Oleg Korenok
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Oleg Korenok has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Douglas D. Davis
Virginia Commonwealth University
8 shared publications Norman R. Swanson
Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
4 shared publicationsDouglas Davis
Virginia Commonwealth University
3 shared publicationsEdward L. Millner
3 shared publicationsJohn Lightle
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia 23284
3 shared publications- Laura Razzolini
Virginia Commonwealth University
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Rockets and Feathers of Inflation Attention
Prior research shows that attention to inflation rises sharply once inflation ex- ceeds a country-specific threshold. This paper studies what happens when in- flation later declines. Using Google search data across countries, contemporary newspaper coverage, and historical U.S. newspaper evidence, we document at- tention hysteresis: attention to inflation falls more slowly than inflation itself. After the recent inflation peak, attention remains elevated relative to earlier periods with comparable inflation rates, even after controlling for current in- flation, lagged attention, inflation volatility, inflation persistence, country fixed effects, and country-specific trends. We then examine one possible reason why persistent attention may matter. Using U.S. wage data, we find that wage growth is more strongly related to past inflation when inflation attention is high, and this relationship remains after controlling for labor-market slack, current inflation, and one-year inflation expectations. We also use a simple be- havioral New Keynesian model to illustrate how persistent attention can slow disinflation relative to a symmetric-attention benchmark. Overall, the evidence suggests that inflationary episodes may leave a persistent attention footprint, keeping inflation salient even after inflation itself has declined.
- 15 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Rockets and Feathers of Inflation Attention
Prior research shows that attention to inflation rises sharply once inflation ex- ceeds a country-specific threshold. This paper studies what happens when in- flation later declines. Using Google search data across countries, contemporary newspaper coverage, and historical U.S. newspaper evidence, we document at- tention hysteresis: attention to inflation falls more slowly than inflation itself. After the recent inflation peak, attention remains elevated relative to earlier periods with comparable inflation rates, even after controlling for current in- flation, lagged attention, inflation volatility, inflation persistence, country fixed effects, and country-specific trends. We then examine one possible reason why persistent attention may matter. Using U.S. wage data, we find that wage growth is more strongly related to past inflation when inflation attention is high, and this relationship remains after controlling for labor-market slack, current inflation, and one-year inflation expectations. We also use a simple be- havioral New Keynesian model to illustrate how persistent attention can slow disinflation relative to a symmetric-attention benchmark. Overall, the evidence suggests that inflationary episodes may leave a persistent attention footprint, keeping inflation salient even after inflation itself has declined.
- Top Cited Papers
- 21 May 2026
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 108 (3) , 842-850
Inflation and Attention Thresholds
One of the dangers of high inflation is that it can cause individuals to pay close attention to it. This internalization of inflation can lead to an accelerationist regime, making inflation harder to control. We empirically assess the relationship between attention and inflation for 38 countries. Our measures of attention are constructed from Internet search behavior or the popularity of inflation mentions on Twitter. We find evidence that attention thresholds exist for most of the countries, and that they typically occur between 2% and 4% inflation. We also document interesting variability across countries and find similar thresholds in newspaper coverage of inflation.
- 21 May 2026
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 108 (3) , 842-850
Top Cited PapersInflation and Attention Thresholds
One of the dangers of high inflation is that it can cause individuals to pay close attention to it. This internalization of inflation can lead to an accelerationist regime, making inflation harder to control. We empirically assess the relationship between attention and inflation for 38 countries. Our measures of attention are constructed from Internet search behavior or the popularity of inflation mentions on Twitter. We find evidence that attention thresholds exist for most of the countries, and that they typically occur between 2% and 4% inflation. We also document interesting variability across countries and find similar thresholds in newspaper coverage of inflation.
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 1341-1355
Frequent Reporting and Short-Termism: An Experimental Investigation
Financial market regulators have long debated the appropriate frequency of mandatory corporate financial disclosures. Whereas frequent disclosures may help deter overinvestment, they may also encourage short-termism. This paper reports an experiment that examines the effects of varying reporting frequencies on managerial investment decisions. Experimental results indicate that frequent reporting modestly induces short-termism, but it fails to reduce the overinvestment observed in the infrequent reporting regime. Nonbinding communication of intended investment plans does reduce overinvestment, but only in the infrequent reporting regime. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant SES 1949112]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01955 .
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 1341-1355
Frequent Reporting and Short-Termism: An Experimental Investigation
Financial market regulators have long debated the appropriate frequency of mandatory corporate financial disclosures. Whereas frequent disclosures may help deter overinvestment, they may also encourage short-termism. This paper reports an experiment that examines the effects of varying reporting frequencies on managerial investment decisions. Experimental results indicate that frequent reporting modestly induces short-termism, but it fails to reduce the overinvestment observed in the infrequent reporting regime. Nonbinding communication of intended investment plans does reduce overinvestment, but only in the infrequent reporting regime. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant SES 1949112]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01955 .
- Open Access
- 20 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-16
Heterogeneous Vulnerability and Vaccination Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Games
Understanding the impact of population heterogeneity on the spread of vaccine-preventable diseases is crucial for containment and control. Here, we develop an experimental game model to examine how risks from disease and vaccination shape vaccination decisions in a population with heterogeneous vulnerability. Our results show that participants vaccinate strategically in line with Nash equilibrium. Specifically, vaccination rates were higher among more vulnerable individuals than among those less vulnerable. Additionally, we observed minimax behavior in a subset of individuals who consistently chose the secure option (vaccination) regardless of others’ actions. These findings underscore the epidemiological interdependence of vaccination decisions and the need for public health approaches that recognize the different risks and costs faced by vulnerable groups.
- 20 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-16
Open AccessHeterogeneous Vulnerability and Vaccination Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Games
Understanding the impact of population heterogeneity on the spread of vaccine-preventable diseases is crucial for containment and control. Here, we develop an experimental game model to examine how risks from disease and vaccination shape vaccination decisions in a population with heterogeneous vulnerability. Our results show that participants vaccinate strategically in line with Nash equilibrium. Specifically, vaccination rates were higher among more vulnerable individuals than among those less vulnerable. Additionally, we observed minimax behavior in a subset of individuals who consistently chose the secure option (vaccination) regardless of others’ actions. These findings underscore the epidemiological interdependence of vaccination decisions and the need for public health approaches that recognize the different risks and costs faced by vulnerable groups.
- 13 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 154
Stress tests and information disclosure: An experimental analysis
- 13 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 154
Stress tests and information disclosure: An experimental analysis
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 200, 1221-1239
Playing with money
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 200, 1221-1239
Playing with money
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 200, 1372-1383
Liquidity regulation, banking history and financial fragility: An experimental examination
- 1 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 200, 1372-1383
Liquidity regulation, banking history and financial fragility: An experimental examination
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 115, 113-126
Liquidity requirements and the interbank loan market: An experimental investigation
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 115, 113-126
Liquidity requirements and the interbank loan market: An experimental investigation
- Open Access
- 6 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Liquidity Requirements and the Interbank Loan Market: An Experimental Investigation (Presentation Slides)
This conference presentation reports on results of an experiment that illustrates costs and benefits of liquidity regulation. These costs and benefits may come out of interbank market equilibrium behavior.
- 6 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLiquidity Requirements and the Interbank Loan Market: An Experimental Investigation (Presentation Slides)
This conference presentation reports on results of an experiment that illustrates costs and benefits of liquidity regulation. These costs and benefits may come out of interbank market equilibrium behavior.
- 7 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 171, 211-213
Giving, taking, earned money, and cooperation in public good games
- 7 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 171, 211-213
Giving, taking, earned money, and cooperation in public good games