revisits results from a field experiment, conducted in Florence, Italy, to study the effects of incentives provided to high school teens to motivate them to visit art museums. In the experiment, different classes of students were randomized to three types of encouragement and were offered a free visit to a main museum in the city. Using the principal stratification framework, the paper explores causal pathways that may lead students to increase future visits, as induced by the encouragement received, or by the individual experience of the proposed free museum visit, or by the spillover of classmates’ experience. We do so by estimating and interpreting the causal effects of the three forms of encouragement within the principal strata defined by compliance behaviors. Bayesian inferential methods are used to derive the posterior distributions of weakly identified causal parameters.
- 11 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cultural Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 279-281
Erratum to: Nudging museums attendance: a field experiment with high school teens
- 11 January 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cultural Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 279-281
Erratum to: Nudging museums attendance: a field experiment with high school teens
- 7 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cultural Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 259-277
Nudging museums attendance: a field experiment with high school teens
- 7 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cultural Economics
- Vol. 41 (3) , 259-277
Nudging museums attendance: a field experiment with high school teens
- Open Access
- 25 January 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 148 (1) , 37-51
The Indirect Ethics of AIG’s ‘Backdoor Bailout’
- 25 January 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 148 (1) , 37-51
Open AccessThe Indirect Ethics of AIG’s ‘Backdoor Bailout’
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 488-500
Taking, giving, and impure altruism in dictator games
We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 488-500
Taking, giving, and impure altruism in dictator games
We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 461-487
Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox
This study considers a model of road congestion with average cost pricing. Subjects must choose between two routes—Road and Metro. The travel cost on the road is increasing in the number of commuters who choose this route, while the travel cost on the metro is decreasing in the number of its users. We examine how changes to the road capacity, the number of commuters, and the metro pricing scheme influence the commuters’ route-choice behavior. According to the Downs-Thomson paradox, improved road capacity increases travel times along both routes because it attracts more users to the road and away from the metro, thereby worsening both services. A change in route design generates two Nash equilibria; and the resulting coordination problem is amplified even further when the number of commuters is large. We find that, similar to other binary choice experiments with congestion effects, aggregate traffic flows are close to the equilibrium levels, but systematic individual differences persist over time.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 461-487
Traffic congestion: an experimental study of the Downs-Thomson paradox
This study considers a model of road congestion with average cost pricing. Subjects must choose between two routes—Road and Metro. The travel cost on the road is increasing in the number of commuters who choose this route, while the travel cost on the metro is decreasing in the number of its users. We examine how changes to the road capacity, the number of commuters, and the metro pricing scheme influence the commuters’ route-choice behavior. According to the Downs-Thomson paradox, improved road capacity increases travel times along both routes because it attracts more users to the road and away from the metro, thereby worsening both services. A change in route design generates two Nash equilibria; and the resulting coordination problem is amplified even further when the number of commuters is large. We find that, similar to other binary choice experiments with congestion effects, aggregate traffic flows are close to the equilibrium levels, but systematic individual differences persist over time.
- 18 August 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 60 (3) , 482-500
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.
- 18 August 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 60 (3) , 482-500
The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 80 (2) , 271-281
Editor's Report
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 97, 1-8
Impure altruism in dictators' giving
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 97, 1-8
Impure altruism in dictators' giving