David Voas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Interests
David Voas has a total of 67 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alasdair Crockett
Alasdair Crockett was Chief Research Officer at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, United Kingdom. He died in September 2006 following a long illness
4 shared publicationsPaul Williamson
4 shared publicationsSteve Bruce
University of Aberdeen
4 shared publications- Ingrid Storm
University of Manchester
3 shared publications - Wesley J. Wildman
Boston University
3 shared publications - Fount LeRon Shults
University of Agder
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Church and State
- Vol. 67 (3)
Goodbye Religion: The Causes and Consequences of Secularization. By Ryan T. Cragun and Jesse M. Smith
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Church and State
- Vol. 67 (3)
Goodbye Religion: The Causes and Consequences of Secularization. By Ryan T. Cragun and Jesse M. Smith
- Open Access
- 5 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Forces
- Vol. 104 (1) , 366-385
Invisible secularity: American theism beyond belief
It is often asserted that religion is changing rather than declining and that the usual indicators give a misleading impression of growing secularity. The evidence presented here suggests that on the contrary, social measures like affiliation and attendance may understate the weakening of personal religiosity. The apparent persistence of belief in God conceals erosion in its substance, strength, salience, and stability. The levels of religiosity and spirituality among the religiously unaffiliated are declining, notwithstanding the rapid expansion in their numbers. Moreover, belief has not just diminished among Americans who no longer belong to religious organizations: it is fading from one generation to the next among people who continue to belong. Americans are becoming less confident in the existence of God, less persuaded that God is active and judgmental, less inclined to see God as important, and less likely to express consistent conviction. Contrary to claims that apparent secularization masks enduring (if unorthodox) invisible religion, implicit religion, diffused religion, lived religion, and so on, the evidence shows that continuing religious involvement disguises waning religiosity. The research is based on six waves of the Baylor Religion Survey (2005–2021) in conjunction with the General Social Survey (1972–2022).
- 5 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Forces
- Vol. 104 (1) , 366-385
Open AccessInvisible secularity: American theism beyond belief
It is often asserted that religion is changing rather than declining and that the usual indicators give a misleading impression of growing secularity. The evidence presented here suggests that on the contrary, social measures like affiliation and attendance may understate the weakening of personal religiosity. The apparent persistence of belief in God conceals erosion in its substance, strength, salience, and stability. The levels of religiosity and spirituality among the religiously unaffiliated are declining, notwithstanding the rapid expansion in their numbers. Moreover, belief has not just diminished among Americans who no longer belong to religious organizations: it is fading from one generation to the next among people who continue to belong. Americans are becoming less confident in the existence of God, less persuaded that God is active and judgmental, less inclined to see God as important, and less likely to express consistent conviction. Contrary to claims that apparent secularization masks enduring (if unorthodox) invisible religion, implicit religion, diffused religion, lived religion, and so on, the evidence shows that continuing religious involvement disguises waning religiosity. The research is based on six waves of the Baylor Religion Survey (2005–2021) in conjunction with the General Social Survey (1972–2022).
- Open Access
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Teaching Statistics
- Vol. 47 (2) , 91-102
The odds are it's wrong: Correcting a common mistake in statistics
Binary logistic regression is one of the most widely used statistical tools. The method uses odds, log odds, and odds ratios, which are difficult to understand and interpret. Understanding of logistic regression tends to fall down in one of three ways: (1) Many students and researchers come to believe that an odds ratio translates directly into relative probabilities. (2) Alternatively, they learn that coefficients tell us whether the variables make the outcome more or less likely, without knowing how to interpret changes in the odds. (3) They may be instructed in how to calculate predicted probabilities, but the additional steps are too complicated for them to follow. Our key aim is to highlight and correct the common mistake of confusing differences in odds with relative risks. Simply reporting the odds ratio is unhelpful, however, so we describe an easy method of estimating probabilities for both binary and continuous variables.
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Teaching Statistics
- Vol. 47 (2) , 91-102
Open AccessThe odds are it's wrong: Correcting a common mistake in statistics
Binary logistic regression is one of the most widely used statistical tools. The method uses odds, log odds, and odds ratios, which are difficult to understand and interpret. Understanding of logistic regression tends to fall down in one of three ways: (1) Many students and researchers come to believe that an odds ratio translates directly into relative probabilities. (2) Alternatively, they learn that coefficients tell us whether the variables make the outcome more or less likely, without knowing how to interpret changes in the odds. (3) They may be instructed in how to calculate predicted probabilities, but the additional steps are too complicated for them to follow. Our key aim is to highlight and correct the common mistake of confusing differences in odds with relative risks. Simply reporting the odds ratio is unhelpful, however, so we describe an easy method of estimating probabilities for both binary and continuous variables.
- Open Access
- 9 June 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Sociology of Religion
- Vol. 86 (3) , 303-330
Religious Polarization in Europe
We define two types of religious polarization and investigate the extent to which they are present across European countries, based on data from the 2008 to 2017 European Values Study and hierarchical linear modeling. The first type is polarization by religiosity, with declines in the middle ground between the actively religious and the nonreligious as secularization reaches an advanced stage. The second type is issue polarization, with the religious and secular taking different positions on a range of socio-political values, including social conservatism and ethnic nationalism. We find limited evidence of bimodality in the distribution of religiosity. We find more evidence, however, of issue polarization between the religious and secular in Europe, especially in social conservatism. Religious polarization should thus be understood as a multidimensional concept where one dimension may be more prevalent than others in society.
- 9 June 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Sociology of Religion
- Vol. 86 (3) , 303-330
Open AccessReligious Polarization in Europe
We define two types of religious polarization and investigate the extent to which they are present across European countries, based on data from the 2008 to 2017 European Values Study and hierarchical linear modeling. The first type is polarization by religiosity, with declines in the middle ground between the actively religious and the nonreligious as secularization reaches an advanced stage. The second type is issue polarization, with the religious and secular taking different positions on a range of socio-political values, including social conservatism and ethnic nationalism. We find limited evidence of bimodality in the distribution of religiosity. We find more evidence, however, of issue polarization between the religious and secular in Europe, especially in social conservatism. Religious polarization should thus be understood as a multidimensional concept where one dimension may be more prevalent than others in society.
- Open Access
- 6 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
- Vol. 63 (4) , 809-829
Can We Explain the Generation Gap in Churchgoing?
In western societies, secularization in the sense of declining individual religiosity is mainly caused by cohort replacement. Every cohort is somewhat less religious than its predecessor, indicating that religious transmission is incomplete. The puzzle is just what causes this incomplete transmission and whether there is one or a restricted number of factors that mainly explain the process. Our aim in this article is to establish, describe, and explain this lack of religious transmission in West Germany, comparing parents’ and children's level of church attendance and their determinants over time. We use a data set of more than 8,000 parent‐child pairs across four cohorts from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and test whether indicators measuring parent attributes, family relations, or parental context influence the attendance gap. As expected, we find a substantial parent‐child attendance gap. However, we do not find factors that mainly explain the process. Only family disruption and the percentage of nones in the state slightly increase the attendance gap, but effect sizes are small. Our surprising result is that secularization happens largely independently of attributes of the parents and their immediate surroundings. We discuss how this finding may give credibility to new theories of secular transition and present an agenda for future research on religious transmission.
- 6 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
- Vol. 63 (4) , 809-829
Open AccessCan We Explain the Generation Gap in Churchgoing?
In western societies, secularization in the sense of declining individual religiosity is mainly caused by cohort replacement. Every cohort is somewhat less religious than its predecessor, indicating that religious transmission is incomplete. The puzzle is just what causes this incomplete transmission and whether there is one or a restricted number of factors that mainly explain the process. Our aim in this article is to establish, describe, and explain this lack of religious transmission in West Germany, comparing parents’ and children's level of church attendance and their determinants over time. We use a data set of more than 8,000 parent‐child pairs across four cohorts from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and test whether indicators measuring parent attributes, family relations, or parental context influence the attendance gap. As expected, we find a substantial parent‐child attendance gap. However, we do not find factors that mainly explain the process. Only family disruption and the percentage of nones in the state slightly increase the attendance gap, but effect sizes are small. Our surprising result is that secularization happens largely independently of attributes of the parents and their immediate surroundings. We discuss how this finding may give credibility to new theories of secular transition and present an agenda for future research on religious transmission.
- Open Access
- 5 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- p. 1-41
Dataset of Integrated Measures of Religion (DIM-R). Harmonization of religiosity data from selected international multiwave surveys
- 5 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- p. 1-41
Open AccessDataset of Integrated Measures of Religion (DIM-R). Harmonization of religiosity data from selected international multiwave surveys
- 28 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 15 (2) , 216-221
Sex, value change and the erosion of religious adherence
- 28 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Religion, Brain & Behavior
- Vol. 15 (2) , 216-221
Sex, value change and the erosion of religious adherence
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
Explaining Religious Revival in the Context of Long-Term Secularization
Secularization theory has often been criticized for not being able to explain counterexamples. However, secularization theorists argue that transitory religious resurgences are expected to occur even in modernizing conditions. The aim of this article is to identify mechanisms that can explain the temporary upswing of religion against the backdrop of long-term modernization. We classify the mechanisms under five broad headings: crisis, reaction, transition, state intervention, and composition. Historical examples are provided to illustrate these mechanisms. The mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can be understood within the framework of rational action.
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessExplaining Religious Revival in the Context of Long-Term Secularization
Secularization theory has often been criticized for not being able to explain counterexamples. However, secularization theorists argue that transitory religious resurgences are expected to occur even in modernizing conditions. The aim of this article is to identify mechanisms that can explain the temporary upswing of religion against the backdrop of long-term modernization. We classify the mechanisms under five broad headings: crisis, reaction, transition, state intervention, and composition. Historical examples are provided to illustrate these mechanisms. The mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and can be understood within the framework of rational action.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
Secularization Vindicated
In the 1960s, it was taken for granted that modernization eroded religion. In the 1980s, this consensus was challenged by the rational choice, supply-side, or market model proposed by Rodney Stark and associates. In particular, they argued that the UK was hardly less religious then than it had been in 1880. Clive Field’s compendium of statistical data allows us to test Stark’s approach to the religiosity of the UK. We follow this with data on Europe and the USA. While we may still argue over some of the precise levers, there is now so much evidence in favor of the secularization approach that we regard it as vindicated.
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSecularization Vindicated
In the 1960s, it was taken for granted that modernization eroded religion. In the 1980s, this consensus was challenged by the rational choice, supply-side, or market model proposed by Rodney Stark and associates. In particular, they argued that the UK was hardly less religious then than it had been in 1880. Clive Field’s compendium of statistical data allows us to test Stark’s approach to the religiosity of the UK. We follow this with data on Europe and the USA. While we may still argue over some of the precise levers, there is now so much evidence in favor of the secularization approach that we regard it as vindicated.