Tam Huy Nguyen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tam Huy Nguyen has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emmanuel Adegbite
Nottingham University Business School
4 shared publications Dale Loepp
San Jose State University
2 shared publications- Hesham Ali
Nottingham University Business School, UK
2 shared publications Teerooven Soobaroyen
Essex Business School University of Essex Colchester UK
2 shared publications- Vu Quang Trinh
Newcastle University Business School Newcastle University Newcastle upon Tyne UK
2 shared publications - Chi Duong Thi
National Economics University, Ha Noi, Vietnam
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Business Strategy and the Environment
CEO Tenure and Sustainable Growth: Non‐Linear Effects and Strategic Trade‐Offs Between Sustainability Dimensions
This study examines how CEO tenure influences firm sustainable growth across economic and social dimensions and whether it is associated with sustainability trade‐offs. Prior research has largely focused on short‐term performance measures and linear CEO tenure effects, providing limited evidence on sustainable growth and potential trade‐offs across sustainability dimensions. Using panel data from 272 publicly listed Vietnamese firms from 2011 to 2022, we employ fixed‐effects models, system GMM, and seemingly unrelated regression. The results show that CEO tenure has non‐linear effects on sustainable growth: a U‐shaped relationship with economic sustainability and an inverted U‐shaped relationship with social sustainability. Evidence of a negative residual correlation between the two dimensions suggests the possibility of sustainability trade‐offs among these two aspects. Furthermore, the relationship between CEO tenure and sustainability trade‐offs is evident only among firms with positive economic sustainability. This study contributes to the CEO tenure and sustainability literature by demonstrating that CEO tenure affects sustainable growth differently across economic and social dimensions and by identifying the non‐linear nature of these relationships. It also extends the sustainability trade‐off literature by showing that CEO tenure is associated with sustainability trade‐offs under specific performance conditions, offering important implications for board succession planning, executive monitoring, and the pursuit of balanced long‐term sustainable growth. These findings highlight the multidimensional and dynamic nature of CEO tenure effects on sustainable growth.
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Business Strategy and the Environment
Open AccessCEO Tenure and Sustainable Growth: Non‐Linear Effects and Strategic Trade‐Offs Between Sustainability Dimensions
This study examines how CEO tenure influences firm sustainable growth across economic and social dimensions and whether it is associated with sustainability trade‐offs. Prior research has largely focused on short‐term performance measures and linear CEO tenure effects, providing limited evidence on sustainable growth and potential trade‐offs across sustainability dimensions. Using panel data from 272 publicly listed Vietnamese firms from 2011 to 2022, we employ fixed‐effects models, system GMM, and seemingly unrelated regression. The results show that CEO tenure has non‐linear effects on sustainable growth: a U‐shaped relationship with economic sustainability and an inverted U‐shaped relationship with social sustainability. Evidence of a negative residual correlation between the two dimensions suggests the possibility of sustainability trade‐offs among these two aspects. Furthermore, the relationship between CEO tenure and sustainability trade‐offs is evident only among firms with positive economic sustainability. This study contributes to the CEO tenure and sustainability literature by demonstrating that CEO tenure affects sustainable growth differently across economic and social dimensions and by identifying the non‐linear nature of these relationships. It also extends the sustainability trade‐off literature by showing that CEO tenure is associated with sustainability trade‐offs under specific performance conditions, offering important implications for board succession planning, executive monitoring, and the pursuit of balanced long‐term sustainable growth. These findings highlight the multidimensional and dynamic nature of CEO tenure effects on sustainable growth.
- Open Access
- 8 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Research in International Business and Finance
- Vol. 86
Environmental uncertainty and corporate bankruptcy risk: Insights from China
- 8 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Research in International Business and Finance
- Vol. 86
Open AccessEnvironmental uncertainty and corporate bankruptcy risk: Insights from China
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
'No' to Stock-Based Compensation for Directors: Is there an Association between Directors' Compensation and Financial Statements Fraud? Forthcoming in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation (JIAAT)
Using a unique dataset of fraud firms in the United States over a 15 year-period (2005-2019), this study investigates whether compensation for the board of directors has an association with financial statements fraud (FSF). It further investigates which components of the compensation package could be more amenable to this association. We find a positive association between the incidence of FSF and directors' stock-based compensation. Considering the remedy mechanism for FSF, we find a negative association between FSF and the average age of directors. Additionally, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, size/type of auditor, institutional ownership, accounting returns, and firm size all significantly influence the incidence of FSF. We contribute to the accounting, governance, and accountability literatures, while critiquing agency theory in advancing an alternative view that stock-based compensation for directors should be used with caution, as it may provide an incentive for FSF. This research has implications for businesses and regulators regarding the design of directors' compensation packages.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open Access'No' to Stock-Based Compensation for Directors: Is there an Association between Directors' Compensation and Financial Statements Fraud? Forthcoming in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation (JIAAT)
Using a unique dataset of fraud firms in the United States over a 15 year-period (2005-2019), this study investigates whether compensation for the board of directors has an association with financial statements fraud (FSF). It further investigates which components of the compensation package could be more amenable to this association. We find a positive association between the incidence of FSF and directors' stock-based compensation. Considering the remedy mechanism for FSF, we find a negative association between FSF and the average age of directors. Additionally, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, size/type of auditor, institutional ownership, accounting returns, and firm size all significantly influence the incidence of FSF. We contribute to the accounting, governance, and accountability literatures, while critiquing agency theory in advancing an alternative view that stock-based compensation for directors should be used with caution, as it may provide an incentive for FSF. This research has implications for businesses and regulators regarding the design of directors' compensation packages.
- Open Access
- 21 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation
- Vol. 59
Balancing performance and ethics: Navigating visual recognition technology adoption in the auditing industry
- 21 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation
- Vol. 59
Open AccessBalancing performance and ethics: Navigating visual recognition technology adoption in the auditing industry
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1086-1106
The Influence of Ownership and Control on Corporate Social Responsibility in East Asia
Research Question/Issue: Underpinned by an eclectic theoretical framework of agency theory and stakeholder theory, this study examines whether control by family, institutional investors, or governments affects a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) in East Asian firms.Research Findings/Insights: By examining 1236 firms in nine East Asian countries from 2010 to 2019, our findings show that family‐controlled firms reduce their CSR engagement since family controller strengthens the agency problem. Additionally, agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and managers may be shifted onto the controller and other stakeholders. However, if institutional investors or the government have control power, they have a positive impact on firms' CSR since they act in the interests of stakeholders.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper addresses a lacuna in the corporate governance and CSR literature by exploring the influence of ultimate control type in East Asia, a fast‐developing but under‐researched context. We contribute to the understanding of agency conflicts among institutional shareholders, government, family controllers, and stakeholders within East Asian firms, particularly highlighting how controllers' behavior influences CSR outcomes. We extend the discussions on the complementarity of agency and stakeholder theories to explain why different types of ultimate controllers affect CSR.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This paper provides recommendations for embedding CSR through corporate governance, particularly in East Asia. First, for family‐controlled firms, agency problems and shareholder primacy may become obstacles to achieving CSR. Corporate governance supervision policy should pay attention to when firms are controlled by a family. Second, external investors seeking a socially responsible firm may consider whether firms have higher institutional ownership or government control.
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Wiley in Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1086-1106
The Influence of Ownership and Control on Corporate Social Responsibility in East Asia
Research Question/Issue: Underpinned by an eclectic theoretical framework of agency theory and stakeholder theory, this study examines whether control by family, institutional investors, or governments affects a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) in East Asian firms.Research Findings/Insights: By examining 1236 firms in nine East Asian countries from 2010 to 2019, our findings show that family‐controlled firms reduce their CSR engagement since family controller strengthens the agency problem. Additionally, agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and managers may be shifted onto the controller and other stakeholders. However, if institutional investors or the government have control power, they have a positive impact on firms' CSR since they act in the interests of stakeholders.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper addresses a lacuna in the corporate governance and CSR literature by exploring the influence of ultimate control type in East Asia, a fast‐developing but under‐researched context. We contribute to the understanding of agency conflicts among institutional shareholders, government, family controllers, and stakeholders within East Asian firms, particularly highlighting how controllers' behavior influences CSR outcomes. We extend the discussions on the complementarity of agency and stakeholder theories to explain why different types of ultimate controllers affect CSR.Practitioner/Policy Implications: This paper provides recommendations for embedding CSR through corporate governance, particularly in East Asia. First, for family‐controlled firms, agency problems and shareholder primacy may become obstacles to achieving CSR. Corporate governance supervision policy should pay attention to when firms are controlled by a family. Second, external investors seeking a socially responsible firm may consider whether firms have higher institutional ownership or government control.
- Open Access
- 20 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting Forum
- Vol. 49 (2) , 336-368
Ownership structure and climate-related corporate reporting
- 20 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting Forum
- Vol. 49 (2) , 336-368
Open AccessOwnership structure and climate-related corporate reporting
- Open Access
- 6 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 62 (1) , 1-37
CFO overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism
This study investigates the association between Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism. Relying on upper echelons and overconfidence theories and based on a large sample of US-listed firms’ data from 1992 to 2019 (21,626 firm-year observations), we find a statistically and economically significant negative relationship between CFO overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism, suggesting that overconfident CFOs tend to diminish conditional accounting conservatism. These findings persist in a series of robustness tests. In the mechanism analysis, we predict that overconfident CFOs aim to convey private information by reducing conditional accounting conservatism. We prove this conjecture by observing that overconfident CFOs who adopt lower levels of conditional accounting conservatism increase earnings informativeness (i.e., the amount of information about future cash flows or earnings contained in current stock returns) and reduce their precautionary incentives to save cash. We further rule out another mechanism (i.e. compensation concerns) that may motivate overconfident CFOs to reduce conditional accounting conservatism. Moreover, we show that overconfident CFOs with higher powers are more able to minimize conditional accounting conservatism. Our study highlights the significance and motivation of overconfident CFOs in determining asymmetric recognition of good and bad news.
- 6 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 62 (1) , 1-37
Open AccessCFO overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism
This study investigates the association between Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism. Relying on upper echelons and overconfidence theories and based on a large sample of US-listed firms’ data from 1992 to 2019 (21,626 firm-year observations), we find a statistically and economically significant negative relationship between CFO overconfidence and conditional accounting conservatism, suggesting that overconfident CFOs tend to diminish conditional accounting conservatism. These findings persist in a series of robustness tests. In the mechanism analysis, we predict that overconfident CFOs aim to convey private information by reducing conditional accounting conservatism. We prove this conjecture by observing that overconfident CFOs who adopt lower levels of conditional accounting conservatism increase earnings informativeness (i.e., the amount of information about future cash flows or earnings contained in current stock returns) and reduce their precautionary incentives to save cash. We further rule out another mechanism (i.e. compensation concerns) that may motivate overconfident CFOs to reduce conditional accounting conservatism. Moreover, we show that overconfident CFOs with higher powers are more able to minimize conditional accounting conservatism. Our study highlights the significance and motivation of overconfident CFOs in determining asymmetric recognition of good and bad news.
- Open Access
- 13 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 62 (7) , 1496-1540
Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Responsibility
This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee education enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility.
- 13 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 62 (7) , 1496-1540
Open AccessCorporate Governance and Corporate Political Responsibility
This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee education enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2022
- Published by San Jose State University Library - DIGITAL COMMONS JOURNALS in The Contemporary Tax Journal
- Vol. 11 (2) , 7
Credit for Caring Act of 2021 H.R. 3321 (117th Congress)
By Dale Loepp CPA, Tam Nguyen, and MST Students BUS 223A Spring 2022, Published on 08/18/22
- 18 August 2022
- Published by San Jose State University Library - DIGITAL COMMONS JOURNALS in The Contemporary Tax Journal
- Vol. 11 (2) , 7
Open AccessCredit for Caring Act of 2021 H.R. 3321 (117th Congress)
By Dale Loepp CPA, Tam Nguyen, and MST Students BUS 223A Spring 2022, Published on 08/18/22
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 12 July 2022
- Published by Wiley in Business Strategy and the Environment
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1634-1649
Top‐management compensation and environmental innovation strategy
The increasing awareness of global climate change puts more pressure on firms to reduce their environmental externalities. Managers long ignored this responsibility, which may erode business profits, going against their traditional goals. In this study, we examine the effect of top management's extrinsic incentives (i.e., reward‐driven motivation) on corporate environmental innovation strategy (i.e., eco‐innovation) using a large dataset of S&P1500 non‐financial firms for 2000–2020. The results indicate that firms with greater levels of top‐management compensation exhibit higher scores of eco‐innovation engagement. The effect holds after we address the endogeneity problem through the quasi‐natural experiment using the difference‐in‐differences analysis on the event of the Paris Agreement 2015. Our further investigations reveal that such a positive impact of managerial incentives on eco‐innovation is less intensified in the more polluting industries but more pronounced in more innovative ones.
- 12 July 2022
- Published by Wiley in Business Strategy and the Environment
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1634-1649
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessTop‐management compensation and environmental innovation strategy
The increasing awareness of global climate change puts more pressure on firms to reduce their environmental externalities. Managers long ignored this responsibility, which may erode business profits, going against their traditional goals. In this study, we examine the effect of top management's extrinsic incentives (i.e., reward‐driven motivation) on corporate environmental innovation strategy (i.e., eco‐innovation) using a large dataset of S&P1500 non‐financial firms for 2000–2020. The results indicate that firms with greater levels of top‐management compensation exhibit higher scores of eco‐innovation engagement. The effect holds after we address the endogeneity problem through the quasi‐natural experiment using the difference‐in‐differences analysis on the event of the Paris Agreement 2015. Our further investigations reveal that such a positive impact of managerial incentives on eco‐innovation is less intensified in the more polluting industries but more pronounced in more innovative ones.