Hesham Ali
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hesham Ali has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emmanuel Adegbite
Nottingham University Business School
2 shared publications - Tam Huy Nguyen
Nottingham Business School Nottingham Trent University Nottingham UK
2 shared publications Awad Elsayed Awad Ibrahim
1 shared publication- Awad Elsayed Awad Ibrahim
Faculty of Business and Law University of Portsmouth Portsmouth UK
1 shared publication Heba Aboelkheir
1 shared publication- Mohamed A. Mekhaimer
St. John Fisher University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
Firm Exposure to Government Agencies and Asymmetric Cost Behaviour
- 23 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
Open AccessFirm Exposure to Government Agencies and Asymmetric Cost Behaviour
- Open Access
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Greasing a Hollow Wheel: Political Corruption and Innovation Strategy
We examine how political corruption shapes firms’ innovation strategies. Using corruption convictions at the U.S. federal judicial district level, we find that firms headquartered in more corrupt districts shift their innovation strategy toward exploration and away from exploitation. Our results suggest that government contracting is a mechanism through which political corruption induces this shift. The effect is more pronounced among firms with politically connected boards and those whose CEOs are politically aligned with the state’s ruling party. Despite the positive association between political corruption and exploratory innovation, we find that this strategic shift does not translate into firms’ economic or scientific advantage. In contrast, we find that political corruption is negatively associated with the economic value of innovation, innovation efficiency, and the likelihood of breakthrough discoveries even for exploratory innovation. Our findings suggest that this exploratory shift reflects distorted managerial risk-taking rather than value-enhancing innovation. To confirm this conjecture, we show that the positive association between exploratory innovation and corruption can be attributed to overconfident CEOs, who tend to overestimate their investment returns and success. We address potential endogeneity concerns by employing both the instrumental variable technique and a quasi-experimental approach. We use various plausibly exogenous shocks to firms’ exposure to political corruption, including headquarters relocations, a Supreme Court ruling, and the enactment of state anti-corruption laws. Our results alleviate concerns that endogeneity drives the documented relationships and remain robust to alternative model specifications, state-level controls, and alternative measures of innovation strategy and political corruption.
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGreasing a Hollow Wheel: Political Corruption and Innovation Strategy
We examine how political corruption shapes firms’ innovation strategies. Using corruption convictions at the U.S. federal judicial district level, we find that firms headquartered in more corrupt districts shift their innovation strategy toward exploration and away from exploitation. Our results suggest that government contracting is a mechanism through which political corruption induces this shift. The effect is more pronounced among firms with politically connected boards and those whose CEOs are politically aligned with the state’s ruling party. Despite the positive association between political corruption and exploratory innovation, we find that this strategic shift does not translate into firms’ economic or scientific advantage. In contrast, we find that political corruption is negatively associated with the economic value of innovation, innovation efficiency, and the likelihood of breakthrough discoveries even for exploratory innovation. Our findings suggest that this exploratory shift reflects distorted managerial risk-taking rather than value-enhancing innovation. To confirm this conjecture, we show that the positive association between exploratory innovation and corruption can be attributed to overconfident CEOs, who tend to overestimate their investment returns and success. We address potential endogeneity concerns by employing both the instrumental variable technique and a quasi-experimental approach. We use various plausibly exogenous shocks to firms’ exposure to political corruption, including headquarters relocations, a Supreme Court ruling, and the enactment of state anti-corruption laws. Our results alleviate concerns that endogeneity drives the documented relationships and remain robust to alternative model specifications, state-level controls, and alternative measures of innovation strategy and political corruption.
- Open Access
- 13 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 62 (7) , 1496-1540
Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Responsibility
This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee education enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility.
- 13 March 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Business & Society
- Vol. 62 (7) , 1496-1540
Open AccessCorporate Governance and Corporate Political Responsibility
This study investigates the pivotal policy question of whether a firm’s corporate governance influences its political spending disclosures. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 2011 to 2019, we find empirical evidence that a board of directors’ monitoring and resource provision roles affect a firm’s political spending disclosure. Extending agency theory-driven expectations, we provide evidence that measures of a board’s monitoring role such as female monitoring directors, shorter board tenure, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and audit committee education enhance a firm’s political spending disclosures. Second, drawing from resource dependence theory and examining a board’s resource provisions, we find evidence that female advisory directors, CEO duality, additional directorships, and audit committee characteristics (i.e., size, number of meetings, age, and education) promote political spending disclosures. The study contributes to corporate governance and corporate political activity literatures by outlining different types of governance that may drive a firm’s political spending disclosures, a key component of a firm’s political responsibility.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation
- Vol. 46
Cost stickiness: A systematic literature review of 27 years of research and a future research agenda
- 1 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation
- Vol. 46
Top Cited PapersCost stickiness: A systematic literature review of 27 years of research and a future research agenda
- Open Access
- 8 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting Forum
- Vol. 46 (2) , 160-190
Ownership structure and political spending disclosure
This study examines the link between ownership structure and political spending disclosure (PSD). We break down ownership into four different groups of shareholders: institutional, insider, governmental and foreign. Using a unique dataset provided by CPA-Zicklin for PSD and a panel dataset from S&P 500 companies between 2015 and 2018, our results reveal that institutional and governmental ownership are positively associated with the level of PSD, while insider ownership is negatively associated with the level of PSD. Additionally, while prior literature mainly investigated how ownership structure influences disclosure practices, we analyse the mechanisms through which ownership characteristics influence PSD. Our cross-sectional tests provide evidence that insider owners exhibit more PSD if they are pursing tax-related lobbying expenses and tax avoidance practices. Additionally, governmental owners demand lower PSD in firms with higher nonfinancial and financial reporting quality. Finally, institutional owners demand more PSD in the case of lower industry concentration. Overall, we conclude that different owners have distinct impacts and preferences on a firm's political strategy and various mechanisms uniquely operationalise the interactions between different owners and political transparency. Through agency theory, our results advance heated debates on PSD – an emerging, yet hitherto less examined, category of voluntary disclosure.
- 8 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting Forum
- Vol. 46 (2) , 160-190
Open AccessOwnership structure and political spending disclosure
This study examines the link between ownership structure and political spending disclosure (PSD). We break down ownership into four different groups of shareholders: institutional, insider, governmental and foreign. Using a unique dataset provided by CPA-Zicklin for PSD and a panel dataset from S&P 500 companies between 2015 and 2018, our results reveal that institutional and governmental ownership are positively associated with the level of PSD, while insider ownership is negatively associated with the level of PSD. Additionally, while prior literature mainly investigated how ownership structure influences disclosure practices, we analyse the mechanisms through which ownership characteristics influence PSD. Our cross-sectional tests provide evidence that insider owners exhibit more PSD if they are pursing tax-related lobbying expenses and tax avoidance practices. Additionally, governmental owners demand lower PSD in firms with higher nonfinancial and financial reporting quality. Finally, institutional owners demand more PSD in the case of lower industry concentration. Overall, we conclude that different owners have distinct impacts and preferences on a firm's political strategy and various mechanisms uniquely operationalise the interactions between different owners and political transparency. Through agency theory, our results advance heated debates on PSD – an emerging, yet hitherto less examined, category of voluntary disclosure.