Ingrid Storm
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ingrid Storm has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Voas
University College London London
3 shared publications Bastiaan Rutjens
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
1 shared publication- David Sloan Wilson
Departments of Biology and Anthropology, Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York
1 shared publication David Voas
1 shared publicationFrenk van Harreveld
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
1 shared publication- Kingsley Purdam
School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnic and Racial Studies
- Vol. 48 (5) , 1110-1138
Reactive religiosity? The longitudinal relationship between ethnic harassment, religious identity and wellbeing in the UK
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnic and Racial Studies
- Vol. 48 (5) , 1110-1138
Open AccessReactive religiosity? The longitudinal relationship between ethnic harassment, religious identity and wellbeing in the UK
- 3 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
- Vol. 60 (1) , 189-197
National Context, Parental Socialization, and the Varying Relationship Between Religious Belief and Practice
Parents are crucial agents of religious socialization, but the broader social environment is also influential. A key question is whether parents are more or less influential when their religious beliefs and practices are not shared by people around them. Current thinking on the issue has largely been shaped by Kelley and De Graaf, who argued that parental religious socialization matters most in secular countries. We maintain that that conclusion is mistaken: levels of parental and national religiosity are both important, but their effects are largely independent of each other. Kelley and De Graaf's findings rely on the assumption that religious belief and practice are different expressions of the same underlying phenomenon (religiosity) and vary in the same way across time and space. These measures are not equivalent, however. In relatively religious societies, belief in God is widespread even among those who do not attend services, whereas in societies where religious involvement is low, nonchurchgoers tend to be nonbelievers.
- 3 December 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
- Vol. 60 (1) , 189-197
National Context, Parental Socialization, and the Varying Relationship Between Religious Belief and Practice
Parents are crucial agents of religious socialization, but the broader social environment is also influential. A key question is whether parents are more or less influential when their religious beliefs and practices are not shared by people around them. Current thinking on the issue has largely been shaped by Kelley and De Graaf, who argued that parental religious socialization matters most in secular countries. We maintain that that conclusion is mistaken: levels of parental and national religiosity are both important, but their effects are largely independent of each other. Kelley and De Graaf's findings rely on the assumption that religious belief and practice are different expressions of the same underlying phenomenon (religiosity) and vary in the same way across time and space. These measures are not equivalent, however. In relatively religious societies, belief in God is widespread even among those who do not attend services, whereas in societies where religious involvement is low, nonchurchgoers tend to be nonbelievers.
- 23 August 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 10 (4) , 428-443
Personal experience or cultural tradition: the difference between Christian identity in the Netherlands and Denmark
Denmark and the Netherlands are both countries with a Christian heritage, where only a minority of the population are actively religious. Behind the similarities, there are also striking differences. While Danish Christians tend to be largely nominal members, Dutch Christians are more likely to believe in God, pray and attend church regularly. Previous research has highlighted insecurity as a source of national differences in religiosity. In this comparative study, we explore whether insecurity and threat to personal control partially contribute to one or both forms of religiosity, using data from a survey experiment and secondary international survey data. Our main findings are that Danish Christians identify more with Christianity as a cultural tradition, whereas the Dutch Christians identify more with Christianity as personal experience. Christians in both countries were more likely to identify as Christians based on their personal beliefs after a control threat manipulation. This finding suggests that belief in a higher power, rather than group tradition, is the aspect of religious identity that is triggered by insecurity and lack of control.
- 23 August 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 10 (4) , 428-443
Personal experience or cultural tradition: the difference between Christian identity in the Netherlands and Denmark
Denmark and the Netherlands are both countries with a Christian heritage, where only a minority of the population are actively religious. Behind the similarities, there are also striking differences. While Danish Christians tend to be largely nominal members, Dutch Christians are more likely to believe in God, pray and attend church regularly. Previous research has highlighted insecurity as a source of national differences in religiosity. In this comparative study, we explore whether insecurity and threat to personal control partially contribute to one or both forms of religiosity, using data from a survey experiment and secondary international survey data. Our main findings are that Danish Christians identify more with Christianity as a cultural tradition, whereas the Dutch Christians identify more with Christianity as personal experience. Christians in both countries were more likely to identify as Christians based on their personal beliefs after a control threat manipulation. This finding suggests that belief in a higher power, rather than group tradition, is the aspect of religious identity that is triggered by insecurity and lack of control.
- 14 November 2017
- Published by MIT Press in European Societies
- Vol. 20 (4) , 595-620
When does religiosity matter for attitudes to immigration? The impact of economic insecurity and religious norms in Europe
Religious identity and practice has been associated with attitudes to immigration in Europe, but it is not known how this relationship varies between different cultural and economic contexts. Analysing data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2014 we examine the association cross-nationally and over time, in what was a financially unstable period for many European countries and households. We have two main findings. Firstly, it is not religion per se, but rather conformity to national rates of religiosity which is associated with concern about the economic and cultural consequences of immigration. Secondly, the association between religion and anti-immigration is strengthened in contexts of economic uncertainty. These findings suggest that while religion does not predict immigration attitudes uniformly across countries, when religion reflects cultural conformity, it could become an expression national or ethnic group identity in times of economic insecurity.
- 14 November 2017
- Published by MIT Press in European Societies
- Vol. 20 (4) , 595-620
When does religiosity matter for attitudes to immigration? The impact of economic insecurity and religious norms in Europe
Religious identity and practice has been associated with attitudes to immigration in Europe, but it is not known how this relationship varies between different cultural and economic contexts. Analysing data from seven waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2014 we examine the association cross-nationally and over time, in what was a financially unstable period for many European countries and households. We have two main findings. Firstly, it is not religion per se, but rather conformity to national rates of religiosity which is associated with concern about the economic and cultural consequences of immigration. Secondly, the association between religion and anti-immigration is strengthened in contexts of economic uncertainty. These findings suggest that while religion does not predict immigration attitudes uniformly across countries, when religion reflects cultural conformity, it could become an expression national or ethnic group identity in times of economic insecurity.
- 6 October 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 10 (3) , 328-349
Does Security Increase Secularity? Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey on the Relationship between Income and Religious Service Attendance
Material security has been associated with lower religious attendance both between and within countries and has been proposed as one of the mechanisms causing long term religious decline in economically developed countries. Using a British panel study, this article examines (a) whether change to household incomes can incite individual religious change and (b) whether religion can buffer against the stress of economic loss. The main trend in Britain is that of religious stability or decline, and income change does nothing to reverse this trend. Increases in household income are associated with religious disengagement, but income reduction has no effect on religious attendance. However, religious activity may still act as a ‘buffer’ by improving and maintaining life satisfaction in the face of economic loss.
- 6 October 2017
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Religion in Europe
- Vol. 10 (3) , 328-349
Does Security Increase Secularity? Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey on the Relationship between Income and Religious Service Attendance
Material security has been associated with lower religious attendance both between and within countries and has been proposed as one of the mechanisms causing long term religious decline in economically developed countries. Using a British panel study, this article examines (a) whether change to household incomes can incite individual religious change and (b) whether religion can buffer against the stress of economic loss. The main trend in Britain is that of religious stability or decline, and income change does nothing to reverse this trend. Increases in household income are associated with religious disengagement, but income reduction has no effect on religious attendance. However, religious activity may still act as a ‘buffer’ by improving and maintaining life satisfaction in the face of economic loss.
- 29 April 2017
- Published by Wiley in The British Journal of Sociology
- Vol. 68 (3) , 410-434
Is ethnic prejudice declining inBritain?Change in social distance attitudes among ethnic majority and minorityBritons
Most literature on racial prejudice deals with the racial attitudes of the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately. This paper breaks this tradition. We examine the social distance attitudes of white and non‐white British residents to test if these attitudes follow the same trends over time, whether they are driven by the same social processes and whether they are inter‐related. We have three main findings. Firstly, social distance from other ethnic groups has declined over time for both white and ethnic minority Britons. For the white majority there are both period and cohort elements to this decline. Secondly, we see some evidence that social distance between the majority and minority groups is reciprocal. Specifically, minorities who experience rejection by the white British feel a greater sense of distance from them. Thirdly, we find that all groups share the perception of the same ethnic hierarchy. We see evidence of particularly widespread hostility towards Muslim Britons from all ethnic groups suggesting that Muslims are singled out for negative attention from many British residents of all other backgrounds, including a large number who do not express hostility to other groups.
- 29 April 2017
- Published by Wiley in The British Journal of Sociology
- Vol. 68 (3) , 410-434
Is ethnic prejudice declining inBritain?Change in social distance attitudes among ethnic majority and minorityBritons
Most literature on racial prejudice deals with the racial attitudes of the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities separately. This paper breaks this tradition. We examine the social distance attitudes of white and non‐white British residents to test if these attitudes follow the same trends over time, whether they are driven by the same social processes and whether they are inter‐related. We have three main findings. Firstly, social distance from other ethnic groups has declined over time for both white and ethnic minority Britons. For the white majority there are both period and cohort elements to this decline. Secondly, we see some evidence that social distance between the majority and minority groups is reciprocal. Specifically, minorities who experience rejection by the white British feel a greater sense of distance from them. Thirdly, we find that all groups share the perception of the same ethnic hierarchy. We see evidence of particularly widespread hostility towards Muslim Britons from all ethnic groups suggesting that Muslims are singled out for negative attention from many British residents of all other backgrounds, including a large number who do not express hostility to other groups.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 23 March 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Sociology of Religion
- Vol. 78 (2) , 146-172
Does Economic Insecurity Predict Religiosity? Evidence from the European Social Survey 2002–2014
Economic development and increases in material security have been suggested as primary causes of secularization in the West. However, the relationship between economic insecurity and religion is both under-theorized and under-explored. The recent economic recession, and the financial insecurity faced by many households in Europe, both increase the relevance of such questions, and the availability of data to address them. The European Social Survey (ESS) has data on religiosity from 31 countries over seven waves, covering the period from 2002 to 2014. Using a multilevel model, we find that lower income, GDP, and social welfare availability are associated with more religiosity, and increases in social security through government welfare expenditure reduces country levels of religiosity over the 12 year period. Further we find that religious people are more likely to feel economically secure regardless of their income levels, which lends support to the hypothesized mechanism of religious stress buffering.
- 23 March 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Sociology of Religion
- Vol. 78 (2) , 146-172
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDoes Economic Insecurity Predict Religiosity? Evidence from the European Social Survey 2002–2014
Economic development and increases in material security have been suggested as primary causes of secularization in the West. However, the relationship between economic insecurity and religion is both under-theorized and under-explored. The recent economic recession, and the financial insecurity faced by many households in Europe, both increase the relevance of such questions, and the availability of data to address them. The European Social Survey (ESS) has data on religiosity from 31 countries over seven waves, covering the period from 2002 to 2014. Using a multilevel model, we find that lower income, GDP, and social welfare availability are associated with more religiosity, and increases in social security through government welfare expenditure reduces country levels of religiosity over the 12 year period. Further we find that religious people are more likely to feel economically secure regardless of their income levels, which lends support to the hypothesized mechanism of religious stress buffering.
- 9 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and Religion
- Vol. 9 (1) , 111-138
Morality in Context: A Multilevel Analysis of the Relationship between Religion and Values in Europe
The exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study 1981–2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.
- 9 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Politics and Religion
- Vol. 9 (1) , 111-138
Morality in Context: A Multilevel Analysis of the Relationship between Religion and Values in Europe
The exact relationship between religiosity and moral values is understudied, and it is unclear what the process of secularization means for the morality of Europeans. Previous research shows that religion is associated with low levels of political and economic development. A potential explanation is that religion provides an alternative moral authority to the authority of the state. Using data from four waves of the European Values Study 1981–2008, I analyze attitudes to personal autonomy (vs tradition) and self-interest (vs social norms) in a multilevel model of 48 European countries. The results show that religious decline has been accompanied by an increase in autonomy values, but not self-interest, that the relationship between religion and morality is stronger in more religious countries, and that it has declined since the 1980s. We also show that religiosity is more negatively associated with self-interest among people with low confidence in state authorities.
- 29 April 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary Religion
- Vol. 30 (2) , 213-229
Religion, Inclusive Individualism, and Volunteering in Europe
- 29 April 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary Religion
- Vol. 30 (2) , 213-229
Religion, Inclusive Individualism, and Volunteering in Europe
- Open Access
- 28 October 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Sociological Review
- Vol. 31 (1) , 14-29
Civic Engagement in Britain: The Role of Religion and Inclusive Values
The relationship between religion and volunteering is well documented (Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006), and a prevalent hypothesis for the association is that the effect of religion is mediated through religious social networks. However, research on this relationship has largely been conducted on majority Christian populations in the United States and Europe. In this study, we use two data sets, the European Values Study (1999–2008) and the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (2010) to examine this relationship in Britain on the general population and ethnic minority population, respectively. The results suggest that religion increases volunteering primarily through bonding rather than bridging social networks. We also find that in non-Christian religions, solitary and collective religious rituals may both have an effect on civic participation, but whereas the effect of service attendance is mediated through bonding social networks, the effect of prayer is mediated more through bridging networks. Finally, values of individual autonomy and generalized trust are associated with non-religious, but not religious, participation, suggesting an alternative secular ethos of civic engagement.
- 28 October 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Sociological Review
- Vol. 31 (1) , 14-29
Open AccessCivic Engagement in Britain: The Role of Religion and Inclusive Values
The relationship between religion and volunteering is well documented (Putnam and Campbell, 2010; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006), and a prevalent hypothesis for the association is that the effect of religion is mediated through religious social networks. However, research on this relationship has largely been conducted on majority Christian populations in the United States and Europe. In this study, we use two data sets, the European Values Study (1999–2008) and the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (2010) to examine this relationship in Britain on the general population and ethnic minority population, respectively. The results suggest that religion increases volunteering primarily through bonding rather than bridging social networks. We also find that in non-Christian religions, solitary and collective religious rituals may both have an effect on civic participation, but whereas the effect of service attendance is mediated through bonding social networks, the effect of prayer is mediated more through bridging networks. Finally, values of individual autonomy and generalized trust are associated with non-religious, but not religious, participation, suggesting an alternative secular ethos of civic engagement.